People's Democracy(Weekly Organ of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) |
Vol. XXXV
No.
25 June 19, 2011 |
The Reliance KG Gas Scam
Prabir Purkayastha
THE CAG draft
report on the audit of the production sharing contracts for the onshore
and
offshore oil and gas blocks is now widely being circulated in the
media,
showing once again the unholy nexus between the UPA and big capital in
the
country. The CAG has shown that the Directorate General of Hydrocarbons
(DGH)
allowed Reliance Industries and other private operators to gold-plate
the
capital costs of the plant, allowing them to make huge profits. The
production
sharing contract pegged the profit share of the private operators and
the
government to something called an investment multiplier, which meant
that
higher the capital cost, the larger the share of the profits of the
private
parties.
INFLATING THE
CAPITAL COSTS
The capital costs
in the KG Basin D-6 Block went up from 2.4 billion dollars in the
initial
contract to 8.5 billion dollars. This was the pattern followed in other
gas and
oil fields also, involving Reliance, Cairn Energy and others. In all
this, the modus
operandi was to submit a bid which shows a certain capital cost
and, during
the operation of the contract, inflate the capital cost by a huge
amount with
the connivance of DGH and the Ministry of Petroleum. The management
committee,
in which the government had 2 nominees out of 4, played no oversight
role in
such inflation of contracts.
For inflating the
capital costs, the familiar route is of course over-invoice through
sweetheart
deals from “friendly” sub-contractors, sometimes even a Reliance family
company. While the CAG has not computed the loss to the exchequer, it
has held
that the Government has suffered large losses on this account. It has
also held
that the production sharing contact being followed by the government of
India
has very little controls on the investment costs, unlike for example,
Bangladesh, where the management committee which has 50 per cent
government
nominees as in India, has to approve any expenditure above 500,000
dollars.
The CAG draft
report has also brought out that while the contract envisaged that if
the
company did not develop certain areas within the contracted area within
the
stipulated time, it should have been relinquished. Instead, the DGH and
the
Ministry of Petroleum allowed the whole area to be designated as
“discovery
area” in violation of the contract.
As we shall show
below, there are two sets of scams that have taken place, with the CAG
having
looked at only one of them. One is of course various violations of the
production
sharing contract as pointed out by CAG; the second is the high price of
Reliance gas --- 4.2 dollars per million BTU (MBTU) --- set in 2007 by the Empowered Group of Ministers headed by
Pranab Mukherjee. Reliance itself admitted in the court case between it
and the
NTPC/Anil Ambani Group that its production cost was 1.43 dollars per
MBTU.
Reliance Industries Ltd (RIL) had initially agreed to supply gas at
2.34 dollars
to both NTPC and Anil Ambani Group, which it subsequently reneged once
the EGOM
set the price at 4.2 dollars. It might be noted that by its own
calculations,
RIL would have made profits of 50 per cent if it had supplied gas at
2.34
dollars.
GOLD-PLATING CAPITAL
COSTS AND ROLE OF DGH
The gas and oil field in question is known as
KG-DWN-98/3 (Block D-6), and consists of 8,100 sq km of offshore area
in the
Krishna Godavari basin. Block D-6 was awarded to Reliance Industries
(90 per
cent) and Niko Resources Ltd (10 per cent) under New Exploration
Licensing
Policy 1 (NELP-1) bidding round under a production sharing contract.
Initially,
the D6 was to produce 40 million MMSCD (million cubic metres per day),
which
was subsequently revised to 80 MMSCD. The initial development cost in
the
contract was 2.4 billion dollars which was revised through an
“addendum” in
2006 to 5.2 billion dollars in the first phase and 3.3 billion dollars
in the
second phase. The CAG has also observed that the 3.3 billion dollars
for the
second phase has every possibility of being hiked up in the same way as
the
first phase.
The production
sharing contract (PSC) that the government had struck with the RIL in
2000
envisaged that there would be something called “cost petroleum,” which
would
cover government royalty of 5 per cent, operating costs, the costs of
exploration, and the development cost of producing gas. Till the capital costs are recovered, 90 per cent of
the petroleum/gas sold would be considered as “cost” petroleum and the
rest 10
per cent would be “profit” petroleum.
