People's Democracy

(Weekly Organ of the Communist Party of India (Marxist)


Vol. XXXV

No. 48

November 27, 2011

 

Hindutva and the BJP’s Politics of ‘Development’ in Gujarat

 

Archana Prasad

 

CORPORATE India has hailed Gujarat as the most investor friendly state in India. Not only do the nation’s biggest capitalists house their main projects in the state, Maruti, one of India’s biggest joint ventures, has now declared its intention to start its new plant in the state. The state government has used this high inflow of investment as a parameter to project and market this model for development. This model of development has also been used to counter the argument that Narendra Modi’s role in the Gujarat riots of 2002 had alienated the people from him. In fact, party advocates of the model argue that Gujarati Muslims have moved beyond the riots and the state government’s policies have acted as a balm to promote communal harmony. Modi’s sadbhavana yatra is aimed at creating the impression that in Gujarat ‘development matters’ and not religion. And it is this context that the national leadership of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has exhorted others to follow the “Gujarat Model of Development” which (its advocates claim) has been characterised by “high growth” and “development for all.”

 

This advocacy is, however, not innocent or borne out by facts. Rather it is an attempt to erase the scars of the Gujarat riots and blunt the critique of Narendra Modi as a partisan leader working in the service of both, Hindutva and neo-liberalism. The political and developmental experience of the state shows that it is not only a laboratory for Hindutva but also of corporate neo-liberalism based on the model of trickledown effect. The facts brought out by recent studies and also the India Human Development Report 2011 (IHDR) need to be considered in this political context.

 

‘HIGH GROWTH’ AND

CONCENTRATION OF WEALTH

The IHDR shows Gujarat as having one of the best growth rates in the country and this growth rate is attributed to high growth rates in both agriculture and industry. The report notes that industry contributes to 84.5 per cent of the state domestic product and agriculture contributes 15.5 per cent even though more than half of the population is dependent on it. It further notes that the per capita domestic product is high because the state has witnessed an unprecedented period of 10 per cent growth in agriculture. This is considered one of the most positive features of the Gujarat Model.

 

However, a closer look at the economic structure of the state can lead us to an altogether different conclusion as some startling figures reveal the inequities that exist within agriculture itself. 

 

Since 2005 the state government has been actively following agricultural policies that favour retail giants in setting up contract farms and capture the agricultural market. At least 30 corporate firms have been contracted into the agricultural market through tripartite agreements since 2005. Prominent amongst these are Reliance Retail, Reliance Fresh and Subhiksha, for whom the state government brought about important changes in the state agricultural marketing legislation in 2005. These companies buy produce at predetermined prices and specify the inputs that they want the farmers to use and the crops they want them to produce. Thus the cultivation of palm oil seed, jatropha and organic cotton is becoming common under such contract farming, inducing farmers to use imported inputs and linking them to the export market. In March 2011, the farmers of Gujarat held protests against such an agricultural policy because they complained that the selling price of their produce was too low to meet the input costs of farming. This led to indebtedness and farmers’ suicides.

 

Responding to an RTI application, the government of Gujarat informed that 403 farmers had committed suicide in the state in the period between 2003 and 2007. However, independent estimates put this figure at over 582 farmers. In the period between 2007 and March 2011, another 500 farmers committed suicide, especially in the Kutch and Saurashtra regions. The main reason for these suicides was indebtedness because of the increasing costs of agriculture, the non-availability of cheap and ready agricultural credit and the lack of investment in rural social infrastructure. Another reason for indebtedness was the failure of the state sponsored crop insurance schemes, in which claims were filed because of the failure of crops and floods resulting from the release of water from dams. According to the RTI activist Bharat Sinh Jhala, only 20 per cent insurance claims were honoured out of 6,055 claims filed till March 2011. 

 

Further, about 6,000 ‘accidental deaths’ of farmers have been reported since 2003, with no causes reported for the deaths. This alarming figure is significant in two respects. First, it points to the insufficient social infrastructure and security for small farmers and agricultural workers; and second, that the reorganisation of agricultural production through contract farming is not benefiting the ordinary farmer. In fact, there is the corporate accumulation and concentration of agricultural and industrial surplus in the hands of a few, leading to a trend of increases in socio-economic inequality. This basic structural feature of the Gujarat Model not only reflects its ideological inclination, but also militates against the basic argument that the ordinary citizen of the state has benefited from the ‘developmental politics and policies’ of Narendra Modi.

 

INEQUALITY: INDICATORS

AND MANIFESTATIONS

The structured inequity within the Gujarat political economy is reflected in the character and social composition of poverty in the state. The IHDR reports that the incidence of poverty has declined substantially in the state. As per official estimates, the combined rural and urban poverty levels were placed in 2004-05 at 16.8 per cent, which was a gross underestimation. Alternative estimates suggest that the incidence of rural poverty in Gujarat was 39.1 per cent higher than other major states in 2005-06. This estimate would have been even higher if poverty were to be estimated on the basis of nutritional norms. A recent study pointed out that as much as 88 per cent of the rural population was not able to meet the 2400 kcal norm in 2004-05. The same study also stated that 77 per cent of the urban population could not get the required 2100 kcal in the same period. Further, this trend has not declined but increased after the mid-1990s.

