How Are Defence Industries Being Forced To Natural (?) Death

A Test Case of Vehicle Factory, Jabalpur

Badal Saroj

ONE can very well take a lesson, if it is required at all, from the deeds of political masters of the day. Mesmerised by the ongoing LPG economic policies, they are converting into ruins a clean and tidy house by smearing it over with scraps, crumbs and rubbish. In fact, their pronounced love for liberalisation and privatisation at times goes to the extent of a criminal offence when we see how they deal with the defence industries, and in particular the ordnance factories which are the backbone of defence preparedness. It is only the strong internal features of these establishments and the concerned trade unions� deep sense of integrity with the nation that keep these establishments going in the midst of the current adverse circumstances.

One of the important defence industries in Madhya Pradesh is the Vehicle Factory, Jabalpur (VFJ) which can be taken as a test case to see how these industries are being pushed to a natural (?) death by the same people who are responsible for their protection.

On November 28, 2007, A K Antony, the defence minister, replied to a question from Tapan Sen and Mohammed Amin (No 888) in Rajya Sabha, saying that the existing strength of workers in the VFJ is 3866 as against the sanctioned strength of 7464. (This included only the industrial employees.) In reply to the question as to how the government plans to fill up the existing vacancies, about half of the total strength, the minister cleverly replied that they are being filled up in accordance with the government policy of annual direct recruitment plan (ADRP). It may be noted that the ADRP was introduced during the NDA regime in year 2001 with the aim of an assured reduction in manpower strength, and that the UPA government has preferred to continue with it. The minister did not pay heed to the cruel fact that only 10 posts (out of the remaining 3598 vacancies!) were sanctioned in the year 2007-08 to be filled up by recruitment.

The changing age and qualification profile of the employees may help us understand the frightful consequences of such wilful omission. As many as 58 percent employees are in the age group of 50--60 years. Natural wastage due to retirement, death etc is on the rise. In the last three years, as many as 1296 employees have retired. If this trend is allowed to continue, it is estimated that the employee strength will get reduced to 2282 by the year 2011-12.

Dipankar Mukherjee, former member of parliament and vice president of the All India Defence Employees Federation, wrote a letter to the defence minister on February 4, 2008, drawing his attention to the problem. He also noted that the VFJ is only a part of the larger game of planned manpower erosion in the existing ordnance factories under the ministry of defence. The total manpower strength of 39 ordnance factories was 1,48,375 in 1998-99, as compared to 1,17,649 in 2004-05. The year-wise details are given alongside:

Year	Manpower Strength	Year	Manpower Strength
1998-99	1,48,375	2002-03	1,26,363
1999-00	1,44,852	2003-04	1,20,551
2000-01	1,38,551	2004-05	1,17,649
2001-02	1,31,907	Depletion in six years	30,726

According to B Guha Thakurta, joint secretary of the All India Defence Employees Federation, the impact of this depletion of human resources is not limited to the quantitative aspects of the manpower; to a large extent it has led to a dearth of experienced working hands due to the natural wastage as those going out could not pass on their valued experience to the newcomers. The discontinuation of induction has also left its imprint on the education profile which has got disturbed. As many as 43.17 percent of the workers are educated up to matriculation; 19.21 percent out of them are illiterate. In spite of these odds, however, employees have improved progressively their performance. The annual output was worth Rs 850 crore in 2001-02 but it is estimated to be Rs 1,170 crore in the current financial year.

Regarding an optimal utilisation of the ordnance factories� capacity in order to reduce our dependence on foreign imports, Dipankar Mukherjee said, �Ordnance factories are industrial units to be run on long term manpower planning and not on the basis of year to year ADRP, based on a fiat of �no recruitment� policy for government departments, the functioning of which cannot be equated with armed forces, and defence production is an integral part of the armed forces.� It does not, of course, mean that a ban on recruitment is a wise proposition for other departments. Defence production, however, needs to considered an exception as we can neither leave it for the foreign multinational companies nor rely upon casual and unskilled workers of brought in by contractors. But the way the problems are currently being dealt with, raises a question whether or not the policy makers are at all interested in maintaining the ordnance factories like the VFJ as departmental undertakings. Isn�t it that they are inching forward towards their hand-over to private companies in the name of a level playing field?

To meet the requirements of changing defence procurement procedures, the VFJ needs to acquire, absorb and assimilate new technology. It needs to strengthen in-house research and development (R&D) as well as introduction of newer concepts of quality management. For all these, it requires induction of qualified new generation staff and workforce. But how can these be achieved without a change in the concept of economising which is responsible for the present crisis? It demands a reversal of the policy of outsourcing the jobs of trained and experienced workforce to contractors who engage labourers on abysmally low wages and exploit them by despotic actions, with all kinds of circumvention of labour laws? For instance, what would happen if a cranky economist, for instant money saving, suggests actions like replacing concrete bunkers in the war field by clay ones? He would instantly endanger the country�s defence and compel the nation to succumb to multinational defence industries in an exigency situation. One need not be a learned economist to understand this simple fact that in a �liberalised� world of heartless competition, one cannot think of sailing in a boat with ramshackle oars and dilapidated radars.

To quote from what Mukherjee wrote, �I am afraid that such short-sighted manpower planning on piecemeal basis, coupled with the continuous threat of grabbing the orders of these units by private sector led by CII and FICCI in the name of level playing field, would have serious impact on the government owned defence production sector, including the long term validity of these units in coming days. Ironically, when the CII and FICCI are putting pressure on the government to open up defence production on the plea of additional employment, existing employment is being reduced drastically in government defence units.�

The revised defence procurement procedure (DPP) also needs serious scrutiny. Employees� organisations have already lodged protests against it. Tapan Sen, a member of the Rajya Sabha and national secretary of the CITU, wrote to the defence minister on the subject, saying the DPP 2006 has categorised the transport vehicles required for operational purposes as non-strategic, thus requiring prior approval of the finance ministry for any placement of orders on the VFJ.

There are also disquieting reports of delayed placement of orders, that too in inadequate numbers. In 2006-07, 50 percent of the procurement was kept withheld; it was released only in the month of December after several rounds of talks.

Such step-motherly treatment to this industrial unit of the ministry of defence, which was established for catering to the defence service, does not end here. The VFJ is left exposed to an unfair competition with the private sector. The acquisition wing of the army has asked the VFJ to come through the �request for production� (RFP) route along with other possible contenders even for the manufacture of variants of the existing series of production, instead of the nomination route. All this, according to one estimate, has a cost implication to the extent of several crores of rupees every year. Of course, only the workforce will be blamed for it, while they are not really responsible for it.

Thus the VFJ serves as a test case to see how the productive public assets are being subjected to under-utilisation of capacity and non-performance in the name of competitiveness.