The catch here is
that the proportion of profit sharing changes depending on the amount
of cost
recovered to the total cost, something that the contract calls as
investment
multiplier. The proportion of shares between RIL and the government is
pegged
to this investment multiplier. Till the major portion of the costs is
recovered,
Reliance gets the major share of the “profit” petroleum. It is only
after the
major part of the costs have been recovered that the investment
multiplier
begins to increase and so does government’s share, which is pegged to
this investment
multiplier. That is why increasing capital costs helps Reliance retain
a much
larger share of the profits in the initial years, while the government
gets its
share only in the last phase, when the production starts to decline.
Reliance therefore
can make a double killing --- by over-invoicing the capital costs, it
can skim
money from the top. In addition, by ensuring that the capital costs
take a
longer time to recover, it takes out its major share of the profit
right in the
beginning.
If it was only a
question of getting money later, it could be argued that the government
has not
suffered a loss, only postponed its earnings. But here is the problem.
In
financial accounting, money earned later has to be discounted by an
amount
equivalent to what we would have earned if we had put the money in the
bank and
earned interest. The same amount earned today therefore is more
valuable than
money earned one or more years later. If we apply the
standard discounted cash flow method ---
discount future earnings by a nominal discounting rate of 10 per cent
--- we
find (see table below) that the government’s share would have been 63 per cent of the total profits if
the original figures of production and capital costs retained, while
now it is
only 48 per cent.
Conversely, Reliance’s
share goes up from 37 per cent to 52
per cent.
|
Capital Costs $ Billion |
Production Volume MMSCMD |
Total Profits $ Billion |
RIL’s Share per cent |
Gov’s Share per cent |
Discounted RIL Share per cent |
Discounted Govt’s Share per
cent |
Original |
2.5 |
40 |
19.4 |
30 |
70 |
37 |
63 |
Revised |
8.8 |
80 |
35.4 |
44 |
56 |
52 |
48 |
Notes: (1) Calculations
done by the author. (2) Figures based on a 12 year production period
and
constant gas production. (3) If a 16 year period is taken and/or
production
figures increased, the figures would change somewhat, but the broad
trends
would remain the same.
SUSPICIOUS
DOUBLING
If we look at the
fact that the extra investments have doubled production, how much has
each of
the parties gained out of this doubling of revenue? Out of the extra
revenue
(at discounted prices) of about 7.5 billion dollars, Reliance
gains about $5.5 billion and the government only about 2
billion dollars.
The increase of
four times the capital cost for a mere doubling of production had
always seemed
highly suspicious. No logic can explain why the doubling of capacity
should
lead to such an increase – economies of scale normally ensure that a
doubling
of capacity would increase capital cost by about one and a half times.
The draft
CAG report now makes clear that the increase from 2.4 billion dollars
to 5.2
billion dollars took place for the first phase, where no augmentation
of
capacity was involved. This makes nonsense of the bidding procedure for
awarding of blocks, as the calculations for award of blocks involves
profit
shares promised by the various parties. If the capital costs change,
all this
change, vitiating the award of contract itself.
Not only did the
Directorate General of Hydrocarbons accept this increase in capital
cost, which
under the contract it need not have accepted; it did so in unseemly
haste ---
it took a scant 53 days to go through the cost increase of nearly 6.3
billion
dollars. Some wizardry indeed!
The CAG’s draft
report brings out the various ways costs could have been doctored ---
single
party bids, making changes to scope, substantial variation on orders,
etc. the CAG
has stated that it is going to examine these issues in greater detail
in a
subsequent audit.
In November 2009,
preliminary investigations by the CBI had found evidence of “gross
abuse and
misuse of public office” by V K Sibal, the then Director General of
Hydrocarbons.
This had been informed to the Petroleum Ministry and to the CVC.
Numerous links
had been found between Sibal and Reliance. The CBI enquiry remains
stalled,
very much in the telecom 2G mode, showing that Reliance tentacles in
the government
go far beyond Sibal.
CURIOUS CASE OF
4.2 DOLLARS GAS PRICE
An Empowered Group
of Ministers (EGoM), in September 2007, set the price of gas at 4.2
dollars per
MBTU for five years with no transparency and without giving any reason
for this
price. It might be noted that in the same period (2005-2008) the ONGC
was being
paid only 1.8 dollars per MBTU. The 4.2 dollars price was supposedly
done on
the basis of RIL’s price “discovery.”
