EDITORIAL 

Bihar Verdict: Draw Proper Lessons

A POLITICAL change has come about in Bihar following the recent assembly elections after a gap of 15 years.  Clearly, the people in the state were looking for a change in the political leadership. Unlike the earlier experiences when there have been political changes in states like Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh and Haryana, where a massive voter turnout displaced the incumbent governments, in Bihar’s case, the change occurred with a lower voter turnout.

Apart from everything else, this, by itself, suggests that the apprehension which the CPI(M) voiced from the beginning of the poll process – a division in the votes rallied behind secular  parties would only help the communal combination – seems to have come true.  This is also buttressed by the fact that there is only a marginal difference in the vote share of Laloo Prasad Yadav’s Rashtriya Janata Dal.   Further, there appears to have been, on the basis of preliminary data, only a marginal shift in the vote share of other parties, though the decline of the share garnered by the independents in the February 2005 elections has, to a large measure, gone in favour of the JD(U)-BJP combine. Nevertheless, it is clear that the division in the secular votes did play the primary role in ensuring the defeat of the RJD-led front and the victory of the JD(U)-BJP front. 

Further, in Bihar’s caste-dominated political situation, the disunity amongst the backward and the oppressed castes also helped, to a large extent, the victory of many upper caste candidates who favour the JD(U)-BJP alliance.  On this aspect, the most backward and the oppressed caste groups, long neglected by the RJD whose exclusive strategy was to promote the Muslim-Yadav combine, also played an important role. 

A look at the past few elections in Bihar confirms that wherever secular forces were in disarray, the communal combine has decisively gained. The index of secular unity, if this could be treated as a measure of the success in uniting all secular forces under a single electoral platform, is inversely proportionate to the success of the combination of the communal forces. In the 1998 Lok Sabha elections, when this index of secular unity was low, the communal combination scored spectacular gains. Again, in the 2004 general elections, when this index was strong and high, the RJD, alongwith the Congress and the Lok Janshakti Party, virtually swept capturing 29 of Bihar’s 40 Lok Sabha seats with a formidable 43.3 per cent of the vote share. 

The general dissatisfaction against the style and content of governance in Bihar, under the RJD, was another important factor in shaping this verdict.  In February 2005, the RJD lost the elections but was still the single largest party with 75 seats and a vote share of 28.35 per cent. This, in itself, was a huge decline from the May 2004 Lok Sabha elections when the RJD polled 30.7 per cent of the vote. This time around, the RJD seats declined from 75 to 54. The RJD opponents could exploit to the hilt the general dissatisfaction amongst the people against the style and character of the state government.

Those who think that these results in Bihar will have a negative bearing on the government at the centre are mistaken. One should recollect that during the six years of the BJP-led NDA government at the centre, the communal combination lost as many as 14 state assemblies. While these results may not have an effect at destabilising the central government, a proper analysis based on the concrete figures of the results must be undertaken to draw the proper lessons.