People's Democracy(Weekly Organ of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) |
Vol.
XXIX
No. 49 December 04, 2005 |
ALTERNATIVE
PROPOSAL FOR RESOURCE MOBILISATION
Investment
Without Disinvestment
Dipankar
Mukherjee
TWO
major revival schemes approved by the UPA government since it came to power
involved considerable fund-based and non-fund based financial investments. Both
are in private sector with investments coming from public sector. These packages
were carried out without waiting for “return” on any Investment
Fund created out of disinvestments and, of course, without any other
or alternative proposal from the Left for resource mobilisation being
considered. The first one was the takeover of Global Trust Bank by public
sector Oriental Bank of Commerce Bank (OBC) involving Rs 2,500 crore
and the other one is
revival of Dabhol Power Company (DPC) involving Rs 10,000 crore through
two PSUs, NTPC and GAIL along with public sector financial institutions and
banks.
However,
there was a difference. In the case of OCB, the finance minister took a
pro-active stand, quite rightly so, in the interest of the thousands of
depositors. But in the case of the revival of DPC, through its conversion to a
new company – Ratnagiri Gas and Power Company – the finance minister
reclused himself from the exercise of revival of DPC on ethical grounds. The
inference is that notwithstanding the non-existence of a so-called “investment
fund”, “other proposal from Left on resource mobilisation” and even with
or without finance minister’s involvement, the revival of private outfits
costing more than thousands of crores of public money is possible.
This
simply shows where there is a will, there is a way.
Even NTPC and GAIL, the two navaratna
PSUs, could be roped in to
revitalise a foreign private power company which was found
non-viable because its tariff was
incompetitive (in global terms). Look at it the other way, GAIL
is a gas transportation company but still it
could be engaged to infuse funds to the tune of Rs 500 crore in a private
power company! But if we talk about reviving PSUs like Hindustan Cables (which
supplies cables to BSNL and MTNL) by BSNL or MTNL, Bharat Heavy Plate &
Vessels (BHPV) by Hindustan Petroleum, its major client, or public sector wagon
making units like Burn Standard, Braithwaite, Bharat Wagon units by Indian
Railways, BCCL and ECL by merging with Coal India etc, we will be charged of
blasphemy by reformers in the government and walk
the talkers or talk the talkers in corporate media.
Not
only that, the 30 odd sick PSUs, recommended for revival by Board for
Reconstruction of Public Sector Enterprises (BRPSE), reportedly envisages
infusion of Rs 418 crore for revival, excluding the non-fund requirement of
financial restructuring. These revival packages are kept pending for last one
year on the plea of fund crunch. One thing is certain, revival of all the sick
CPSUs, would not cost more
than the cost involved in reviving DPC,
i.e. Rs 10,000 crore. Money is not the problem. It is the lack of will
which cannot be substituted by any alternative proposal for resource
mobilisation.
WHERE
IS THE MONEY?
At
present there are 230 operating central public sector undertakings (CPSUs) as
per the ‘Public Enterprise Survey, 2003-2004’. Out of these, 140 are
profit-making units and 90 are loss-making units. The net profit after tax in
2003-2004 if all the CPSUs are taken together is Rs
53,168 crore and dividend paid to the government was Rs
15,282 crore. And these CPSUs have
reserve and surplus of Rs 2,59,576 crore.
Analysis
Of Investment By The Central PSUs (2003-04)
(Rs
Crores)
S.
