People's Democracy(Weekly Organ of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) |
Vol. XXXIII
No.
45 November 08, 2009 |
Congress-NCP
Ashok Dhawale
IT is now almost a fortnight
since the results of the
This accurately reflects the way
the INC-NCP regime
has been governing
GROWING
DISILLUSIONMENT
The table below gives a
comparative picture of the
seats won and the voting percentage of the four main parties and their
fronts
in the Vidhan Sabha elections of 2004 and 2009.
Party/Front
2004
2009
Seats Won Vote
% Seats
Won Vote %
INC
69
21.1
82
21.0
NCP
71
18.8
62
16.4
INC + NCP
140
39.9
144
37.4
SS
62
20.0
44
16.3
BJP
54
13.7
46
14.0
SS + BJP
116
33.7
90
30.3
What do these results indicate?
In terms of seats won, the INC
increased its tally by
13, while the NCP tally reduced by 9. This is partly because the INC
fought 174
seats as compared to 114 fought by the NCP this time. In 2004, this
ratio was
164:124. Taking advantage of the poor performance of the NCP in the
last Lok
Sabha polls, the INC wrested 10 more seats from the NCP this time in
seat
sharing. The INC-NCP alliance increased its seat tally from 140 to 144,
which
is exactly the half way mark in the 288-member state assembly. However,
a dozen
ministers of the INC-NCP regime have been defeated in this election.
The seats won by both the Shiv
Sena (SS) and the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) declined: the SS by 18 and the BJP by 8.
The seats
of the SS-BJP combine declined by 26, from 116 to just 90. This is its
lowest
tally ever � in 1990, when they first fought together it was 94, in
1995 when
they won it was 138, in 1999 when they lost in spite of the INC and NCP
fighting separately it was 125, and in 2004 it was 116. Moreover, it is
for the
first time in the last two decades since the SS-BJP alliance was formed
in 1989
that the SS has won less seats in the state assembly than the BJP. Thus
the
leader of the opposition in the assembly this time could well be from
the BJP.
This will be an additional source of heartburn and friction between the
two.
In terms of vote percentage
secured, the INC has
almost retained its vote, the BJP has marginally increased it, while
the NCP
has lost 2.4 per cent and the SS has lost 3.7 per cent. The INC-NCP
alliance
has lost 2.5 per cent, while the SS-BJP combine has lost 3.4 per cent.
In the
Lok Sabha polls held five months ago, the INC-NCP had got 38.9 per
cent, which
has now declined by 1.5 per cent; in the same election, the SS-BJP had
got 35.2
per cent, which has now declined by 4.9 per cent.
The total votes gained by all
these four parties along
with their allies in the 1999 Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha elections that
were
held simultaneously were nearly 95 per cent, leaving just 5 per cent to
all
other parties and independents. In the 2004 Vidhan Sabha polls, the
total vote
of all these four parties came to 73.6 per cent. In the 2009 Vidhan
Sabha
polls, this total has further declined to 67.7 per cent. Thus 32.3 per
cent,
which means almost one third of the electorate, has rejected all these
four
established parties in this election. This is an indication of the
growing
disillusionment of the people with all of them. However, this does not
point
towards any change in the correlation of class forces, since most of
these
votes have gone to smaller bourgeois parties and even some right-wing
parties like
the MNS and to rebels and independents.
The MNS has for the first time
won 13 seats in this
election and has secured 5.7 per cent of the vote. In the Lok Sabha
election,
although it did not win any seat, it got 4.1 per cent of the vote. It
then
fought 12 out of a total of 48 LS seats. It was then leading in 9
assembly
segments. Now it fought 144 of the 288 assembly seats, i.e. exactly
half the
seats. In the Lok Sabha election, the MNS ensured the defeat of the
SS-BJP and
the victory of the INC-NCP in 8 seats. In this election, it is
estimated that
the MNS has ensured the defeat of the SS-BJP in at least 47 assembly
seats. The
MNS helped the INC-NCP in two ways � first, it split the SS-BJP vote
and
second, it ensured the consolidation of the non-Marathi vote in the
cities
behind the INC-NCP.
