People's Democracy(Weekly Organ of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) |
Vol.
XXIX
No. 21 May 22, 2005 |
Raghu
DEFENCE and strategic analysts around the world have been taken by surprise by the news, in the air for quite some time but formally revealed during the recent visit to India by US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice, that India may acquire US-made F-16 fighter aircraft. The chief representative in India of Lockheed Martin Corporation, the manufacturer of the F-16s, also revealed that his company had received export licenses, that is US government approval, for sale to India of Hercules C-130 transport aircraft and P3C Orion maritime reconnaissance aircraft.
India
has not acquired any military hardware from the US for several decades and, for
its part, the US has actively denied India any US-made military equipment,
even imposing sanctions on dual-use equipment after India's nuclear weapon test
in Pokhran-II. This development is therefore widely being interpreted as a
major breakthrough in strategic and defence relations between India and the US.
Some of this is just wishful thinking by a section of commentators who have long
desired a close US-India defence relationship as part of a wider partnership.
Examination of various aspects, however, would show that none of the above expectations would be met. In fact, as would be argued below, even the offer of such a deal to India, far from being a recognition of India's regional power status or a significant upgrading of India in the US strategic calculus, is self-serving on the part of the US, seeking only to advance its own interests and lure India into a US trap. In strategic terms, India has little to gain, and a lot to lose, from such a deal. Apart from geo-political considerations, this article argues that, even from a purely military or defence technology stand-point, acquiring of F-16s by India makes little sense in the current context.
US CONTINUES INDO-PAK ZERO-SUM GAME
The
story of Pakistan and US F-16s is well known but a brief recap will help to set
the backdrop for these recent developments. The US supplied 40 F-16s to Pakistan
in the mid-1980s when it was a "front-line" state against Soviet
communism. The F-16 was then the leading military aircraft in the world and the
Pakistani acquisition seriously upset the balance of power in the region to the
considerable disadvantage of India which then embarked on a frantic buying spree
that included Anglo-French Jaguars and Soviet MiG-23s and ill-fated Sukhoi-7s.
After
the Soviet Union was forced to withdraw from Afghanistan and US strategic
objectives there had been met, and with worsening US-Pak relations exacerbated
by Pakistani involvement in nuclear weapons and missile-systems proliferation,
the US imposed sanctions against Pakistan, specifically prohibiting the sale of
F-16s to the latter. 70 F-16s which Pakistan had paid for were not delivered and
even the money not returned for over 10 years! After Pakistan re-emerged as a
"front-line state", this time in the US "war on terror"
after the famous about-turn by General Musharraf, president Bush and then the US
Congress waived the ban on F-16 sale to Pakistan but delivery is yet to be
resumed.
In
the meantime, however, the US supplied 2 P3C Orion armed maritime reconnaissance
aircraft to Pakistan, again altering the balance of forces in the region even
though it is difficult to visualise the anti-submarine Orions being used against
al-Qa'ida which operates in the Pak-Afghan mountains!
Those
commentators who are today overjoyed at the US offer of these aircraft to India
as if they are some major prize are completely overlooking the fact that the US
is only offering to India what it has already made available to Pakistan
earlier. While P3C Orions are already with Pakistan, F-16s were in fact supplied
to Pakistan by the US over 20 years ago! Clearly therefore, the US is far from
viewing India in any new or special light.
US STRATEGIC POLICY IN
The
US strategic perspective in making the offer is revealed through closer
examination.
Condoleezza
Rice, in interviews to the Indian media during her visit, repeatedly insisted
that the US was keen to show that it did not take a "hyphenated"
Indo-Pak view of the region. However, the approach US to supply of military
hardware in the region shows precisely such a bracketing, especially when it
comes to looking at Indo-US relations which evidently continue to be seen
through this hyphenated prism.
When
the US first indicated its desire to open up a "new strategic
relationship" with India, India had indicated that it would like to acquire
the E2C Hawkeye, far more advanced than the P3 Orion and a true AWACS (with
real-time integration with strike aircraft) which India needed, especially given
its enormous coast line and the need for patrolling a vast exclusive economic
zone (EEZ) along its coasts not to mention the island territories of the Andaman
& Nicobar to the east and the Lakshadweep and Minicoy to the west. The
US denied the same to India arguing that the AWACS would "upset the balance
of power in the region". The same argument continues to be used in
blocking Indian acquisition of the Israeli Phalcon system which is to be mounted
on a Russian IL-76 platform with additional Indian avionics. Yet the US never
hesitated to tilt the balance of power in Pakistan's favour whenever the latter
was playing the role of a key US junior partner. All the US is now doing is
offering to bring India on par with Pakistan and maintain a "balance of
power."
This
has two implications, one short term and the other medium to long term.
The US under president Bush is keen sell F-16s and other weapons systems to Pakistan which is in the process of being built up as a potential US base bordering Iran, West Asia and Central Asia. But the US finds itself hampered by Indian objections. If India accepts the US offer and buys F-16s herself, it can no longer object to US sale of F-16s to Pakistan. The US can make both nations happy, keep the hyphenated zero-sum game in place and Lockheed Martin can make a killing, retaining jobs in the F-16 assembly line which is due to be shut down since the aircraft is being phased out.
In
the medium term, the simple fact is that the US does not want India to become
significantly stronger in military terms. Maintaining a "balance of
power" between India and Pakistan and keeping the two countries on par
serves this purpose while simultaneously sending a message as to the strategic
weight the US attaches to India. All talk of the US viewing India as a potential
counterweight to China represents an old way of thinking which current US
strategic thinking has long overgrown. The new strategic doctrine adopted by the
US explicitly states that the US will do all it can to prevent any power,
regional or global, from being able to come anywhere near being able to
challenge US strategic domination. As such, the US would be loathe to see India,
which is emerging as a serious economic player certainly in the region, also
become strategically strong. Contending with the growing economic and strategic
clout of China is proving enough of a headache for the US without it helping yet
another regional power!