No |
Name
of the Public Sector Undertaking |
Reserves
and Surplus |
Investment |
Work
In Progress |
Cash
& Bank Balance |
Net
Worth |
1. |
Cotton
Corpn. of India Ltd |
221 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
Positive
|
2. |
National
Fertiliser Ltd |
590 |
0 |
1 |
196 |
Positive
(L) |
3. |
Bharat
Dynamics Ltd |
303 |
1 |
1 |
1167 |
Positive
|
4. |
MRPL
Ltd |
349 |
0 |
3 |
27 |
Positive
(L) |
5. |
Bharat
Earth Movers Ltd |
564 |
4 |
2 |
508 |
Positive |
6. |
Manganese
Ore (India) Ltd |
136 |
0 |
2 |
71 |
Positive
(L) |
7. |
Dredging
Corpn. of India Ltd |
761 |
0 |
13 |
361 |
Positive
|
8. |
Bharat
Heavy Electricals Ltd |
5051 |
29 |
109 |
2660 |
Positive
(L) |
9. |
Rashtriya
Chemicals & Fertilisers Ltd |
695 |
0 |
19 |
32 |
Positive
(L) |
10. |
Kudermukh
Iron Ore Co Ltd |
716 |
17 |
5 |
603 |
Positive
(L) |
11. |
Indian
Rare Earths Ltd |
130 |
0 |
4 |
129 |
Positive
|
12. |
Hindustan
Newsprint Ltd |
109 |
0 |
4 |
4 |
Positive
|
13. |
Electronic
Corpn. of India Ltd |
163 |
2 |
6 |
212 |
Positive
|
14. |
Bharat
Electronic Ltd |
1169 |
26 |
34 |
1435 |
Positive
(L) |
15. |
RITES
Ltd |
279 |
20 |
0 |
139 |
Positive
|
16. |
Northern
Coal fields Ltd |
3126 |
115 |
113 |
60 |
Positive
(L) |
17. |
National
Minerals Dev Corpn. Ltd |
1895 |
75 |
66 |
1092 |
Positive
(L) |
18. |
Kochi
refineries Ltd |
1667 |
71 |
74 |
305 |
Positive
(L) |
19. |
Mahanagar
Telrphone Nigam Ltd |
9698 |
381 |
482 |
2553 |
Positive
(L) |
20. |
Container
Corporation of India Ltd |
1312 |
3 |
115 |
599 |
Positive
(L) |
21. |
Pawan
Hans Helicopters India Ltd |
122 |
0 |
12 |
504 |
Positive
|
22. |
Garden
Reach Ship Build & Engrs Ltd |
160 |
0 |
16 |
570 |
Positive
|
23. |
Central
Warehousing Corpn |
736 |
60 |
14 |
30 |
Positive
|
24. |
Goa
Shipyard Ltd` |
153 |
0 |
18 |
136 |
Positive
|
25. |
Oil
India Ltd |
3855 |
225 |
235 |
1176 |
Positive
(L) |
26. |
Bharat
Sanchar Nigam Ltd |
50518 |
200 |
5855 |
11557 |
Positive
(L) |
27. |
IBP
Co Ltd |
603 |
16 |
76 |
664 |
Positive
|
28. |
IRCON
International Ltd |
707 |
122 |
0 |
479 |
Positive
|
29.
|
Airport
Authority of India |
2603 |
10 |
456 |
1251 |
Positive
(L) |
30. |
Shipping
Corpn. of India |
2115 |
1 |
386 |
483 |
Positive
(L) |
31. |
Engineers
India Ltd |
734 |
137 |
1 |
664 |
Positive
|
32. |
Andrew
Yule & Co Ltd |
109 |
16 |
5 |
26 |
Positive
|
33.
|
Bongaigaon
Refinery & Petrochem Ltd |
353 |
66 |
12 |
3 |
Positive
|
34. |
Tlecom
Consultants India Ltd |
381 |
86 |
0 |
240 |
Positive
|
35. |
GAIL
(India) Ltd |
6599 |
772 |
814 |
1568 |
Positive
(L) |
36. |
Mahanadi
Coal fields Ltd |
2157 |
344 |
220 |
166 |
Positive
(L) |
37. |
Numaligarh
Refinery Ltd |
400 |
0 |
126 |
26 |
Positive
(L) |
38. |
National
Aluminium Company Ltd |
3112 |
200 |
791 |
98 |
Positive
(L) |
39. |
MMTC
Ltd |
622 |
198 |
3 |
2819 |
Positive
|
40. |
Balmer
Lawrie and Co Ltd |
159 |
50 |
2 |
10 |
Positive
|
41. |
Hindustan
Petroleum Corpn. Ltd |
7404 |
2050 |
496 |
197 |
Positive
(L) |
42. |
Western
Coalfields Ltd |
1449 |
321 |
189 |
340 |
Positive
(L) |
43. |
STC
of India Ltd |
266 |
97 |
0 |
3014 |
Positive
|
44. |
ONGC
Ltd |
39117 |
15468 |
983 |
8742 |
Positive
(L) |
45. |
Indian
Oil Corpn Ltd |
21879 |
5779 |
5486 |
698 |
Positive
(L) |
46. |
Neyveli
Lignite Corpn. Ltd |
5169 |
2591 |
183 |
1208 |
Positive
(L) |
47. |
Chennai
Petroeum Corpn. Lt |
1462 |
12 |
854 |
12 |
Positive
(L) |
48. |
Bharat
Petroleum Corpn. Ltd |
5550 |
1977 |
1408 |
627 |
Positive
(L) |
49. |
NTPC
Ltd |
28275 |
17347 |
7495 |
609 |
Positive
(L) |
50. |
Power
Grid Corpn of India Ltd |
5454 |
1851 |
3
876 |
775 |
Positive
(L) |
51. |
Steel
Authority of India Ltd |
907 |
714 |
382 |
2017 |
Positive
(L) |
52. |
Nuclear
Power Corpn. Ltd |
7739 |
2647 |
9070 |
5166 |
Positive
(L) |
53. |
Narmada
H.E.D. Corpn. Ltd |
617 |
0 |
1529 |
659 |
Positive
(L) |
54. |
NHPC
Ltd. |
4534 |
3663 |
7781 |
174 |
Positive
(L) |
55. |
Coal
India Ltd |
3381 |
11114 |
2 |
1107 |
Positive
(L) |
56. |
NEEPCO
Ltd |
209 |
955 |
472 |
185 |
Positive
(L) |
57. |
ONGC
Videsh Ltd |
177 |
2987 |
3233 |
380 |
Positive
|
Positive
(L) denotes that company has Net Worth of more than Rs 1000 Crore. |
Source: Public
Enterprises Survey, 2003-04.
