THE MAHARASHTRA ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS

Yet Another Stinging Rebuff To The Communal Forces

Ashok Dhawale

THE results of the Maharashtra Vidhan Sabha elections that were held on October 13, have given yet another stinging rebuff to the communal forces in the second largest state of the country after Uttar Pradesh. Just five months earlier, the BJP and its allies had crashed to a resounding defeat in the crucial Lok Sabha elections. With state assembly elections due in Bihar, Jharkhand and Haryana in 2005 and in West Bengal, Kerala and Tamilnadu in 2006 – in all of which the BJP and its allies are likely to get clobbered – all their hopes were pinned on Maharashtra. Those have now been dashed to the ground. 

The voting figures for the 2004 state assembly elections, in fact, show a marked shift against the BJP-SS communal combine and in favour of secular parties and candidates. The following tables, based on official information released by the Election Commission of India, will make this shift clear. While studying these tables, it must be remembered that both the INC and the NCP fought practically all the seats against each other in both the elections in 1999, while they were in alliance in both the elections in 2004. On the other hand, the SS and the BJP were in alliance in all the four elections cited below.

TABLE 1

Vote percentage of four main contestants in 1999 and 2004 – LS and VS

TABLE 2

Seats won by the four main contestants in 1999 and 2004 – LS and VS

FACTORS BEHIND SECULAR VICTORY

The assembly elections review report of the CPI(M) Maharashtra state committee states,  “The marked change in the electoral picture in the five months after the 2004 Lok Sabha elections needs to be underlined. In the Lok Sabha polls, the SS-BJP had won 42.7 per cent of the votes and 25 of the 48 seats, and they were ahead in 141 of the 288 assembly segments. In the Vidhan Sabha polls, the vote share of the communal combine has sharply dropped by 9 per cent to 33.7 per cent and their seats have come down to just 117 (including one seat won by their ally, the Shetkari Sanghatana of Sharad Joshi).

“On the other hand, in the Lok Sabha polls, the INC-NCP had won 42.1 per cent of the votes and 23 seats (including one seat won by their ally, the RPI-A) and they were ahead in 138 assembly segments. In the Vidhan Sabha polls, the vote share of the INC-NCP has also dipped by 2.3 per cent to 39.8 per cent, but the seats won by them have marginally increased to 141 (including one seat won by their RPI-A ally). If to this number are added the 15-odd seats won by INC-NCP rebels and the 6 seats won by smaller secular parties, the secular tally goes up to a comfortable majority of over 160 seats in a House of 288.

“This change in the popular mood is principally due to the changes at the centre following the Lok Sabha election results. The defeat of the BJP-led communal NDA government followed by the formation of the Congress-led secular UPA government with Left support, the adoption of the Common Minimum Programme (CMP) under Left pressure and the role of the Left in trying to get the CMP implemented – all these developments have had a positive impact in Maharashtra, where people now have some hope of a pro-people shift in government policies.

“Besides this main reason, the renunciation by Congress president Sonia Gandhi of her claim to the prime ministership and her campaign tour of the state, the hurricane election campaign by NCP president Sharad Pawar, the failure of the SS-BJP to take up popular grievances against the lacklustre performance of the INC-NCP regime over the last five years, the lack of response from the people to the communal combine’s efforts to whip up divisive passions and the failure of attempts to substantially divide the secular vote, also contributed to this electoral verdict.”

THE QUESTION OF ANTI-INCUMBENCY

The BJP-SS strategy of winning Maharashtra was, in fact, based on three main prongs: (a) the so-called anti-incumbency wave against the lacklustre performance of the INC-NCP state regime; (b) the success of their divisive antics aimed at creating communal polarisation; and (c) a massive split in the secular vote by encouraging parties like the BSP and also rebels in both the Congress factions. The results have shown that all three prongs failed dismally in achieving the BJP-SS objective.

So far as the first prong of the BJP-SS strategy was concerned, it was, of course, true that the INC-NCP state government’s performance over the last five years was poor in almost all respects. We have had occasion to dwell on this aspect in earlier articles in these columns. The renewed spate of peasant suicides in the backward regions of Vidarbha and Marathwada, the reports of large-scale malnutrition deaths in the tribal areas and the failure of the monsoon in July 2004 all created a piquant situation for the INC-NCP state regime on the very eve of assembly elections.

