People's Democracy(Weekly Organ of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) |
Vol. XXXVI
No. 25 June 24, 2012 |
The
Scenario in
Prabhat
Patnaik
WHEN
news first came that the New Democracy
Party, committed to imposing “austerity,” was marginally ahead
in the new
elections in
This
is not because financiers individually
lack the “quality of mercy;” it is because individuals’
qualities are
irrelevant before the “spontaneous” functioning of an
impersonal economic
system. In Shakespeare’s time when the world of finance was
peopled by
individuals like Shylock, Portia could plead for an exhibition
of the “quality
of mercy;” but times have changed. There is no scope for the
exercise of mercy
in the functioning of an impersonal market.
AUSTERITY:
SOLUTION
OR
CAUSE OF CRISIS!?
This
contradiction between the people and
finance permeates even the conception of the “crisis” itself.
During the Greek
election, for instance, a common refrain was that a vote for
SYRIZA would
precipitate a massive “crisis” for
As
a matter of fact, however, what should
concern a democratic polity is the crisis of the people, and
even though the
reified bourgeois view may overlook it, it will necessarily
thrust itself as an
ugly reality. This is why the idea that the victory for New
Democracy in the
Greek elections marks the resolution of the Greek crisis is
only an illusion
and nothing else.
The
victory of New Democracy itself is a
pyrrhic one; the political formations opposed to “austerity”
have got half the
popular votes, despite all the propaganda about the dire
consequences that were
supposed to follow their victory. It is just that under the
Greek electoral
system, half the votes do not translate into half the seats.
And New Democracy,
with 29.5 per cent votes compared to 27.1 for SYRIZA, has
cornered a lot more
seats, though not enough to form a government on its own. It
would be forced,
as already mentioned, to dilute the “austerity” package for
forming an
alliance, and if finance capital whose cause within the
Eurozone is championed
by the zone’s leading state,
GENESIS
OF CRISIS
IN
But
even if a government is formed and the
“austerity” package is somewhat diluted, “austerity” is after
all “austerity.”
The
end of the Greek crisis can come only
with the end of “austerity,” a situation that remains
unchanged despite the New
Democracy victory, since this victory does not signify a vote
for “austerity.”
Finance capital, in short, is being extremely short-sighted in
thinking that
the victory of New Democracy represents a victory for
“austerity.” It is
nothing of the sort and the imposition of “austerity” will
recreate the very
conjuncture that made two elections necessary.
But
why, it may be asked, did
RECESSION,
UNEMPLOYMENT &
SLACKENING
IN WORLD DEMAND
A
simple example will clarify the point.
Consider any country. No matter what the unit cost of
production (at the
existing exchange rate) in this country, it can always achieve
full capacity
output if the level of world demand is large enough. Suppose
this country’s
full capacity output is 300 and this is what is actually
produced, and its
domestic absorption, i.e. consumption, investment and
government expenditure,
is also 300, then its current account must be balanced. Now,
suppose the level
of world demand falls, which reduces this country’s exports by
15; if its
domestic absorption is kept unchanged at 300, and if imports
depend on
domestic absorption, then it will
experience a current deficit of 15. If this deficit, which
arises because of
developments external to the economy, is attributed instead to
the country’s
lack of “competitiveness,” and its exchange rate is
depreciated to make it more
competitive, without
any steps being
taken to increase the level of world demand, then the
country may well
succeed in reducing its current deficit, but only at the
expense of some other
country; it would be pursuing a “beggar-my-neighbour” policy.
On
the other hand, if it cannot depreciate
its currency (as no single Eurozone country can) and is asked
to reduce its
current deficit by cutting domestic absorption, then, assuming
that imports are
20 per cent of domestic absorption, such absorption has to be
cut by 75, from
300 to 225, to eliminate the current deficit, of which 60 will
reduce domestic
output. Hence, the country’s total output, which had fallen
from 300 to 285
because of the world recession, causing a five per cent drop
in employment,
would have to fall further to 225, which means a 25 per cent
drop in employment
compared to the original situation. Moreover, such a drop in
its absorption,
which reduces its own import demand (and domestic demand) is
the same as
reducing the export demand from other countries, who would
then have to reduce their
absorption for reducing their
current deficit, and so on. All
over the world, including in the country in question, the
recession and
unemployment will get greatly magnified, if countries adjust
to the initial
slackening in world demand in this manner.
This,
however, is precisely the manner in
which finance capital wants Greece, and other countries in
southern Europe (and
elsewhere), to adjust to their initial crisis, caused by the
slackening in
world demand. Since current deficits cannot be financed
because banks are
unwilling to lend to these countries, the remedy is seen to
lie in their
adopting “austerity” measures which reduce domestic
absorption.
NO
SOLUTION WITHIN
FINANCE
CAPITAL’S AMBIT
Matters
are actually worse for these
countries in two ways compared to what our arithmetical
example depicts: first,
the problem they face is not just in financing current
deficits, but in
financing public expenditure itself. In any other country the
central bank can
be called upon to finance public expenditure in excess of
revenue, so that
government spending is not necessarily cut, even as the
country goes around
finding ways of obtaining foreign loans to finance its current
deficits.
Southern European countries, however, do not have central
banks, since they
belong to the Eurozone. So public expenditure itself depends
upon the
willingness of finance capital to hold government debt.
Secondly, it is not
just the deficit but the stock of debt itself that is seen as
the problem, and
“austerity” is demanded not just to eliminate the deficit but
to reduce the
burden of debt, which makes it even more harsh on the people.
The
problem of southern Europe, Greece
included, has a simple solution, which many have advocated:
first, the European
Central Bank simply takes over the debt of these countries so
that they are not
supplicants before a host of private banks. This debt, already
incurred, can be
rolled over with no harm to anyone. Second, there is a
pan-European expansion
in demand through a fiscal agreement among the governments,
which has the
effect of reducing the current deficits of the southern
European countries.
Europe may not be able to do much about expanding world
demand; but it can
certainly undertake an expansion of European demand.
This
solution, however, is anathema for
finance capital, which is opposed to state intervention for
expanding aggregate
demand, and which prefers “austerity”-based debt-repayment to
a “painless” debt
rollover. But this is precisely the reason why there is no
solution to the
Greek “crisis” or even the European “crisis” within a regime
of hegemony of
finance capital. What is happening in Greece and its
neighbours is therefore a
defining moment for world capitalism.