Thus, in spite of the dismal
performance of the
INC-NCP regime on all fronts during the last 10 years of its rule ---
as evidenced
by thousands of peasant suicides, back-breaking price rise, breakdown
of the
PDS, chronic load-shedding of power, poor implementation of the NREGA
and the
Forest Rights Act, growing unemployment due to recession etc --- it
could
counter the anti-incumbency factor mainly because of the MNS. During
the last
three years, the INC-NCP regime constantly encouraged, instigated and
protected
the MNS in spite of its violent chauvinist activities. In both Lok
Sabha and
Vidhan Sabha elections, there are reliable reports that the INC-NCP
lavishly
financed the MNS leadership and many of its candidates as well.
Much of the minority vote went
to the INC-NCP, with
two significant exceptions of the two large minority-dominated cities
of
While the MNS factor was a major
reason for the defeat
of the SS-BJP, it was not the only one. In and out of the state
assembly, the
SS-BJP combine during the last five years failed to provide an
effective
opposition. There were several burning issues on which it did not put
the
government on the mat. The association of Hindutva forces with communal
riots,
bomb blasts and other divisive activities also put off the people at
large,
although the SS-BJP did gain a few seats in
The BSP had been on an upswing
in
Two other obnoxious features
that marked this election
were the unprecedented and unimaginable use of money power by all the
above
bourgeois parties on the one hand, and the proliferation of political
dynasties
on the other. The money power used in this election by far surpassed
all
earlier elections in
The offspring (or other
relatives) of top leaders like
the President of India, Union ministers Sharad Pawar, Vilasrao Deshmukh
and
Sushil Kumar Shinde, state ministers Chhagan Bhujbal and Ganesh Naik,
Congress
MP Eknath Gaikwad and BJP leader Gopinath Munde, all won the election.
This
list only takes into account some of the prominent leaders; there are
many more
offspring or relatives of lesser leaders who have also won. The
daughter of
former BJP leader Pramod Mahajan, however, lost. This �neo-feudal� rise
of
political dynasties is directed towards ensuring that both economic and
political power remains an exclusive preserve of the family.
THE RLDF
EXPERIENCE
The Left Democratic Front (LDF)
had been formed in
The 2009 Lok Sabha polls saw the
defeat of all three
RPI candidates in the fray. Two of them --- Ramdas Athavale and
Rajendra Gavai
--- fought as part of the INC-NCP alliance while Prakash Ambedkar
fought
independently. This defeat led to a wave of anger among the
pro-Republican
dalit masses who rightly concluded that both the Congresses had
deliberately
sabotaged the chances of their leaders.
Ramdas Athavale took the lead in
forging Republican
unity and all major factions, except the Prakash Ambedkar faction, came
together to resurrect the Republican Party of India, the idea of which
had been
mooted by Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar. Both the INC-NCP and the SS-BJP tried
to
entice the united RPI to their fold. But Athavale refused the Rajya
Sabha
ticket offered to him last month by the NCP and also rejected out of
hand the
offer of a future deputy chief ministership dangled by the SS-BJP.
The LDF --- particularly the PWP
and the CPI(M) ---
reached out to the RPI and invited it to be a major part of the
emerging third
front. The RPI accepted the invitation. Other forces like the SP and
some small
secular parties under the banner of the Parivartan Front also agreed to
join
the new coalition. Thus, all the four main forces that had led the
historic
Samyukta Maharashtra movement in the late fifties � undivided CPI, PWP,
RPI and
Socialists � along with some others came together to form the
Republican Left
Democratic Front (RLDF).
On August 24, 2009, the RLDF
comprising 17 different
parties was formed at a meeting in Mumbai and this development was
reported in
a press conference the same day. Within 15 days, on September 7, the
RLDF
declared its seat sharing formula for 200 assembly seats. On September
12, the
RLDF held its first one lakh strong rally in Mumbai. On September 15,
it
released its election manifesto at another press conference and printed
one
lakh copies of it for distribution in each assembly constituency. On
September
23, it began its series of joint election rallies in the districts
which
continued till the end of the campaign and evoked good popular
response. On
September 25, it announced its seat sharing for all the 288 seats. In
every one
of these steps, the RLDF was far ahead of its two main rivals.
One problem came when Rajendra
Gavai, son of Kerala
governor R S Gavai, left both the RLDF and the united RPI, and declared
that he
would fight 15 seats on his own strength. Later he teamed up with the
Congress,
which threw him the crumb of two seats, both of which he lost. It was
clear
that the Gavai father-son duo had once again succumbed to Congress
pressure.
But most of Gavai�s associates unequivocally declared that they would
remain
with the RLDF and the united RPI, regardless of Gavai�s antics.