It must be underlined, however, that the unprecedented phenomenon of peasant suicides first began in Maharashtra in 1998 under the SS-BJP regime, during which malnutrition deaths in tribal areas also continued to be a regular tragic feature. But this did not prevent the SS-BJP from now launching a scathing attack on the state government. It was in the background of the growing agrarian crisis in the state that Shiv Sena supremo Bal Thackeray in early August made the populist declaration that if the SS-BJP combine were to come to power, it would give free power to all farmers and also waive all their debts. Neither central nor state governments headed by the BJP and the SS had ever even contemplated such steps, leave alone implementing them.

Mercifully, the rains revived almost all over the state in August. The revival of the monsoon served to temporarily alleviate some of the acute rural distress, although its root causes remain very much alive. Thrown on the defensive by Thackeray’s populist declaration, the INC-NCP state government hurriedly announced its decision to give free power to all farmers and to waive the interest on their debts, just before the election code of conduct came into effect. In that hectic fortnight, the state government also announced several other relief measures to various sections, all of which were collectively worth over Rs 3,000 crore. All these were also incorporated into the INC-NCP election manifesto. Although the state government did not find the time or the need for giving such relief during the past five years of its rule, there is some reason to believe that this last-minute bonanza did succeed in at least blunting the edge of the SS-BJP attacks.

It now remains to be seen how far the new INC-NCP regime lives up to the old regime’s promises –– saddled as it is with an astronomical debt burden of Rs 43,000 crore that was inherited from the SS-BJP regime in 1999, and that has now burgeoned under its own five year rule to a massive sum of nearly Rs 1,00,000 crore!   

Compared to the last assembly elections, the vote share of both the INC and the NCP has declined considerably. It is, in fact, down by 10 per cent despite the fact that both the parties were in alliance in 2004. This is a clear reflection on the performance of their state government for the last five years. A classic example is the Yavatmal district of Vidarbha, which had the largest number of suicides of debt-ridden peasants. Although it is a traditional Congress stronghold over decades, the INC-NCP alliance lost six of the eight assembly seats here, and also both the parliamentary seats, Yavatmal and Washim, which has two assembly segments from Yavatmal district.   

Another reason for the decline in the INC-NCP vote was the presence of several of their rebels. Of the 1,083 independents who contested this election, 1,002 lost their deposits. Those who did not were the influential rebels. But all independents together polled a total of 14 per cent votes and 19 of the rebels won. By far the largest number of these rebels were those of the NCP and the INC. Other rebels even went to the extent of accepting tickets from the SS-BJP, and many from the BSP. Even SS-BJP rebels were rewarded with BSP tickets. This shows not only the fatal attraction of pelf and power, but also the abysmal level of ideological commitment in all the four established bourgeois parties.

In terms of seats contested and won, the NCP has fared much better than the INC. The NCP won 71 of the 124 seats that it contested, while the INC won only 69 of the 157 seats that it fought. It was the unexpected fact that the NCP won more seats than the INC, which led to the prolonged 11-day stalemate between the two over the chief ministership. This was finally resolved in favour of the INC, but with the NCP getting three more ministers than the INC. In effect, this means a difference of six, since the NCP will have 24 and the INC will have 18 ministers in a cabinet of 42, apart from the chief minister. This has already led to considerable heartburn in the ranks of INC legislators.

The CLP meetings of the INC and the NCP have resulted in surprise choices of their leaders. Former chief minister Vilasrao Deshmukh, from the Marathwada region, will return as the new chief minister. Former home minister and NCP state president R R Patil, from the Western Maharashtra region, will be the new deputy chief minister. Significantly, both of them belong to the powerful Maratha lobby. Equally significantly, the high command of both parties appears to have taken the views of their legislators into consideration while finalising these choices.

Former chief minister Sushil Kumar Shinde, a dalit leader, who is reputed to be close to Sharad Pawar, has been ‘elevated’ as the new governor of Andhra Pradesh. While he led the secular alliance to victory, he has had to pay for the fact that the INC won less seats than the NCP. The choice of Vilasrao Deshmukh is aimed to counter Sharad Pawar, and also to prevent consolidation of the Maratha lobby behind the NCP. 

WHIPPING UP COMMUNAL PASSIONS

The second prong of the BJP-SS strategy predictably centered round whipping up communal and linguistic passions. The first issue they seized upon was that of the removal of the plaque of Savarkar’s quotation from the memorial at the Andamans. They took up a statewide agitation of throwing shoes (Joote Maro Andolan) at effigies of Mani Shankar Aiyar. Large sections of even the secular Marathi newspapers went overboard in their chauvinistic defence of Savarkar. The INC-NCP, who had allowed a portrait of Savarkar to be put up in the Vidhan Bhavan during their own regime, refused to take the BJP-SS head-on over the Savarkar issue during the election campaign.

