People's Democracy(Weekly Organ of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) |
Vol. XXXVI
No. 47 November 25, 2012 |
The
2G Auction: Rigged to Flop? Prabir
Purkayastha THE recent auction of the 2G spectrum
has
drawn bids of only Rs 9,407 crore. Various
spokespersons of the Congress and union
ministers have been propagating that this somehow
justifies Raja’s illegal first-come-first-served
policy of giving away spectrum. The 122 licenses
awarded by Raja had netted Rs
9,014 crore. What is hidden in this is the simple
fact that even with this
“flop” auction, the amount realised in the auction
is for less than a
fifth of
the same spectrum. Further, the spectrum sold in the
current auction is only
for the circles that have a much lower value – three
of the circles whose
combined reserve price is more than 50 per cent of
the total reserve price did
not see bids. This high value spectrum still remains
with us. Just to give some facts that do not
seem to
have appeared in the media. Against 756.84 MHz of
spectrum that Raja gave away
in 2008, the amount on sale this time was only
366.25 MHz. Only 48.4 per cent
of the total amount given away in 2008 was put up
for auction by the
government. The Supreme Court has already made its
displeasure known on this
count, calling this a violation of its directions.
Even in this spectrum that
was on sale, only 128.75 MHz was actually sold,
representing 17 per cent of the
amount given away by Raja. If we look at what price
Raja gave the same spectrum
in 2008, the figures are even more revealing. In Raja’s
first-come-first-served policy, for
the same spectrum we had got only a measly Rs1,205
crore in 2008 as against Rs
9,407 crore this time. Even a “flop” auction has yielded roughly eight times the
revenue when we compare on a like
to like basis. REAL
QUESTION
The real question to be asked is why
did
the auction not draw higher bids? Was there
collusion between the industry and
the government to keep spectrum prices artificially
low? There is little doubt that whether
there
was either an explicit or a tacit understanding
between the industry and the government
that a failed auction would benefit both. For the
industry, low price of
spectrum obviously helps to keep their costs low.
For the UPA government, a low
price helps in running down the CAG – claiming as
the Congress ministers and
spokespersons are doing –that the CAG’s estimations
of loss for not only
telecom but also coal and KG Basin gas are similarly
flawed. Currently, the CAG
and the government have been on a collision course,
particularly on auditing of
Reliance and its KG Basin gas field operations.
Therefore a failed auction helps
in de-legitimising CAG, even if it leads to a big
hole in the government’s
finances. In the industry’s case, there are two
over-riding reasons why they were willing to
sacrifice the opportunity of
securing spectrum. The major players – Vodafone and
Airtel – got their licenses
in 1994-1995, and the license period of 20 years is
almost over. Further, they
are sitting on additional spectrum beyond the amount
bundled with the spectrum,
for which they will have to pay prices pegged to the
current auction price. A
sharp increase in price is therefore not in their
interest. Therefore, they had
a vested interest in seeing that the auction does
not succeed. This tacit understanding between the
government and the industry would have failed if the
telecom scenario was like
it was in 2008, when Raja gave away the 122
licenses. At that time, the
incumbent operators had about 300 million
subscribers and the telecom market
was really taking off. In the last four years, we
have added another 600
million subscribers – the market has expanded to
three times its size from 2008.