The Reliance’s
price discovery was to ask a selected set of bidders to quote a gas
price
according to a formula which fixed the price within a narrow range of
4.54 to
4.75 dollars. With this as the basis, Reliance declared the
“discovered” price
to be 4.59 dollars per MMBTU which was later revised to 4.3 dollars per
MMBTU.
The government then magnanimously decided that the right price was 4.2
dollars and
claimed that it was arrived at through “a discovery” mechanism.
It might be argued
that the government also gained out of the high price of gas. This is
indeed
true --- by our calculations, the Government stood to gain about 4
billion dollars
or about Rs 20,000 crore from the increased price of gas as its share
of
profits. However, as gas is the major feedstock for fertiliser
production and
also a fuel for power, this gain has to be balanced against the
resulting
higher fertiliser and power prices. If the cost of production of
fertiliser and
power goes up, so does the government subsidy. So while the RIL would
pocket
the benefit of the higher cost of gas, the government would have to pay
out a
much higher subsidy of around Rs 75,000 crore for a gain of Rs 20,000
crore and
therefore incur a net loss of more than Rs 55,000 crore.
It is indeed
strange that at a time that the government complains about high cost of
subsidies, it should itself promote policies that help private parties
while
pushing up its own subsidy bill.
Not only was the
price set at a much higher level than the cost of production, it was
also set
in foreign exchange and pegged to the price of crude in the
international
market. Why should the gas price be set in dollars for even the future
when the
costs have already been incurred and therefore can easily be converted
into
rupees? Why should the gas price be set at 4.2 dollars when RIL itself
admitted
in the court proceedings between it and Anil Ambani’s RRNL/NTPC that
its cost
price of gas was 1.43 dollars and it was willing in 2004 to sell NTPC
gas at
2.34 dollars? What is the justification of pegging the domestic gas
price to
the price of crude in the international market, to which it has no
relation?
Fixing gas prices
without examining cost figures and a mechanism of converting the cost
figures
to a gas price is making gas pricing another way of handing out private
largesse. No basis of the gas price rate of 4.2 dollars has been given,
so how
did the ministers pull this figure of 4.2 dollars --- straight out of
their
collective hat?
PROMOTING RIL’S
MONOPOLY IN GAS
The last issue is
one of monopoly. At the moment, Reliance is a major gas producer;
Reliance Gas
Transportation and Infrastructure Limited (RGTIL) owns the pipeline and
again
Reliance is getting orders for citywide distribution of gas. Unlike the
electricity sector, the government does not have a problem in gas
sector with a
vertical monopoly of the type that Reliance is building. Originally,
there was
a proposal of a national gas grid, which would have the Gas Authority
of India
Ltd (GAIL) as the nodal agency. This also makes economic sense as
whoever owns
the gas grid effectively dictates to both the producers as well as the
consumers. That is why generally such facilities are independently run,
with
the state playing a crucial role. Unfortunately, all such policies in
the
country come a cropper when Reliance is in the picture. So also with
the
original gas grid. If we have a gas grid now, it will largely be a
Reliance
grid, with the GAIL and others playing the second fiddle.
We are already
seeing the effect of this monopoly, with the government owned GAIL
becoming a
junior partner to Reliance and the transportation cost of 1.25 dollars
being
charged by Reliance, over and above the 4.2 dollars and again without
any
regulatory oversight.
The CAG has made
clear that the form of production sharing contract under the NELP is
deeply
flawed in favour of the private operators. It provides a perverse
incentive to
increase capital costs to the detriment of government’s share of
revenue. This
is a policy issue that needs to be urgently addressed in view of the
large
number of blocks that have been handed out under the NELP.
What does all this
mean for the Indian people? Simply put, we are facing double loot. On
the one
hand, scarce national resources are being given away at a pittance. Gas
and coal
resources are being handed over to the Amabanis, Tatas and sundry
others at
throwaway prices. However, this is not helping the consumers, who are
being
asked to pay international oil and gas prices. Private loot of public
resources
coupled with public loot of the consumers --- this is the essence of
our
petroleum policies.
It is indeed
welcome that the CAG has drawn attention to the problems in the
production
sharing contract under the new exploration policy of the government.
However,
it is important that other issues also be addressed, a key one being
the
pricing of gas. As for a CBI enquiry against officials who have
connived with
Reliance, public pressure will hopefully force a reluctant UPA to act.
The only
question is: Will the Reliance be also put in the dock for having
subverted the
government machinery and having secured these huge windfalls?