 

Thus, it is not surprising that even the IHDR identifies Gujarat as a state with alarming rates of malnutrition, akin to the poorer states like Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. This is particularly significant in the light of the fact that the state’s public expenditure on health and nutrition is a mere 0.7 per cent from its entire budget.

 

But what is more important is the social composition of the poor people in the state. A study by National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) reveals that the poverty of Muslims is 800 per cent more than high caste Hindus and 50 per cent more than the other backward classes (OBCs). In the rural areas, it was 200 per cent more than high caste Hindus. It is worth noting that more than 60 per cent of the Muslims live in the urban areas.

 

At the same time, the scheduled tribes (STs) and scheduled castes (SCs) also face higher levels of poverty. According to official data, poverty for the STs was estimated at 34.3 per cent and for the SCs it was estimated at 21.8 per cent. But these too have turned out to be faulty estimates. A field survey by scholars of the Gujarat Institute of Development Research showed that more than 60 per cent of the tribal people living in 43 tribal talukas were poor. The claims of poverty reduction are thus debatable and do not reflect the real picture as far as the position of minorities and vulnerable groups are concerned. The real nature of socio-economic development is only evident if the impact of the Gujarat Model on different social groups is seen.

 

HINDUTVA & FORMS

OF DISCRIMINATION

The uneven impact of developmental processes is not only structured and impacted by the concentration of wealth, but by also the discriminatory practices that accompany them. These conservative values are fostered not only by the neo-liberal model of development but also by the patriarchal Hindutva high caste ideology that is being actively promoted by the Modi government. The first manifestation of this is seen in gender discrimination which is reflected in the abysmal sex ratios of the state which is 886 per 1000 for the age group of children under six years of age. This ratio is well below the declining all-India ratio of 914, and is particularly bad amongst high caste and OBC Hindu communities as shown in the IHDR. For example, of all the religious groups the Christians and the Muslims have the better sex ratios of 871 and 898 respectively whereas the Hindus have a ratio of 830. Further, the sex ratio amongst the non-SC/ST groups is 772, one of the lowest amongst all states and only higher than Orissa which has a sex ratio of 757 amongst the non-SC/ST. Clearly, the anti-female child conservatism is highest amongst the higher castes who are the leaders and advocates of Hindutva.

 

But the situation gets more complicated when the correlation between gender, ethnicity and religion in regard to malnutrition is analysed from the official data presented in the IHDR. The overall adult malnutrition figures for 2005-06 in Gujarat (36.3 per cent for women and 36.1 for men) are just slightly higher than the all-India average of (33 for women and 34.2 for men). In the same period, child malnutrition was 44.6 per cent, which is much higher than the all-India average of 34.2 per cent. However, the real story behind these figures emerges when the distribution of adult malnutrition is seen across social and religious groups. The percentage of undernutritioned women was the same between Hindus and Muslims, but the rate of decline of malnutrition was much slower amongst the Muslims. Thus while malnutrition amongst Hindu women declined by 1.8 per cent between 1999 and 2006, amongst the Muslims this decline was only by 0.3 per cent. Further, while the SCs in the state had a malnutrition rate of 42.2 per cent in 2005-06 (a decline of 3.2 per cent since 1999), malnutrition amongst the STs went up from 55 to 61 per cent from 1999 to 2006.

 

Similarly, the nutrition status of children was also bad amongst the STs, with about 83.3 per cent children having anaemia. This meant that the schemes and programmes to address the problem of malnutrition were not reaching the non-Hindus (i.e. the Muslims) and those living in the remote underdeveloped districts (for example, the STs, a large proportion of whom are Christians).

 

HINDUTVA STRENGTHENS

HIGH CASTE DOMINATION

This is just one instance of the multiple forms of discrimination that exist within the state even in terms of access to public services. While, on the basis of official figures, the BJP may make a case for development of dalits in the state, this is only a part of the political strategy to incorporate them within the Hindutva fold. Studies show that rampant discrimination exists against the SCs and this is reflected in the working of public schemes as shown by the 1589 villages surveyed by Navsarjan (Ahemdabad) and the Robert Kennedy Centre (USA). In more than half of the villages, a non-dalit midwife would not serve dalit households and at least one third of the dalit households had no proper supply of drinking water. Such discriminatory practices also worked in the functioning of the Gram Sabhas and the mid-day meal schemes. Hence, even while caste discrimination may not be evident in some of the official figures, its rampant prevalence only shows that Hindutva has emboldened the high castes and strengthened their domination in the state.

 

Narendra Modi’s oft-repeated claim that his development policies know no religion and no caste, seems hollow in the context of the above scenario. They represent an attempt by the Hindu right to create a hegemonic ‘Gujarati Identity’ in order to expand and defend its own political space and ideology. Thus the politics of Hindutva and neo-liberal development are closely intertwined. Any strategy for combating the growth of both communalism and capitalist globalisation must therefore demystify the Gujarat Model and build up a campaign against it in order to limit the growth of the BJP and expose its hypocrisy in the current political climate.