Although the RLDF suffered from
the limitation that it
was formed on the very eve of elections and was not the product of any
joint
struggles on people�s issues, it nevertheless was a positive step in
the given
conditions. It brought all secular, democratic and progressive forces
together
on one political platform.
It was expected that the RLDF
would win around 20 to
25 seats in this election. It actually won 11 seats as follows: PWP �
4, SP �
4, CPI(M) � 1, Rashtriya Samaj Party � 1, Swabhimani Party � 1. The RPI
did not
win any seat, but two independents supported by it won. The CPI, JD(S)
and
other smaller parties won no seats. However, the positive feature was
that the
RLDF secured 24.64 lakh votes and independents supported by it got
another 6.06
lakh votes, making it a total of 30.70 lakh votes, which is 6.9 per
cent of the
total votes polled. It should be mentioned that the BRP Prakash
Ambedkar
faction � not a part of the RLDF - won two seats in its base of
However, it must also be
mentioned that there were
opportunist trends in some of the RLDF constituents, which damaged its
credibility. The print and electronic media almost blanked the RLDF out
when
the actual campaign began. Despite these limitations, if the RLDF is
built up
through joint struggles of the people, and if the above instances of
opportunism can be checked, it can emerge as a force to reckon with in
the
future.
THE CPI(M)�S
PERFORMANCE
The CPI(M) contested 20 seats as
part of the RLDF. Of
these, 10 were ST reserved seats. Three of its candidates were women,
and one
of them was a tribal woman. It got a total of 2,70,052 votes in all
these 20
seats put together (see the details given in these columns last week).
Of its
three sitting seats, it could win only one � the Dahanu (ST) seat in
Thane
district. It lost the other two � Kalwan (ST) in Nashik district and
Solapur Central
in Solapur district --- to the NCP and INC respectively. This was
undoubtedly a
major setback.
The final conclusions on the
CPI(M)�s performance can
be drawn only after the district committees and the state Committee
complete
their reviews by November-end. But some preliminary conclusions can be
drawn.
In Kalwan, the CPI(M) had an
excellent candidate J P
Gavit, a member of the party�s state secretariat, secretary of the its
Nashik
district committee, state president of the AIKS and six-term MLA. He
had won
the seat constantly since 1978, with one exception in 1995. However,
the CPI(M)
still lost the Kalwan seat by a large 16,000 vote margin to the
powerful NCP
candidate, who was a seven-term MLA and was also a former state
minister. In
the Lok Sabha election five months ago, the CPI(M) had got 49,164 votes
in the
Kalwan segment, and this increased by nearly 9,000 votes to reach
58,135 in
this election. But it still lost for the following main reasons.
First and most important, nearly
27,000 votes of the
SS-BJP were transferred to the NCP for both political and money
considerations
in this election. This is clearly seen from the fact that the BJP
candidate had
got 37,524 votes in this segment in the Lok Sabha elections five months
ago,
but the vote plummeted down to just 10,628 now for the SS candidate.
Thus there
was an anti-CPI(M) gang-up of all forces, and this vote transfer was
managed by
the sitting BJP MP who also hails from Gavit�s Surgana tehsil and has
always
been a bitter foe of the CPI(M) for decades. Second, delimitation had
an
adverse impact since the entirely new Kalwan tehsil, where we are
organisationally weak, was joined to the Surgana tehsil, which is our
strong
base. Kalwan tehsil has always been the strong base of the NCP MLA who
has won
from here for the last seven times. Third, it was in this Kalwan tehsil
that
the NCP MLA poured crores of rupees in the last three days, apart from
throwing
innumerable mutton and liquor parties. We could stop this in Surgana,
but were
unable to do so in Kalwan.
In Solapur, the CPI(M) had
another excellent candidate
Narsayya Adam, a member of the its state secretariat, secretary of the
its Solapur
district committee, state vice president of the CITU and three-term
MLA. However,
it still lost the Solapur Central seat by a massive 33,000 vote margin
to the INC
candidate, whose only qualification was that she was the daughter of
union
power minister and former chief minister Sushil Kumar Shinde. The
CPI(M) got
34,664 votes and lost for the following main reasons:
First and foremost was the
unprecedented money power
unleashed by the Congress in the last three days. Although the CPI(M)
lodged
many complaints to the EC against the mutton and liquor parties
organised by
the Congress, nothing was done. It was impossible to stop this massive
outpouring of money. The same money power was witnessed when actors
like Salman
Khan, Ritesh Deshmukh, Sunil Shetty and Mohan Babu were specially
brought to
Solapur for road shows as part of the campaign for Shinde�s daughter.