But
the most startling point is the low rate of investment of the available
reserves. While the government is, time and again, harping on
lack of resources to justify its one-point
agenda of disinvestment of
profitable PSUs, the reserves available within PSUs (as shown in the
accompanying table) is an eye opener for those who are genuinely interested in
investment in public sector and not in disinvestments. The table shows a study
of 57 public sector undertakings, which have both positive Net Worth and Net
Current Assets. The balance sheet data indicate that only 17 PSUs had invested
more than 33 per cent of their “Reserves & Surplus” in the year 2003-04.
The remaining 40 PSUs have invested less than 33 per cent, and a considerable
number have practically not been investing at all. In a few cases the magnitudes
are alarmingly large. BSNL, for instance, which has reserves of over Rs 50,000
crore and a cash/bank balance of over Rs 11,000 crore, has invested only 12 per
cent of its reserves and surplus (S.No 26), and similar is the case of the MTNL
(S.No 19), with only 9 per cent investment. Almost all the PSUs in the
hydrocarbon sector too appear to be underinvesting given their profitability and
internal accruals. There are, of course, some companies which are undertaking
aggressive investments, but these are relatively few (only 8 or 9 in this
sample).
In
the aggregate, there are 50 CPSUs which collectively have reserves and surpluses
of Rs 2,21,157 crore, amounting to
nearly 7.5 per cent of GDP, but are actively investing only Rs 81,805 crore,
i.e. 37 per cent of the available resources. In other words, more than 4.5 per
cent of GDP is locked up by these companies in bank deposits and government
securities. If GAIL, NTPC or OBC funds can be used for reviving private sector,
why not a part of CPSU reserves be used for revival of CPSUs? We need a revival
fund and not a disinvestment fund alias,
‘Investment Fund’ as per government’s terminology.
As
a matter of fact there are two major causes for lack of dynamism in investment
of the PSUs.
Firstly, successive governments since 1991 lost interest in actively
guiding and promoting the role and functioning of the PSUs. Most PSUs are also
not being allowed to chart their own course with long term vision in the
development of their sector, or in the economy at large. In the absence of such
vision and with increasing government encouragement to private sector
participation in practically all the sectors, there is neither a push to invest
nor an obvious need which has to be met. Secondly,
the internal impetus to investment and growth of the PSUs has been constrained
in the last 10 years as there has
been a growing demoralisation due to the uncertainties caused by the continuous
talk of disinvestments and
privatisation due to which most PSUs cannot take a long-term view of their
business strategy. `
The
government would in all likelihood come out with the plea that the reserves
mentioned above cannot be utilised by sick
or other profitable PSUs
as the bulk of the reserves
and surplus of the CPSUs is in the form of depreciation reserves and they cannot
be appropriated for any purpose outside the company as per the law. But is it
such an insurmountable problem for a government which has so many competent
financial advisers in its midst? After all, in the case of revival of DPC,
taxation law could be amended recently through an ordinance providing income tax
exemption to the money repatriated by GE and Becthel and extending tax benefits
to the newly formed Ratnagairi Gas & Power Pvt Ltd. The question obviously
is of the will, which at present is heavily tilted towards private sector.
There
is a genuine apprehension that lack of investment of reserves of PSUs is a
part of the game plan to utilise these reserves in public-private
partnerships, i.e. public money plus private ownership in the first phase, and
later when political support of the “other” would not be necessary, these
PSUs would be privatised along with their reserves. So, for the time being
disinvestments of a small portion of equity is a bitter option for the UPA
government. In cocktail circuits the reformer may call it “Chhota peg”
instead of “Bada peg”. The objective is the same – intoxicating
feeling of being privatised. The lack of resources is not the issue. The
lack of political will is.