People's Democracy(Weekly Organ of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) |
Vol. XXXVII
No. 24 June 16, 2013 |
The
Politics of a Development
Strategy
Prabhat
Patnaik
THE
projection of Narendra Modi as the next prime minister of
ESSENCE
OF MODI’S
“DEVELOPMENT
MODEL”
The
essence of this strategy is the use of the state exclusively
in the interests
of the corporate-financial elite. (This is why the term
“neo-liberal,”
indicating a blanket disengagement of the state from the
economic terrain, is a
misnomer.) The development, the maturing, the perfection, of
this strategy consists
in the direct appropriation of the state by the
corporate-financial elite. And
Narendra Modi is the agent of this appropriation. He comes
from the BJP stable,
and has a consistent record of communal-fascism; but he is
above all a tool of
the corporate-financial elite, backed to the hilt by this
elite and the media
controlled by it.
The
so-called “development model” of Modi is nothing else but
handing over the
state over which he presides to the corporate-financial
elite. He is the man
who, according to a report in The Hindu, had subsidised
the Tatas to the tune of
Rs 31,000 crore to induce them to establish their Nano plant
in
This
economic model, however, is not Modi’s own concoction. It is
the neo-liberal
model that now has the allegiance of all bourgeois parties.
Modi’s only
distinction is that he pursues this model with a
remorselessness that is
unparalleled. All other political leaders are hemmed in by
their parties with
all sorts of ideological inheritances, and with a myriad
“equations” to be
taken care of. Manmohan Singh and his group, for instance,
have to operate
through the Congress party which is constrained, no matter
how tenuously, by
its own slogan about caring for the “aam aadmi.” But Modi
has no such
constraints. He has risen above his party, reduced his party
into a rubberstamp,
and can pursue the agenda of the corporate-financial elite
single-mindedly.
FAILURE
USED AS ARGUMENT
FOR
MORE NEO-LIBERALISM
A
hallmark of this development model ironically is that its
very failure is used
as an argument to intensify its application. If the rupee is
tumbling, if the
manufacturing sector is in a recession the like of which the
country has never
seen (the mid-sixties industrial recession, the only one
with which it has a
superficial resemblance, had been caused after all by an
exceptional circumstance,
namely the extraordinarily poor agricultural harvests over
two successive
years), if the current account deficit is worsening by the
day, then a chorus is
orchestrated: “we need more reforms,” i.e. a heavier dose of
neo-liberalism.
Was
it not Manmohan Singh himself who said that the country’s
current economic
travails were because the “animal spirits” of the
entrepreneurs were flagging,
and that these had to be revived through state policy? In
other words, if
neo-liberalism had brought us to a crisis, then the way out
of it was more
neo-liberalism imposed through the agency of the state.
While
using Keynes’ phrase “animal spirits,” he did not follow
Keynes into suggesting
that since the “animal spirits” of the entrepreneurs did
often flag, the fate
of the people should be made independent
of these “animal spirits” by pursuing full employment
policies directly,
i.e. through state intervention in the
interests of the people. Rather, his argument was that
if “animal spirits”
were flagging, then the state has to revive them through
policies pursued in
the interests of the corporate-financial elite itself.
Ergo,
Vodafone should be allowed to get away with tax arrears,
multi-brand retail
should be opened up for Walmart, the public sector should be
privatised to an
even greater extent, the financial sector should be further
opened up to
foreign players, development banking should be put an end
to, and so on.
Because
neo-liberalism sees further intensive adoption of
neo-liberalism as the
solution to the crises it generates, the demand for
corporate control over the state
increases in shrillness precisely when the economy is
engulfed in crisis, which
is the case now.
DIFFERENCE
WITH
CLASSICAL
FASCISM
This
is where we find a difference between classical fascism of
the 1930s and now.
At that time, the corporate control over the state came
through the backdoor as
it were, through the rise to power of forces that initially
proclaimed
animosity to big corporate capital, even though funded by
such capital, and
cashed in on the anti-capitalist mood of the people by
adopting a right-radical
posture. It is only after coming to power that such forces
purged their own right-radical
followers and expressed openly their close links with the
monopoly groups.
