People's Democracy(Weekly Organ of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) |
Vol.
XXIX
No. 03 January 16, 2005 |
Foreign
Presence In India’s Stock Markets
C P Chandrasekhar
THE
weekended January 7 witnessed what appeared to be an abrupt end to the bull run
in India’s stock markets. This episode once again focussed attention on the
volatility in India’s narrow and shallow stock markets. Overall, 2004 was one
more unusual year in India’s stock markets. It began with the Sensex still at
a high and above the 6000 mark. It witnessed a decline to a low in mid-May of
around 4500, delivered ultimately with the market’s single day loss of close
to 565 points. It then registered a recovery that turned into a bull run, which
took the Sensex to 6679 on the first trading day in the new year. And then it
witnessed an abrupt end to the bull run, signalled by a 316-point intra-day
decline in the Sensex on January 5.
This
volatility has been visible in the medium and long term as well. From a low of
2924 on April 5, 2003, the Sensex had risen to 6194 on January 14, 2004, only to
fall to 4505 on May 17, before rising to close at a peak of 6679 on January 3,
2005. These wild fluctuations have meant that for those who bought into the
market at the right time and exited at the appropriate moment, the average
return earned through capital gains were higher in 2003 than 2004, despite the
extended bull run in the latter year.
There
are two messages that this experience sends out. The first is that, if market
expectations can turn so whimsically, the signals or rumours on which they are
based must lack any substance since any “fundamentals” on which they could
be anchored have not shifted so violently. The second is that there must be some
unusually strong force that is determining movements in the market which alone
can explain the wild swings it is witnessing.
VOLATILITY
OF INDIA’S STOCK MARKETS
The
combination of these two factors is indeed a disconcerting phenomenon, since if
some force has the ability to lead the market and the others can be taken along
without much resistance, the market is in essence being subjected to
manipulation, even if not always consciously. Not surprisingly, recent market
developments have once more focused attention on the volatility that has come to
characterise India’s stock markets.
Movements
in the Sensex during the two years have clearly been driven by the behaviour of
foreign institutional investors (FIIs), who were responsible for net equity
purchases of as much as $6.6 and $8.5 billion respectively in 2003 and 2004.
These figures compare with a peak level of net purchases of $3.1 billion as far
back as 1996 and net investments by FIIs of just $753 million in 2002. In sum,
the sudden FII interest in Indian markets in the last two years account for the
two bouts of medium-term buoyancy that the Sensex recently displayed.
At
one level this influence of the FIIs is puzzling. The cumulative stock of FII
investment, totalling $ 30.3 billion at the end of 2004, amounted to just 8 per
cent of the $383.6 billion total market capitalisation on the Bombay Stock
Exchange. However, FII transactions were significant at the margin. Purchases by
FIIs of $31.17 billion between April and December 2004 amounted to around 38.4
per cent of the cumulative turnover of $83.13 billion in the market during that
period, whereas sales by FIIs amounted to 29.8 per cent of turnover. Not
surprisingly there has been a substantial increase in the share of foreign
stockholding in leading Indian companies. According to one estimate, by
end-2003, foreigners (not necessarily just FIIs) had cornered close to 30 per
cent of the equity in India’s top 50 companies — the Nifty 50. In contrast,
foreigners collectively owned just 18 per cent in these companies at the end of
2001 and 22 per cent in December 2002.
A
recent analysis by Parthaprathim Pal estimated that at
the end of June 2004 FIIs controlled on average 21.6 per cent of shares in
Sensex companies. Further, if we consider only free-floating shares, or shares
normally available for trading because they are not held by promoters,
government or strategic shareholders, the average FII holding rises to more than
36 per cent. In a third of Sensex companies, FII holding of free-floating shares
exceeded 40 per cent of the total.
Matters
have not changed significantly more recently. As of September 2004, which is the
last quarter for which information is available, FII shareholding in the 30
companies included in the Sensex stood at an average of 19.6 per cent. What is
noteworthy, however, is that this proportion varied from a low of 2.52 per cent
to a high of as much as 54 per cent in the case of Satyam Computers and 63.17
per cent in the case of HDFC. If FIIs as a group
chose to move out of the stock concerned, a collapse in the price of the equity
is inevitable.
Given
the presence of foreign institutional investors in Sensex companies and their
active trading behaviour, their role in determining share price movements must
be considerable. Indian stock markets are known to be narrow and shallow in the
sense that there are few companies whose shares are actively traded. Thus,
although there are more than 4700 companies listed on the stock exchange, the
BSE Sensex incorporates just 30 companies, trading in whose shares is seen as
indicative of market activity. This shallowness would also mean that the effects
of FII activity would be exaggerated by the influence their behaviour has on
other retail investors, who, in herd-like fashion tend to follow the FIIs when
making their investment decisions.