TRAI figures indicate that now the market is no
longer expanding – in 2012 for
the first time there has been some drop in mobile
subscribers. It is no longer
possible to think about building a new mobile
business in The only parties who would now be
interested in securing spectrum are the existing
operators, who already have
the necessary subscribers. For them, the cost of
adding new spectrum has to be
balanced against its impact on the additional
spectrum that they hold and the
prices they have to pay when their current licenses
expire. Therefore, at this
point of time, they were far more interested in the
spectrum prices remaining
low. The only parties that were interested in the
spectrum were parties like
Telenor (now Telewings), Videocon and Ideas, who had
secured spectrum in Raja’s
spectrum give away and needed it to continue their
business. Why did the high-end circles – Delhi,
Mumbai and Karnataka – three circles that
collectively was worth more than 50
per cent of the total reserve price of Rs 14,000
crore for an all-India license
not find any bidders? Here, Kapil Sibal, the minister for
Communications & IT is directly responsible. He
has been talking about
making roaming “free”, read having the same cost as
a local call. What does
this mean? It means that a mobile number in any part
of the country can be used
in any other part without incurring any higher
costs. This implies that a
license-holder no longer has to pay high license
fees for a high-value circle
such as Not surprisingly then, the high-value
circles found no takers. The parties that do not
have licenses for these
circles do not need it if Sibal’s free roaming is
allowed from next year. The
existing players in these circles do need extra
spectrum, but will wait till
the prices drop. In any case, it impacts only their
quality of service and not
their bottom lines. The subscribers will continue to
suffer with dropped calls
and poor coverage, but who cares for the subscribers
any way? GOVT’S
TWO-FOLD OBJECTIVE The issue of roaming is not well
understood
by the lay public and even those who cover the
telecom beat in the media. In
mobile telephony, every subscriber is presumed to
have a home circle, where he
uses the infrastructure of the company from whom he
is getting the service. It
is only when he goes outside his home circle that he
uses the network of other
companies – he is roaming or is guest on a network
that is not the network of
the company from whom he is getting his service. He
pays for these guest
services to his operator as roaming charges, who in
turn settles the costs of
such services with the other network operators whose
facilities were utilised. Raja destroyed this concept of “home”
network and “other” networks by introducing the
concept of intra-circle
roaming. This meant that even in an area that is
supposedly covered by the
subscribers’ home network, a subscriber could use
other networks. This was done
explicitly to help the new entrants such as Unitech
and Swan Telecom, who had
secured licenses from Raja and wanted to sell them
without spending any money
on building infrastructure. Raja introduced intra
circle roaming and forced
BSNL to allow other company’s subscribers to “roam”
on its network so that
company’s like Unitech and Swan could acquire
subscribers with just their
licenses. This is what helped them when they sold
the licenses – they not only
had licenses but also subscribers, making them more
valuable for selling either
their companies or shares in their companies. Unfortunately, Sibal is continuing with
Raja’s work on destroying the value of licenses with
devaluing the concept of a
home circle further. If Raja did away with the
concept of a home network for a
circle, Sibal now wants to do away with the concept
of a home circle itself. If
my subscriber can roam in the entire country with
free roaming, why would I as
a company need an all-India license and put up
infrastructure anywhere? Could the auction have been handled
better?
In other words, did the government purposely rig the
auction to fail, apart
from promoting the idea of a free-roaming?
Yes. It could have kept lower reserve prices
which would certainly have
seen a larger number of bids. It was clear from day
one that under the current
conditions of the telecom market, these reserve
prices were unrealistic and
therefore lower starting prices would have helped.
The government had a
two-fold objective here. It wanted lower prices also
but before lowering the
prices, wanted to show that CAG’s figures of
presumptive losses are wrong.
Hence the need for a high reserve price, the claim
of a flop and then lowering
of prices to help the industry – this is the
strategy that the government has
chosen. What should now be done that we now
know
the current market condition will not sustain such
prices? I would argue that
we should in fact not be hasty in reducing spectrum
prices but should hold on
to this spectrum. There are two reasons for this.
One is that though the voice
market for mobile telephony has saturated, the data
market has yet to pick up.
Almost the entire revenue of mobile companies now
comes from voice end of the
market. Only when the data market picks up – and in
Contrary to what the UPA ministers and
Congress spokespersons are saying, the “flop”
auction does not justify Raja’s
policies or that CAG’s calculations were wrong. All
it shows that the loss that
Raja inflicted on the exchequer is a permanent one
as the window of opportunity
that