People's Democracy(Weekly Organ of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) |
Vol. XXXIV
No.
36 September 05, 2010 |
Amit Sen Gupta
SEVERAL recent reports in
the press indicate
that the prime minister’s office had sought the opinion of some
ministries
regarding issues related to the Indian patents act. In itself, this
would pass
as a routine innocuous act. What makes the PMO’s queries interesting is
that
they were in the form of a paper that was submitted to it by the
Organisation
of Pharmaceutical Producers of India (OPPI). OPPI is one of several
industry
associations representing different interests in the pharmaceutical
sector.
What sets OPPI apart from other associations in the pharmaceutical
industry is
that it is the key representative of foreign MNCs that operate in
It is thus no mystery why
the OPPI
should have direct access to the PMO, while the same PMO exhibits scant
regard
for the burden on ordinary citizens placed by rising prices of food and
essential commodities like medicines. For after all, the OPPI speaks
for
“shining
The PMO’s
action is a cause for concern because of the very high
price that may have to be paid by Indian patients if the OPPI’s
suggestions are
acted upon by the government. Let us examine the major proposals made
by the
OPPI, which the PMO now wants discussed.
MNCs Attack
First on
OPPI’s wish list is Section 3(d) of the Indian patents act.
The principal reason for incorporating this section in the Indian act
in 2005
was to prevent the rampant practice, globally, of MNCs to retain
monopoly
rights over a drug even after its patent term expires. This practice –
known as
“evergreening” – involves sequentially patenting the same medicine by
making
very small changes to its molecular structure. Thus, when the patent of
a drug
A is about to expire, the company would make a minor change in its
structure
and call it drug B and apply for a patent. Generally, such minor
changes are
obvious to experts and should not qualify as an innovation that merits
patent
protection. Section 3(d) is designed to plug this loophole in patent
law by
specifying clearly what constitutes a minor modification in an existing
drug,
that should not qualify for grant of a patent. Section 3(d) thus
states: “the following are not inventions within the
meaning of this act -- (d) the mere
discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not result in
increased
efficacy of that substance or the mere discovery of any new property or
new use
for a known substance or of the mere use of a known process, machine or
apparatus unless such process results in a new product or employs at
least one
new reactant”.
It is also
important to understand why MNCs have been so upset
with this provision. Analysis of “new” drugs introduced in the global
market
show that less than 3 per cent are true innovations that have real
benefits for
patients. As opposed to this, up to 70 per cent are drugs that are not
real
improvements over existing medicines. Most of these drugs are developed
by
making slight alterations to existing drugs. But, importantly, these
are the
bread-butter for pharmaceutical MNCs, because they constituted the bulk
of
products that pharma MNCs patent and from which they extract monopoly
profits.
After
Data
Exclusivity:
Ploy to
Delay Competition
The second
issue on the wish list OPPI is data exclusivity. Before
a new drug is granted marketing approval by a drug regulatory agency,
clinical
trials need to be conducted to prove that the drug is both effective
and safe.
Marketing approval is granted after a company submits this data to the
regulatory agency. MNCs have long argued that they have exclusive right
to this
data and the data cannot be used when a generic competitor wants to
introduce
the same drug. If exclusive right over test data is granted – hence
called
“data exclusivity” – generic companies would need to do all the
clinical trials
again, for submission to drug regulatory agencies. Generally such
exclusive
rights are demanded for a period of 5-7 years. This would delay low
cost
generic substitutes (i.e. the same medicines produced by domestic
companies) from
being introduced, would mean extra costs for companies and extra costs
for the generic
medicines produced, and would also mean unnecessarily subjecting people
to clinical
trials when evidence already exists regarding the safety and efficacy
of the
medicine being tested.
MNCs see
data exclusivity as a method of extending monopoly
control over a medicine, even after the expiry of its patent term. In
situations where the patent on a medicine does not exist, this can also
be a
method to delay or prevent competition from generic manufacturers. The
TRIPS
agreement does not talk about data exclusivity but only refers to “data
protection”, and says that countries can have their own way of
protecting test
data. A few years ago the Satwant Singh committee in
Patent
Linkage: DCGI to
act
on behalf of
MNCs?
The third
major item on the wish-list of OPPI pertains to “patent
linkage”. Simply put, it seeks to link the patent status of a medicine
to the
process of registering a drug with the drug regulatory authority.
Traditionally, the process of granting patents and the process of drug
registration are kept distinct and are undertaken by entirely different
agencies. The logic for doing so is clear – the two processes examine
different
kinds of claims. The patent office examines if a product is truly a new
invention, while the drug regulatory agency examines if a drug is
really
effective and safe. MNCs now argue that the DCGI (the drug regulatory
agency in
Evidence of
Good
Behaviour?
It is
curious that the PMO has chosen to have a finger in the
patent pie at a time when two of the issues raised by the OPPI are
sub-judice. Novartis
is suing the Indian government on the issue of Section 3(d) and Bayer
is
engaged in a court battle with the government on the issue of patent
linkage.
Should not the PMO’s action be viewed as a clear attempt to influence
cases to
which the government itself is a party and stands on the opposite side
of the
OPPI?
The stakes
for pharma MNCs are very high, for they seek to secure
super-profits that are impossible to imagine in any other sector. Their
drugs,
when under patents, often cost 10-50 times more than what it would cost
an
Indian generic company to produce. For example, Pegasys (pegalyted
interferon)
a drug by Roche that is used to treat Hepatitis C (precursor of cancer
of the
liver) costs Rs 5,00,000 for the full course. Ten years back these MNCs
would
charge $10,000 (almost Rs 5 lakhs) for a year’s treatment for HIV AIDS
patients. Indian companies now offer the same medicines at a cost of
$100 a
year. This is the kind of profiteering that denies millions treatment,
which
OPPI wants to secure by lobbying with the PMO. That much is clear to
us, but
why is the PMO engaged in encouraging such a practice?
The timing
of the PMO’s peccadillo may supply an answer to this
question.