As A G Noorani has written in his recent illuminating expose of Savarkar (‘A National Hero?’ in Frontline, November 5, 2004), “The divide is deep and fundamental. The inference is as clear – you cannot admire both. A choice must be made. The BJP is more consistent than Congress leaders who profess admiration for Savarkar for political ends. This is no way to defend secularism against the BJP’s Savarkarite onslaught.”

But despite the opportunism displayed by both Congress factions, the BJP-SS began to realise that the Savarkar issue was just not catching on in the state as a whole. Then came the so-called Tiranga Yatra of Uma Bharati. It met with poor response in Maharashtra, as elsewhere in the country. In Maharashtra, additionally, there were reports that the Yatra was sabotaged by Pramod Mahajan and his brother-in-law Gopinath Munde, due to the inner-BJP rivalry between Pramod Mahajan and Uma Bharati at the national level!

The third issue the communal combine seized upon was the VHP’s plan to destroy the tomb of the Mughal warrior Afzal Khan at Fort Pratapgad in Satara district. Afzal Khan had been killed by the legendary Maratha warrior-king Shivaji in the 17th century, and it was Shivaji himself who had given the orders for construction of the tomb. The symbolism behind this gesture was that dead enemies should also be treated with honour. This agitation proved to be a damp squib and, for once, it was dealt with firmly by the state government.

The Marathi chauvinist card had been used by the Shiv Sena in January this year near Mumbai, where SS goons beat up hundreds of Bihari youth who had come for railway recruitment interviews. This step had turned the large North Indian community in and around Mumbai against the SS-BJP combine, and the result was evident in the outcome of both LS and VS polls in the metropolis. The SS drive against so-called Bangladeshi infiltrators was actually nothing but a thinly-veiled campaign against Muslims.

The Shiv Sena’s image of a monolithic, disciplined party under the vice-like grip of its supremo Bal Thackeray, was irrevocably smashed in this election. For the first time in the history of the SS, rebellion raised its head right in the midst of a Vidhan Sabha election. Several SS rebels contested against official SS nominees and in some cases even ensured their defeat. This indicated not only a weakening of the hold of Bal Thackeray over his Party, but also the intense inner-Sena factionalism between Thackeray’s son and anointed heir Uddhav and Thackeray’s nephew Raj. The BJP also had an ample share of rebels.

Basically, against the searing backdrop of the Gujarat genocide, large sections of the people of Maharashtra were simply sick and tired of the shop-soiled communal and divisive slogans of the SS-BJP combine. Further, the experience of the SS-BJP state government of 1995-99 and the BJP-led central government of 1998-2004 was still fresh in their minds, and this did not create in them any confidence about better governance. That is why, despite the poor record in office of the INC-NCP regime, people voted with a vengeance to prevent the SS-BJP from staging a comeback. It is true that Muslims and non-Maharashtrians voted solidly against the SS-BJP combine, but so also did large sections of secular-minded Hindus and Maharashtrians.  

Thus, the BJP won 54 of the 111 seats that it contested, while the SS won only 62 of the 163 seats that it fought. When compared to the last assembly elections in 1999, although the SS vote share has somewhat increased, its seats have declined. For the BJP, both the vote share and the seats have declined. This defeat, coming in the wake of their defeat in the parliamentary elections, has stunned and demoralised both the parties and has already led to rumblings of mutual recrimination. 

Another divisive issue that the people of Maharashtra rejected in this election was the demand for a separate state of Vidarbha, which was first raised by the BJP many years ago and was opportunistically supported subsequently by sections within the INC and the NCP, as well as by all the Republican factions, the Shetkari Sanghatana and also by the BSP. In the recent Lok Sabha elections, the strident champion of a separate Vidarbha, Banwarilal Purohit, was humbled at the hustings in the Nagpur constituency. Now, in the Vidhan Sabha polls, another self-proclaimed champion of a separate Vidarbha, former MPCC president Ranjit Deshmukh, was also defeated from Nagpur. Mayawati’s support to a separate Vidarbha and her emotive declaration that the new state would be named ‘Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar Vidarbha Rajya’ also did not fetch her a single seat.

Factors related to caste and money have played a much bigger role in these elections than ever before. All the major bourgeois parties and even the smaller parties have used caste mobilisation as one of their main planks. Actual expenditure by and for candidates of the established bourgeois parties is now being counted in crores rather than in lakhs of rupees. The number of candidates with a criminal record has also increased, and this is exemplified by the election of the underworld don Arun Gawli in Mumbai.

(To be concluded)