People's Democracy(Weekly Organ of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) |
Vol. XXXVI
No.
12 March 13, 2012 |
Fukushima and the Chilling of
Nuclear Power
Prabir Purkayastha
IT
is now one year since the
According
to TEPCO, the Fukushima Dai-ichi I nuclear plant initially did not face
a
problem, even though power lines to the outside world had snapped. The
three
running reactors – Dai-ichi 1, 2 and 3 had shut-down safely and the
other three
reactors Dai-ichi 4,5 and 6 were already in a cold shut-down mode.
However, the
14 metre tsunami that struck the Dai-ichi I plant, took out the back-up
generators, starting a cascading train of events that saw explosions in
the
reactor buildings 1, 3 and 4 and partial core melt-down in 1,2 and 3.
Some
reports now indicate that unit 1 already had its cooling system
affected due to
the earthquake and was on its way to a meltdown even before the tsunami
struck.
There is however no question that tsunami made a situation, which would
otherwise have been difficult, to what Yoichi Funabashi of Rebuild
Japan
Foundation calls an “existential crisis” for
Even
a reactor that is shut-down, releases enormous amount of heat and needs
the
cooling system to work. With electrical backup systems not available,
the
inability to cool the reactor core meant extremely high temperatures,
releasing
of hydrogen as the hot fuel rods reacted with water and steam inside
the
reactor. Primary containment vessels were breached leading to
radioactivity
release, as well as of hydrogen. The hydrogen eventually ignited
causing the
explosions in units 1, 3 and 4 blowing off the roof of the reactor
buildings.
The disaster could have been much bigger if the plant superintendent, Masyao Yoshida had not
disregarded
the TEPCO management, continuing to pump seawater in the reactors.
Rebuild
Japan Initiative Foundation released a 420 page report with independent
experts
showing how TEPCO at one point wanted to abandon Dai-ichi, which could
have
lead to a “demonic scenario” – large scale release of radio activity,
causing
other nuclear plants to also fail and the possible evacuation of Tokyo.
Only
direct orders from the then PM Naoto Kan, who stormed into TEPCO
headquarters,
prevented it from abandoning the plant and having the Fukushima
disaster spiral
completely out of control.
Though
the plant is now in a cold shut-down and comparatively “stable”, it
will take ten
more years to seal the site from radioactive leakages from the plant.
Decontamination will require radioactive top-soil to be removed from
2,400
square kilometres, with a three kilometres radius around the plant to
be
abandoned permanently. The plant will take a minimum of 40 years to
decommission. It may be either entombed in cement like Chernobyl, after
all the
fuel rods have been taken out, or the reactor cores removed, and the
reactor
buildings dismantled piece by piece robotically, transporting all this
to a
radioactive waste storage facility.
The
damages in
Rebuild
Japan Initiative Foundation report also talks about Japan falling
victim to a
twisted myth of “absolute safety” propagated by the nuclear industry
and its
supporters.
WARNINGS
IGNORED
It
is this cosy relationship between regulators and the nuclear industry
that lead
to all warnings including that of earthquakes and high tsunamis to be
ignored.
In
There
is little doubt that
The
problem with nuclear energy is that that more we learn about it, the
more the
need for new safety systems and upgradation of existing designs, adding
to
costs. The nuclear manufacturers then hike up the unit size to make the
plants
more economical. Increase in unit size, however, increases its
complexity as
well, creating again more chances of failure. This cycle of complexity,
cost
and large unit sizes, combined with a number of units in one location
has
multiplied the danger of possible accidents. If nuclear energy is to be
a
viable option, it must re-examine this paradigm and look at smaller,
modular
designs, and dispersing such units instead of 10,000 MW nuclear parks
that it
is currently promoting.
Indian
nuclear energy program, as observed in
On
the safety of Indian plants, Dr A Gopalkrishnan, former AERB chairman
has
talked about the safety audit reports of AERB being kept secret. He has
written
that in the beginning of his tenure, he undertook a detailed safety
audit. He
states, “1995 AERB safety audit... detailed about 130 individual safety
issues
on which corrective actions were called for, of which 95 were of top
safety
significance...To date, no details are known about concrete
corrective
actions taken, if any, on each of these recommendations” (emphasis
added).
It
is true that
COMPLEX
ISSUES
On
the Kudankulam plant, the no-holds barred debate has been considerably
worsened
by the PM and PMO's intervention virtually calling all opponents of the
plant
as foreign agents. This does not do justice to the complexity of the
issues
surrounding nuclear energy in the country.
There
are 450 reactors operating in the world, out of which 22 are VVER's
with
similar design as Kudankulam. It is also true that in Kudankulam –
based on
public statements issued by Atomic Energy Commission – there are
additional safety
features than available for instance in Fukushima. By itself, this does
not
prove that Kudankulam is safe; neither is it possible to argue that by
definition all nuclear plants are unsafe and should be abandoned, as
the
opponents of Kudankulam are doing.
The
government does not appear to have any serious intention of discussing
the
nuclear energy program or the safety of nuclear plants. Instead, the
dreaded
“foreign hand” is being paraded to explain away the questions that are
being
raised on nuclear energy.
The
foreign hand charge must make strange reading, that too of an American
hand,
coming as it does from a government that has surpassed even the BJP led
NDA
government it its love for the US. The commander of the US Pacific
Command,
Admiral Robert Willard in a recent Congressional hearing stated that
American
Special forces assist teams are stationed in
The
PM therefore claiming how the
This
government for some time has been dealing with dissent in various ways.
It does
not want to engage with the actual issues, because it feels that it
does not
have the necessary credibility. Instead, it tries and uses underhand
means to
try and “control” dissent. We saw very similar methods being applied in
cyber
space, where major internet companies were called by Sibal, the IT
minister and
told to exercise private censorship regarding criticism of the Congress
and its
leaders. If they did not fall in line, then the provisions of IPC
regarding
hate speech, obscenity, etc, would be used against them. Once the
discussions
were leaked in international media, though Sibal backed off on
pre-censorship,
various private complaints have now been filed with the government
providing
tacit support to these complaints in court.
The
nuclear agitation is a convenient tool to fire a shot across the bow of
the
NGO's. The signal is clear – fall in line, otherwise your funding will
be in
danger. And indications are that the NGO's will fall in line.
The
nuclear energy issue needs an open discussion – not only with regards
to safety
but also its costs. It beats all
understanding why the cost of nuclear energy from Kudankulam and
Jaitapur
should be shrouded in such secrecy. The CEO of Areva is on record that
the
costs of the Areva reactors are being kept confidential at the behest
of the
Indian government. Similarly, in Kudankulam, the cost figures are ten
years
old. Why should the cost of nuclear energy, clearly a civilian issue,
be a “State
secret”?
It
is precisely this mysterious secrecy that has created a distrust for
nuclear
energy. It is a sad day indeed that the prime minister of the country
and all
his nuclear experts cannot convince the people around Kudankulam
regarding the
safety of the plant. That a rag-tag band of NGO's have more credibility
than
the Indian government and all its experts is a sad commentary for
Manmohan
Singh and the UPA. It is this aspect of his governance that the PM must
examine
rather than searching for a mythical foreign hand in Kudankulam.
What
is needed is a body of experts who have public credibility to go into
safety
aspects of Kudankulam in transparent way. Only such a procedure in
which people
are given access to information regarding the safety systems in
Kudankulam and
can raise their objections before such a body, can create a climate of
trust
within which