People's Democracy

Rethinking Sepoy ‘Mutinies’ In Chotanagpur

S Sinha

THE sepoy ‘mutinies’ and other adivasi and peasant rebellions posed a significant challenge to the British in Chotanagpur during 1857. It began with a ‘mutiny’ of the sepoys at Hazaribagh on July 30 and soon engulfed the tribal heartland. A detachment of the Ramgarh regiment sent to disarm the Hazaribagh mutineers, defied orders and marched back to Ranchi under the leadership of Jamadar Madhav Singh and Subedar Nadir Ali Khan. On their way they were joined by the Hazaribagh ‘mutineers’ and on reaching Ranchi, Jaimangal Pandey joined the rebel forces with his entire battalion. This essay investigates the nature of sepoy ‘mutinies’ in Chotanagpur. It also examines their relationship with Christian missionaries, and the whole question of ‘plunder’ by the sepoys. Taking into account the inaccessible topography of the region, the short-lived period of the revolt, the poor organisation of the concerned battalions, and the efforts made by the rebel sepoys to organise an administration, it advocates for a more sympathetic understanding of the sepoy actions—which were definitely more than just ‘spontaneous’ acts.

Situating the sepoy ‘mutinies’

With the exception of Santhal Parganas, there was a pattern in the sepoy ‘revolts’ taking place in Chotanagpur—units from Hazaribagh, Ramgarh, Purulia (Manbhum), and Singhbhum marching towards the local power centre—Ranchi. The modus operandi was also similar: attacking official bungalows and buildings, looting the treasury, destroying government records, breaking jails, releasing prisoners and marching to Ranchi. In Singhbhum the onward march of the sepoys was blocked by the raja of Porahat, Arjun Singh. In Santhal Paraganas, one comes across three phases of sepoy action. On June 8 (a week after the rising at Meerut), three men attacked three offices with swords and killed Sir Norman Leslie. In mid-August, the 5th Irregular Cavalry ‘mutinied’ and marched to Rohini (the headquarters of the 5th Irregular Cavalry). On the way they were joined by their comrades and together they marched to Bausi, the headquarters of the 32nd Native Infantry. Later on, in October, a detachment of the 32nd Native Infantry ‘mutinied’, murdered the commanding officer and marched to Rohini after plundering the Bazar.

Once in Ranchi, the sepoys (and other rebels) made serious efforts to enlarge their social base by mobilising and neutralising influential local zamindars. To secure political legitimacy for the rebellious order, they also approached various zamindars related to the old ‘Chotanagpur Raj’. The first to be approached was Biswanath Sahi—a Nagbanshi Rajput connected to Maharaja of Chotanagpur and stationed at Palkote—who declined the offer. Subsequently, they requested Jagarnath Sahi (Maharaja of Chotanagpur) who declined to join. Biswanath Sahi was finally persuaded to lead the rebel administration.

To solicit political support from other quarters the new regime sent emissaries to Chaibasa, Sambalpur and Purulia. Sheik Panch Kauri, the subedar in charge of the Doranda detachment in Sambalpur was instructed to march to Doranda with the treasure. In case of any difficulty, he was asked to release the prisoners and utilise their services. Rudrangshu Mukherje says that during the uprising in Awadh, men moved from one cantonment to another carrying the message of the ‘mutiny’. In Chotanagpur they went beyond and also approached the rebellious kings and zamindars. Thus, the sepoys sent to Chaibasa to spread the word of the ‘mutiny’, also approached the rebellious king of Porahat, Arjun Singh.

Efforts were also made to organise a government. The official bungalows in the Doranda cantonment were made headquarters of the rebel administration. Bishwanath Sahi used to hold court in the captain Natron’s bungalow. On August 4, the proclamation of the Padshahi Raj was circulated throughout the district. The new regime also made efforts to strengthen the propaganda machinery. Balgovind Shahi and Nathi Ali Khan were given charge of publicity of the Padshahi Raj. Biswanath Sahi and his followers also carried out intense propaganda among the local tribes. As articulated by them, British rule had ended not only in Chotanagpur but all over India. The military junta appointed Dost Ali Khan (a Jamadar) in charge of accounts, while Jaimangal Pandey took charge of the treasury.

To strengthen their position militarily the rebels employed prisoners as camp followers in the cantonments. They also made recruitments from Bhojpur, Bihar, Aurangabad and other parts, imparting these people with regular military training. A large number of military pensioners were also taken into service. In order to counter the principal ‘loyalists’ (like Jagatpal Singh of Pithoria and the Raja of Ramgarh) and to prevent the movement of British forces in Chotanagpur, attempts were made to cut off Ramgarh and the Pithoria Ghats. The Sahi administration subjugated and ransacked Pithoria, cut dikes, and threw trees on the connecting road.

Towards the end of August, the military leaders also called a political conference at Ranchi to resolve potential issues and deliberate on the future course of action. Here differences developed among the rebel ranks and three factions emerged – viz. the Hindustanies, Ramgarhies, and Bhagalpurains. The Hindustanies (sepoys from western India and Bihar) led by Madhav Singh and Ganpat Rai were interested in forming a joint front with Kunwar Singh. The Ramgarhies (consisting of sepoys from Shahabad, Gaya, Monghyr, etc.) who were guided by Biswanath Sahi, were fiercely against the restoration of British power. They wanted to capture Hazaribagh and Chatra and extend the zone of rebel administration up to the Grand Trunk road. Their plan also involved attacking the Raja of Ramgarh—the principal collaborator of the British—and confiscating his estate. The Bhagalpurians (composed mostly of upper castes like Brahmins) were under the influence of Jaimangal Pandey and were more interested in rescuing the beleaguered Chaibasa sepoys under the ‘employment’ of Arjun Singh. Ganpat Rai was successful in politically isolating Biswanath Sahi and Madhav Singh, insistent on joining Kunwar Singh at Rohtasgarh, finally persuaded the soldiers to move out of Ranchi leaving Biswanath Sahi behind.

