People's Democracy(Weekly Organ of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) |
Vol. XXXV
No.
28 July 10, 2011 |
“BRINGING
BACK” BLACK MONEY
Prabhat
Patnaik
THERE
have been periodic demands, the latest being from Baba Ramdev, that
“black
money” from
But
as is obvious from this process, there is no difference in terms of
macroeconomic consequences, apart from just one which will be discussed
shortly,
between the government’s spending money acquired from the Swiss Banks
and its
spending money freshly printed by the RBI against government securities
(or
what is called “deficit financing”). The one and only difference
between the
two cases is that Swiss bank deposits are in foreign exchange, and
hence they
will be available with the RBI for future imports, while the government
securities against which deficit financing is undertaken, are incapable
of
financing any imports.
True,
these securities too can be converted into foreign exchange: if the
government
floats an equivalent amount of securities in foreign financial markets
and uses
the foreign exchange proceeds to draw down the securities it has with
the RBI,
then it would have substituted foreign exchange in the place of
government
securities in the RBI’s portfolio. But even in this situation, a
difference
between the two cases will still remain, since the foreign exchange
acquired
from Swiss Banks will be the government’s own property, while the
foreign
exchange obtained by floating government securities abroad will be only
borrowed money.
If
the government does acquire this foreign exchange from Swiss Banks in a
crackdown on black money, then the situation is exactly analogous to
its
obtaining reparations from a foreign government, like
The
money obtained from Swiss Banks therefore can boost both aggregate
demand and
aggregate supply, which is why it need
not aggravate inflationary pressures in the economy. By contrast,
if
government expenditure had been met through deficit financing, that
would have
raised only aggregate demand, and unless the economy was
demand-constrained to
start with (so that an increase in demand would itself bring forth
supplies),
inflationary pressures would have got aggravated.
Money
obtained from Swiss Banks thus would appear to be a sound source of
financing development
expenditure. There are however certain problems even in this case that
one must
reckon with. The best way to appreciate what is a basic problem here is
to
imagine that the commodity for which demand increases as a result of
increased
development expenditure is one that cannot
be imported because its supplies are meagre in the world market
itself. In
such a case, even while the use of the Swiss bank money for development
expenditure increases demand for this commodity in the economy, its
supply cannot
increase, despite foreign exchange being available; this would
aggravate
inflationary pressures in the economy. Swiss
Bank money in this case will be no different in its inflationary
consequences
from deficit financing.
REVERSE
DISINCENTIVES
FOR
PEASANT PRODUCTION
In
reality, there is indeed one such commodity, namely foodgrains. The
expenditure
of Swiss Bank money, if undertaken in a manner, as it should be, that
puts
purchasing power in the hands of the working people, will increase the
demand
for foodgrains. In the world market however not only are foodgrain
stocks low,
thanks to heavy
To
say this is not to suggest that Swiss Bank money should not be used for
development expenditure for the benefit of the people, but that other things must not remain the same.
In particular, if Swiss Bank money is used for development expenditure,
then
there must be appropriate supply management measures for foodgrains
that ensure
that the people are not hit by any aggravation of food price inflation.
This
entails at least two things: first, the increase in development
expenditure
that Swiss Bank money would enable the government to undertake, must be
so
planned that it raises foodgrain output in the country within a short
period.
In other words, the projects financed by this money must have as their
primary
objective a rapid increase in the country’s foodgrain output, for which
a whole
range of disincentives for peasant production that have been created
during the
neo-liberal era must be reversed. Secondly, since an increase in
foodgrain
output will take time, no matter how quick-yielding the new projects
may be, in
the very short run inflationary pressures have to be handled through
the use of
domestic stocks, which in turn requires, both for this purpose, as well
as for
the long-run, an extensive procurement-cum-public distribution system
to be put
in place.
In
short, even if the government obtained Swiss Bank money through a
nationalisation
of the deposits of black money-holders, it would not ipso
facto be in a position to spend that money with impunity, unless it took a number of steps undoing the
damage to the peasant economy, and to the foodgrain economy in
particular that
the neo-liberal regime it has been promoting has inflicted. And if
it does
take those steps, then it need not even wait for Swiss Bank money;
deficit
financing too will not have any greater inflationary consequences than
Swiss
Bank money in such a case.
The
fact that the government does not have the least intention of either
revamping
the peasant economy or ensuring food security for the people is obvious
from
its actions. Throughout the current period of rapid food price
increase, the
government has resorted to foodgrain exports and continues to hold
substantial
stocks, which are rotting in the open, rather than distributing them
among the
famished poor, despite strictures from the Supreme Court. In 2008 for
instance,
when food prices were escalating steeply, 14 million tones of
foodgrains were
exported from
RETREAT
FROM
NEO-LIBERALISM,
CRUCIAL
Putting
the matter differently, the “bringing back” of black money and its use
for the
purpose of development presupposes, on
the part of the government, not only the courage and political will
required
for such “bringing back”; it also presupposes a retreat from
neo-liberalism in
crucial spheres. Baba Ramdev and his supporters talk only about
“bringing back”
black money; they never talk about the whole set of complementary
measures,
involving a retreat from neo-liberalism, that must be put in place if
this
“brought back” black money is to be used for development. To be sure,
“bringing
back” black money itself will require a degree of State activism that
will be
frowned upon by international finance capital; but making use of the
“brought
back” black money will require additional measures of State activism
which are further
anathema for it. But precisely for that reason, anyone who is serious
about the
confiscation of black money accounts in Swiss Banks, must also ask for
complementary measures, so that this demand for confiscation does not
remain
just hot air.
Government
expenditure on development, incidentally, is never held up for the lack
of
something called “money”. Resource mobilisation by the government does
not
consist simply in the mobilisation of “money”. When “money” is raised
through
taxation, the presumption is that real resources are being released in
the
process. The command over such resources is coming into the hands of
the
government which can then use them as it deems fit. But it is these
real
resources that actually matter, not something called “money”. Because
of this,
Michal Kalecki, the renowned Polish Marxist economist had said: “the
financial
problem of resource mobilisation is nothing else but the real problem
of
raising foodgrain output”.
When
we talk of “bringing back” Swiss Bank “money” we must not fall into the
error
of looking at “money” as if it was the real resource. True, it
represents
command over real resources, but translating this command into actual
real
resources in the case of certain crucial commodities like foodgrains
may be
problematical, which is why State activism in foodgrain management may
become
necessary. The real obstacle to putting in place such a regime of
foodgrain
management lies in neo-liberalism. Overcoming neo-liberal constraints,
rather
than obtaining “money” as such, lies at the heart of the problem of
increasing
development expenditure. If these constraints can be overcome, then
deficit
financing too can generate the “money” for such expenditure, even if
Swiss
Banks yield nothing.
To
be sure, tax evaders, black money holders, and all those who flout the
law of
the land, must be punished through a confiscation of their illegal
wealth. But
making proper use of this wealth will require an economic regime that
breaks
out of the neo-liberal straitjacket.