People's Democracy(Weekly Organ of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) |
Vol. XXXVII
No. 48 December 01, 2013 |
The WTO and Agricultural
Subsidy Prabhat
Patnaik THE UNEQUAL TREATMENT The reason for
this unequal treatment of
countries by the WTO lies in an utterly absurd distinction
that it makes
between “market-distorting subsidies” and
non-market-distorting subsidies, the
bulk of which fall under what are called “green box
subsidies”; and the WTO
stipulates that market-distorting subsidies must not
exceed 10 percent of the
value of output in the agricultural sector. In the United
States, even though
total subsidies amount to almost half of the GDP from
agriculture, “green box
subsidies” constitute nearly 40 percent of this GDP, so
that the
“market-distorting subsidies” lie within the WTO limit,
but in India almost the
entire subsidy is counted as “market-distorting”, so that
notwithstanding the
much lower level of agriculture subsidy, India is now
likely to fall foul of the
WTO. The This distinction
which has been foisted upon the
WTO by the advanced capitalist countries to serve their
own interests, and
imposed through it upon the entire world, is invidious for
several reasons.
First, it lacks any theoretical basis whatsoever. The
concept of a “free market
price” is a mythical entity. There are so many things that
go into the price
formation of any commodity, that to single out only a few
of them as
constituting “distortions” and the rest as
“non-distorting” is totally
arbitrary. Is advertising for instance a “market
distortion”? Is speculation
“market distorting”? Is producers’ capacity to hold on to
stocks
“market-distorting”? Every one of these factors affects
the “free market price”
but none of them is considered “market distorting” under
the WTO guidelines.
Since cash transfers certainly affect the producers’
capacity to hold on to
stocks and hence the price that would prevail in the
absence of such transfers,
it is no less “market distorting” than government purchase
of stocks at fixed
procurement prices which happens in India and which is
considered “market
distorting” by the WTO. This entire distinction in short
lacks any credible
theoretical foundation and is introduced by the advanced
countries into the WTO
rules only to serve their own interests. Secondly, even if
we accept for a moment the
theoretical validity of the distinction between “market
distorting” and
non-“market-distorting” subsidies, there is no reason why
the latter should be
frowned upon in a sector like agriculture. It is a
well-known fact, recognised
by every economist, that agricultural prices fluctuate
enormously. This happens
for at least three reasons: one, unlike manufacturing
where the output flow can
be regulated continuously, agricultural output in any
period is not only given
but also subject to wide fluctuations. It is determined by
the acreage devoted
to particular crops, which is a result of past decisions;
by the production
technology; and by natural factors like weather, which are
the source of
fluctuations. Even though inventory changes can in
principle offset the effect
of output fluctuations on supplies, such offsetting is
usually only partial, so
that supply-side fluctuations are a fact of life. Two, the
demand for
agricultural goods is typically price-inelastic, which
means that even small
shortfalls in supply or small excesses in supply can cause
huge swings in prices.
And three, precisely for this reason, speculation plays a
big role in the
formation of agricultural prices; and, far from being
price-stabilizing, as
neo-liberal theorising claims, it tends to increase the
amplitude of price
fluctuations. An obvious
consequence of it is that, in the
absence of countervailing measures by the government,
there is acute distress
for producers in years of excess supply and acute distress
for consumers in
years of excess demand. Expecting speculators operating in
the “free market” to
even out such fluctuations is an absurdity, which only
someone who has had no
experience of famines and has not heard of the Thirdly, to
believe that the deleterious
consequences of the functioning of “free markets” can be
overcome through cash
transfers in societies like ours is also an absurdity. In
the United States,
where cash transfers approved by the WTO are the basic
means of subsidising
agriculture, only 1.1 percent of total employment is in agriculture (the
figure is for 2012), which
means that only about 4 lakh households are dependent upon
agriculture to earn
their livelihood. At the most therefore, cash transfers
have to be given to 4
lakh households. Besides, since the bulk of the transfers
to agriculture in
that country are to big farms and agri-business, effecting
such transfers poses
no difficulties. In The real question
that arises here is the
following: governments in advanced countries are not
expected to shed tears
over the fate of the Indian peasants or the Indian
consumers; on the contrary,
they are interested in protecting and promoting the
interests of their own
agri-business, and if Indian peasants get decimated,
giving way to corporate
farming, then so much the better from their point of view.
But why did the
Indian government accept such an unequal treaty which has
such damaging
implications for the people of this country? This acceptance,
let us also not forget, was
behind the back of the Indian parliament. Unlike in the US
where all treaties
signed by the executive have to be approved by the two
elected houses before
they take effect, in India the executive has from the
beginning arrogated to
itself the power to enter into international treaties at
its own will and then
present these as fait
accompli to the
legislature. The Constitution which is often invoked to
justify this is
actually quite ambiguous on the issue, with many eminent
jurists (like Justice
PB Sawant) holding the view that the Indian Constitution
too can be interpreted
in a manner that makes legislative sanction for
international agreements
obligatory. But by-passing the legislature has been the
means whereby the
government pursuing neo-liberal policies in the interests
of the
corporate-financial elite has sacrificed the interests of
the people in the
process of striking deals with metropolitan capital. PREVENT THE SELL-OUT
Matters however
have now come to a head. The
food security legislation passed by the parliament, even
though it does not
have universal coverage but provides security, and a
modest one at that, to
only 67 percent of the population, will mean procurement
of food-grains on a
scale and at prices that would almost certainly mean
exceeding the 10 percent
limit on the so-called “market distorting” subsidies. For
the forthcoming Bali
meeting of the WTO, India, leading a group of 46
developing countries (the
so-called G-33), has been pressing that the 10 percent cap
should be made
inoperative for countries trying to achieve food security
for their populations.
But this is not acceptable to the advanced countries like
the A compromise
worked out by the WTO officialdom
is to postpone the discussion on this issue for up to four
years and to ensure
that during this period no country should complain against
another for
providing food security in violation of this 10 percent
cap (the so-called
“peace clause”). Since the advanced countries are not
likely to become more
benevolent during these four years, what this compromise
means is simply this:
“we shall allow you to have your food security arrangement
for four years in
violation of this cap, but you must wind up this
arrangement after four years”.
And the government of Parliament must
intervene to prevent such a
sell-out. It must intervene to ensure that the Indian
government does not
accept the compromise of the “peace clause”. It must
intervene to ensure that
if the WTO insists on the 10 percent cap in violation of