REASONS
FOR A HIGH DEGREE
OF VOLATILITY
These
features of Indian stock markets induce a high degree of volatility for four
reasons. In as much as an increase in investment by FIIs triggers a sharp price
increase, it would provide additional incentives for FII investment and in the first
instance encourage further purchases, so that there is a tendency for any
correction of price increases unwarranted by price earnings ratios to be
delayed. And when the correction begins it would have to be led by an FII
pull-out and can take the form of an extremely sharp decline in prices.
Secondly,
as and when FIIs are attracted to the market by expectations of a price increase
that tend to be automatically realised, the inflow of foreign capital can result
in an appreciation of the rupee vis-ŕ-vis the dollar (say). This increases the
return earned in foreign exchange, when rupee assets are sold and the revenue
converted into dollars. As a result, the investments turn even more attractive
triggering an investment spiral that would imply a sharper fall when any
correction begins.
Thirdly,
the growing realisation by the FIIs of the power they wield in what are shallow
markets, encourages speculative investment aimed at pushing the market up and
choosing an appropriate moment to exit. This implicit manipulation of the market
if resorted to often enough would obviously imply a substantial increase in
volatility.
Finally,
in volatile markets, domestic speculators too attempt to manipulate markets in
periods of unusually high prices. Thus, most recently, the SEBI is supposed
to have issued show cause notices to four as-yet-unnamed entities, relating to
their activities on arund around Black Monday, May 17, 2004, when the Sensex
recorded a steep decline to a low of 4505.
THE
END OF THE
BULL RUN
All
this said, the last two years have been remarkable because, even though these
features of the stock market imply volatility, there have been more months when
the market has been on the rise rather than on the decline. This clearly means
that FIIs have been bullish on India for much of that time. The problem is that
such bullishness is often driven by events outside the country, whether it be
the performance of other equity markets or developments in non-equity markets
elsewhere in the world. It is to be expected that FIIs would seek out the
best returns as well as hedge their investments by maintaining a diversified
geographical and market portfolio. The difficulty is that when they make their
portfolio adjustments, which may imply small shifts in favour of or against a
country like India, the effects it has on host markets are substantial. Those
effects can then trigger a speculative spiral for the reasons discussed above,
resulting in destabilising tendencies. Thus the end of
the bull run in January was seen to be the a result of a slowing of FII
investments, partly triggered by expectations of an interest rate rise in the
US.
IMPLICATIONS OF FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION
These
aspects of the market are of significance because financial liberalisation has
meant that developments in equity markets can have major repercussions elsewhere
in the system. With banks allowed to play a greater role in equity markets, any
slump in those markets can affect the functioning of parts of the banking
system. We only need to recall that the forced closure (through merger with
Punjab National Bank) of the Nedungadi Bank was the result of the losses it
suffered because of over exposure in the stock market,
On
the other hand if FII investments constitute a large share of the equity capital
of a financial entity, as seems to the case with HDFC, an FII pull-out, even if
driven by development outside the country can have significant implications for
the financial health of what is an important institution in the financial sector
of this country.
Similarly,
if any set of developments encourages an unusually high outflow of FII capital
from the market, it can impact adversely on the value of the rupee and set of
speculation in the currency that can in special circumstances result in a
currency crisis. There are now too many instances of such effects worldwide for
it it be dismissed on the ground that India’s reserves are adequate to manage
the situation.
NEO-LIBERAL REFORMS AND THE ISSUE’S BYPASSED
Thus,
the volatility being displayed by India’s equity markets warrant returning to
a set of questions that have been bypassed in the course of neoliberal reform in
India. The most important of those questions is whether India needs FII
investment at all. With the current account of the balance of payments recording
a surplus in recent years, thanks to large inflows on account of non-resident
remittances and earnings from exports of software and IT-enabled services, we
don’t need those FII flows to finance foreign exchange expenditures.
Neither does such capital help finance new investment, focussed as it is on
secondary market trading of pre-existing equity. The poor showing of the markets
on the IPO front in most years during the 1990s is adequate confirmation of
this. And finally, we do not need to shore up the Sensex, since such
indices are inevitably volatile and merely help create and destroy paper
wealth and generate, in the process, inexplicable bouts of euphoria and anguish
in the financial press.
In
the circumstances the best option for the policy maker is to find ways of
reducing substantially the net flows of FII investments into India’s markets.
This would help focus attention on the creation of real wealth as well as remove
barriers to the creation of such wealth, such as the constant pressure to
provide tax concessions that erode the tax base and the persisting obsession
with curtailing fiscal deficits, both of which are driven by dependence on
finance capital.