Second, a
large section of the middle class and the youth (where the CPI(M) is
weak), and
a big section of minority votes (the Imam of Delhi�s Jama Masjid was
specially
brought in to campaign) and dalit votes (because Shinde is himself a
dalit) went
to the Congress. Third, due to delimitation, over 1 lakh 10 thousand
new voters
were added to the old constituency. Although we did our best to cover
this new
area, the lack of a party organisation here became a great constraint.
Fourth,
here again, the BJP-SS, which had secured over 47,000 votes in this
segment in
the Lok Sabha election five months ago, came down to just 26,000 now.
Many of
these votes went to the Congress.
The saving grace was that the
CPI(M) was able to
retain the Dahanu (ST) seat in Thane district, where it defeated the
sitting
three-term NCP MLA by a margin of over 16,000 votes. In the Lok Sabha
elections,
the CPI(M) had got 55,298 votes in this segment. They now increased by
more
than 7,000 to reach 62,530. Our winning candidate here was Rajaram
Ozare, a
member of the party�s state committee, secretary of its Thane district
committee, working president of the state AIKS and a one-term MLA.
The CPI(M) thus achieved a
record of winning the
assembly seat in Thane district for 31 years in the last eight
elections --- in
a row since 1978 without a single break. The other distinguishing
feature here
is that in these eight elections, the party has put up four different
candidates, following the practice of giving no more than two or three
terms to
the same comrade. It has been shown in Thane district that the party
cadres
work for, and the people also vote for and give victory to the CPI(M),
not just
the individual candidate. In no other district of Maharashtra has this
happened
so far. But this is the direction in which we have to go.
The Dahanu victory was by no
means easy. Here also,
the landlord-industrialist lobby tried its best to set up a single
candidate to
defeat the CPI(M). But the latter managed to ensure that this did not
happen.
Here also, the vote transfer from the BJP-SS to the NCP took place, but
it was
not of the Kalwan and Solapur magnitude. The BJP had got 24,667 votes
in the
Lok Sabha poll five months ago; the SS now got only 17,955 votes, which
means
that nearly 7,000 votes were transferred to the NCP. Similarly, over
11,000
votes got by the Bahujan Vikas Aghadi (BVA) in the last Lok Sabha
election were
also transferred to the NCP, since the BVA had no candidate here and
was in
alliance with the INC-NCP elsewhere in the district. Here, too,
delimitation
was a problem, because more than half of Dahanu tehsil (including
Dahanu city),
which has been a Congress-NCP stronghold, was joined to Talasari
tehsil, which
is a CPI(M) stronghold. But the CPI(M) put in special efforts during
the last
three years to strengthen the party organisation and mass organisations
in
Dahanu tehsil, and it was this effort that paid off. Here also, crores
of
rupees were spent by the NCP candidate, but in both Talasari and Dahanu
tehsils, volunteer squads of hundreds of young comrades kept night-long
vigils
in several villages during the last few days before the election to
partly
prevent the use of money power.
Regardless of the votes the
CPI(M) got in each of the
20 seats it fought, it was a heartening feature of this election that
the party
unitedly led an enthusiastic political campaign in each of these seats.
The
mass rallies in some of the constituencies addressed by central party
leaders
were truly impressive. The Dahanu rally of 25,000 in drenching rain,
the
Surgana Borgaon rally of 15,000, the Solapur rally of 12,000, the
Vikramgad
rally of 8,000, the Kinwat rally of 7,000 and the Nashik rally of 5,000
were
some of the highlights of this campaign. CPI(M) general secretary
Prakash
Karat, Polit Bureau member and Tripura chief minister Manik Sarkar,
Polit Bureau
members Dr M K Pandhe, Sitaram Yechury and Brinda Karat, and Central
Committee
members Mohd Salim and Subhashini Ali took part in the election
campaign in
The CPI(M)�s Maharashtra state
committee meeting, to
be held on November 29-30, will undertake in detail a
political-organisational
review of these elections and will decide on the steps to be taken not
only to
combat these reverses, but also to forge ahead in Maharashtra in the
days to
come.