INDIAN DEFENCE NEEDS
All
these developments come against the background of some wide-ranging
acquisitions, and indigenous development, of conventional military hardware by
India. Several of these acquisitions are long-pending, the bunching up being
caused by years of faulty planning, bureaucratic delays and
penny-wise-pound-foolish decisions. Even todays acquisitions are quite
ill-planned and lack a long-term vision of India's genuine and realistic
strategic and defence requirements. Indian defence purchases have vacillated
between periods of virtual lulls to sudden shopping sprees often, especially
during the BJP-led regime, driven by faulty over-ambitious goals of power
projection or nuclear delivery triads (land-sea-air) systems. If India needs to
upgrade its defence hardware, it must do so in such a manner as to give it force
multiplication with "leaner and meaner" armed forces not simply adding
to an already bloated and unwieldy behemoth. But this argument is beyond the
scope of the present essay.
Let
us examine the US offers in purely technical-commercial terms from the point of
view of Indian defence requirements which, as is well known, cannot be seen
through an Indo-Pak prism.
The
sweeteners in the package along with the F-16s include the Hercules C-130 and
the P3C Orions, so let us quickly look at these first. The Hercules are a
venerable, time-tested transport work-horses and excellent aircraft, but the
Indian transport fleet is relatively sound with Russian AN-32 and IL-76. If
needs be, the C-130s can also be thought of on a stand-alone basis. The P3C
Orion, as already discussed, is good but not what India wants. If the US is
serious about even a normal, forget about any special defence purchase
relationship with India, it should drop its objections to the Phalcon deal. So
now to the F-16s.
India
is currently shopping for front-line fighter aircraft which are urgently
required to replace the around 700 now dangerously ageing MiG-21s. India is
looking to buy about 126 fighter aircraft and had short-listed the Russian
MiG-29, the Swedish Saab Grippen and the French Mirage-2000-5, now adding the US
F-16s this list. All these are essentially long-range interceptors or fighter
aircraft with multi-role capability while the Russian Sukhoi-30 MkIs, around 200
of which are being acquired including 140 make in India under license, are
basically long-range attack aircraft but again with multi-role capability. A
brief comparison between these and the F-16s would be in order.
The
fourth-generation F-16s were designed in the 1970s specifically for "air
superiority", that is, a clear superiority in performance and armament over
any other aircraft in the world and expecting it to maintain this advantage for
10-20 years, which they pretty well did, equipping their NATO and other allies
with it till the French, British and Russians (formerly Soviets) came up with
more or less equivalent aircraft in the '80s and '90s. Last year, in joint
Indo-US air force exercises, the Indian fighter formations comprising Mig-21s
and Mig-27s, with a few Mirage-2000s and Su-30s in stand-by mode, gave the US
F-15s, rated alongside F-16s, a real run for their money, giving rise to calls
in the US Congress for urgently providing the USAF with the latest fifth
generation F/A-22 and F-35 fighters!
THANKS BUT NO THANKS
The
point is that India no longer needs to fear that it is missing out on something
extra-ordinary. This is especially true if the US does not provide India with
the latest version of F-16s. Interestingly, Lockheed Martin has offered to set
up production lines for F-16s in India if the Indian order is equivalent to 4
F-16s for every Mig-21, that is, around 175 aircraft! However, there is
widespread scepticism whether the US will actually provide full transfer of this
sensitive technology.
The
Swedish Grippen is reputed to be an excellent fighter, some say even better than
the F-16, but with low export numbers, mostly because of tight US controls over
its sale since the aircraft is equipped with US engines and other flight
controls and components. This is
typical of the totally non-commercial manner in which the US deals with military
supplies, denying even its own allies a chance of competing with fully US-made
products. Interestingly, the Grippen uses GE-404 engine, which the US has agreed
to sell to India for the LCA whose development programme was held back by
several years because of US denial of this same engine. Back in the 1970s, the
US had prevented Sweden from selling Viggen fighters to India, again using
US-made engines as leverage. Will the US allow Sweden to sell Grippens to India
this time, especially after it has thrown its F-16 into the ring?
Acquisition
by India of additional Mirage-2000s of the latest variants would synergise with
the existing fleet. Similarly, additional Mig-29s would complement the aircraft
already in service with the IAF and soon to be inducted into the Navy on board
the refurbished Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov (INS Vikramaditya).
Both these would come with technology transfer and would fit in well with the
existing IAF fleet. Whichever of these aircraft India selects, the deals will be
totally commercial, without strings and India has several years of dealing with
both Dassault of France and Mig-MAPO of Russia.
On
the other hand, the US has an extremely poor reputation as a reliable
supplier of military equipment and is notorious for turning off the tap whenever
it pleases, even to its closest allies, Pakistan and Chile being glaring
examples. Former US Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill as well as the present
Ambassador have both made clear that no iron-clad guarantees can be given that
supplies will not be stopped by the US mid-stream since US laws entitle its
Congress to do precisely that. And everybody know that the US only recognises
its own laws and not international laws as could be invoked in the case of any
agreements between any other two countries or companies.
India
has therefore little incentive to consider the US offer of F-16s and several
reasons not to. It has been reported that several former chiefs of the IAF and
Army have opposed any such deal with the US. It is to be hoped that the US will
heed their advice.