Sepoys and the Christian missionaries

Though the language of resistance was articulated in terms of religion, the attacks on churches, missions, and missionaries in Chotanagpur clearly had an agrarian dimension. The German missionaries involved with social service among the Kols, had been directing the peasants to resist feudal exactions. In fact, one of the factors behind the conversion of Kols to Christianity was the ferocity with which the German missionaries took up the grievances of the Kol peasants against the feudal chiefs. The support of the Hindu zamindars to sepoy ‘mutineers’ was therefore deeply connected with agrarian tensions involving the tribals.

Biswanath Sahi complained that the (converted) Kol peasants were settling in his zamindari without his permission and patta. The peasants in turn accused Biswanath Sahi and his managers of forcefully carrying away their cattle and grain. What really irritated Bishwanath Sahi was that the complaints lodged by the peasants had been upheld by several British authorities, including J. H. Davies (the district officer); the court of judicial commissioner (W. H. Oakes); Sadar Nizamat Adalat; and Halliday, the Lieutenant Governor. Clashes between Christian ryots and Hindu zamindars in Lohardaggah were reflective of such agrarian tensions. Likewise, the burning of W.H. Oakes’ residence and firing at the German Church in Ranchi was associated with their partiality vis-à-vis the Christian Kols’. Later, on becoming the head of the rebel administration at Ranchi, Biswanath Sahi persecuted many Christian ryots asserting their rights as peasants.

Sepoys and plunder

The notion of ‘indiscriminate plunder’ generally ascribed to the sepoys also needs to be properly contextualised. In Chotanagpur, one can discern two distinct phases of sepoy action. Thus, the first phase lasted upto the proclamation of Padshahi Raj and the calling of political conference was characterised by attacks on direct and immediate symbols of the British government—treasuries, courts, prisons, official bungalows, and revenue records. At Hazaribagh, the rebels attacked the treasury, the kutchery building and the records’ room, the officers’ bungalows, (burnt Simpson’s bungalow and fired upon the bungalows of Captain Drew and Dr. Delpratt), a part of the bazaar, and the agency and district jails. Similarly, in Purulia (Manbhum), they plundered the district officer’s bungalow and bazaar, the treasury, court property, revenue records (settlement papers) and released all the prisoners from the jail. Even in this drive, there was the logic of selectivity involved in the targets chosen. Thus while making the victory procession at Ranchi, the rebel Ramgarh regiment did not attack ‘Wilkinson Saheb Ki Kothi’—Chotanagpur, Commissioner Dalton’s residence—though they burnt other residential buildings.

The second, more extreme, phase of plunder began soon after the political conference at Ranchi. It was largely related to the decision to join Kunwar Singh at Rohtasgarh and the problems of resource mobilisation. In this context, the backing out of allies— who had earlier promised to provide logistical support—created serious problems. The ‘plunder of Ranchi’ and forceful mobilisation of carriages, coolies, and ponies at Ranchi and Balumath and attacks on traders and civilian population after this at Chatra were connected with the needs for greater resource mobilisation. But even in extreme circumstances, the ‘plunder’ component was not entirely indiscriminate. While plundering Ranchi, the rebels left untouched a bungalow belonging to Doctor Brougham, ‘a friend of Dr. Collumn’. They also did not attack a government hospital housing 50 sick people. Interestingly, what needs to be highlighted is that this plunder was directed against some of their own leaders who refused to cooperate. Thus, six famous chiefs of Chotanagpur were confined and almost held in captivity. This included Pandey Ganpat Rai, the commander-in-chief of the rebel government and Thakur Biswanath Sahi, the head the military government.

Sepoy versus ‘civil’ rebellions

While the sepoy component largely subsided after the defeat at the Battle of Chatra (October 1857), the adivasi and ‘civil’ rebellions in Chotanagpur continued to trouble British till 1860-61. The relationship between the sepoy ‘mutinies’ and the ‘civil’ rebellions is widely debated. According to Majumdar, the civil population revolted only after the withdrawal of British authority, in the context when British rule had collapsed and there was a political vacuum, while S. B Chaudhury divides 1857 into two ‘distinct historical aspects’— the military ‘mutiny’ and the ‘civil’ rebellion. In Chotanagpur, the sepoy ‘mutinies’ and ‘civil’ rebellions either closely followed each other or were happening around the same time. They were closely connected to and reinforced each other. Palamau saw a distinct merger of the sepoy and ‘civil’ elements to pose a formidable challenge to British rule, while in Singhbhum, the ‘civil’ rebellion preceded the sepoy rising. The ‘civil’ rebellions were neither entirely created by 1857, nor were they essentially anti-British throughout their course. In fact, they gave vent to many existing tensions and conflicts. What is interesting is that these tensions intersected with the dynamics generated by sepoy ‘mutinies’ and altered the socio-political configurations, thereby assuming a serious anti-colonial dimension. This is where lay the strength of the spirit of 1857.