But
that was a period of inter-imperialist rivalry when the
world had been divided
into spheres of influence of rival capitalist powers, not a
period of “globalisation”
with unfettered cross-border movements of commodities and
capital. In a world
of globalisation, such a two-stage process, of an initial
radical anti-monopoly
rhetoric followed later by an open direct alliance between
fascist “upstarts”
and the monopoly houses, is scarcely feasible. Any anti-monopoly or anti-finance rhetoric on
the part of an
ascending political force will be followed by such large
capital outflows that
the ascent of this force will be effectively sabotaged.
Hence the prospect
presented to the people reeling under the impact of a crisis
is not that it
would be overcome through an attack on
the monopolists, but that it would be overcome through
placating the monopolists, i.e. not through a
debunking of the
“development model” but through an intensification, a
carrying forward, of the
“development model.”
This
is what Modi promises. Of course his communal-fascism, even
if not fore-grounded
at present, gives him his “mass appeal.” But this “mass
appeal” is combined not
with an anti-capitalist rhetoric for accession to power; on
the contrary it is
combined with a no-holds-barred propagation of the same
development strategy
that the corporate-financial elite wants. European fascists
in the 1930s became tools
of finance capital; Modi is a tool of
finance capital ab
ovo.
This
is also the reason why all his opponents among the bourgeois
parties appear so
feeble in their criticism of Modi; because in basic matters
of economic policy
he stands precisely for what they stand for, only even more
emphatically. Among
most bourgeois parties there is even a sneaking admiration
for his “development
model,” since this is the very “model” they uphold and would
like to follow to
the hilt if they could. It is not surprising that
self-professed political Liberals
like economist Jagdish Bhagwati of
UNSUSTAINABLE
DISTINCTION
All
that Modi’s political opponents among the bourgeois
formations can do is to
draw a distinction between Modi the communal-fascist and
Modi the “successful
developer.” Yes, he may have been successful in his
development effort, they
aver; but isn’t he a communal-fascist? He should be kept out
because of his
latter trait, no matter how laudable his former trait may
be.
But
such a distinction fails to carry conviction, since Modi,
after the Gujarat
carnage, has succeeded in manufacturing for himself an
image-change, projecting
for himself precisely the image that his opponents admire,
of a “development
messiah” and pushing to the background his communal-fascism,
to the point where
the Gujarat government even briefly considered, until
admonished by the RSS,
appealing for award of death sentence for Maya Kodnani and
Babu Bajrangi.
Besides,
this distinction between Modi the “developer” and Modi the
communal-fascist is
intrinsically unsustainable. The concept of “development”
that Modi upholds,
and shares with all other bourgeois formations, apotheosizes
the growth-rate,
which in turn is seen, notwithstanding occasional
invocations of the
“high-growth-yields-larger-government-revenue-which-can-then-be-spent-on-the-poor”
argument,
essentially as helping India’s emergence as an “economic
superpower.”
The neo-liberal model in short is itself sought to be
justified on grounds of
big-power chauvinism: grounds, which, not to beat about the
bush, are themselves
fascistic. In a world where all bourgeois formations are
contributing to this
fascistic discourse, is it any surprise if their resistance
to the emergence of
a real communal-fascist appears feeble in the extreme?
In
short, one cannot oppose Modi if one subscribes to the
development model
championed by him. One cannot oppose Modi by drawing a
Manichean distinction
between Modi the “communal-fascist” and Modi the
“development messiah,” and
thereby upholding the neo-liberal development strategy that
he pushes through
ruthlessly, because this development discourse itself has
fascist
underpinnings.
To
say this is not to suggest that Modi, and his corporate
backers, will succeed
in their project. They would not, because large segments of
the working people,
who have been victims of this development strategy, even
when it was apparently
“successful,” will revolt against it, and oppose this
project; his opponents in
short will get the better of him despite
themselves.
What
is striking in all this, however, is the intellectual
degeneration of Liberalism.
John Maynard Keynes was a Liberal. And long before him John
Stuart Mill was a
Liberal (though later in life under the influence of his
wife, Harriet Taylor, he
moved to a “cooperative socialist” position). John Stuart
Mill had visualised
the arrival of a “stationary state” (where the growth rate
would be zero), but
was not worried by it as long as the workers were better off
in such a
stationary state. A nation, he held, “should fix attention
upon improved
distribution, and a large remuneration for labour, as the
true desiderata.”
Liberalism,
in short, was traditionally concerned with the condition of
the workers; it
differed from socialists on how this condition could be
improved. What a
contrast from today’s Liberal position that apotheosises the
growth-rate on
fascistic grounds, and advocates a squeeze on the working
people for achieving
it?