People's Democracy

Following is an extract from General Vo Nguyen Giap’s collection of articles on the liberation war waged by the Viatnamese people, which was brought out as a book under the title "People’s War People’s Army". General Giap, the legendary commander-in-chief of the People’s Army who led the troops in this crucial battle, elaborates here in his own words on how the battle was won:

DIEN Bien Phu was the greatest victory scored by the Vietnam People’s army in the protracted war of liberation against the Franco-American imperialist aggressors. Dien Bien Phu marked an important turn in the military and political situation in Indochina. It made a decisive contribution to the great success of the Geneva Conference, which restored peace in Indochina, on the basis of respect for the territorial integrity of Vietnam and its two friendly neighbouring countries, Cambodia and Laos.

On the anniversary of the Dien Bien Phu victory, I want to bring out a number of experiences of our party in the conduct of the war, and to recall the determination of the People’s Army to fight and to win, and our people’s devotion in serving the front. The solidarity of our army and people in the struggle under the leadership of the party was the decisive factor of our success. This is the greatest lesson we have drawn from our experience. Dien Bien Phu taught us that:

"A weak and small nation and a people’s army, once resolved to stand up, unite and fight for independence and peace, are fully able to defeat all aggressive forces, even those of such an imperialist power as France aided by the United States."

Dien Bien Phu is a large plain, 18 kilometres long and six to eight kilometres wide in the mountainous zone of the northwest. It is the biggest and richest of the four plains in this hilly region close to the Vietnam-Laos frontier. In the theatre of operations of Bac Bo and Upper Laos, Dien Bien Phu was a strategic position of the first importance, capable of becoming an infantry and air base of extreme effectiveness.

At the beginning there were at Dien Bien Phu only ten enemy battalions but they were gradually reinforced to cope with our offensive. When we launched the attack the enemy forces totalled 17 battalions and 10 companies, comprising chiefly European and Africans and crack units of paratroops. Moreover the camp had three battalions of artillery, one battalion of sappers, one armoured company, a transport unit of 200 trucks and a permanent squadron of 12 aircraft. In all, 16,200 men.

Those forces were distributed into three sub-sectors, which had to support one another, and comprised 49 strong-points. Each was a defence centre, while several were grouped into "complex defene centres" equipped with mobile forces and artillery, and surrounded by trenches and barbed wire hundred of metres thick. Each sub-sector comprised many strongly-fortified defence centres.

The most important was the central sub-sector situated in Muong Thanh village, the centre of the Dien Bien Phu district. Two thirds of the garrisons were concentrated here. To the east, well-situated hills formed the most important defence system of the sub- sector.

The northern sub-sector comprised the defence centres of Him Lam, Doc Lap and Ban Keo. The very strong positions of Him Lam and Doc Lap were to check all attacks of our troops coming from Tuan Giao and Lai Chau.

As for the southern sub-sector, also known as Hang Cum sub-sector, it was to break any offensive coming from the south and to protect the communications with Upper Laos.

The enemy artillery was divided into two bases: one at Muong Thanh, the other at Hang Cum, arranged in such a way as to support each other and to support all the surrounding strong-points.

Dien Bien Phu had two airfields: besides the main field at Muong Thanh, there was a reserve airstrip a Hang Cum; they linked the camp with Hanoi and Haiphong through an airlift which ensured 60 to 80 planeloads of supply daily.

The reconnaissance and fighter planes of the permanent squadron constantly flew over the entire region. The planes from the Gia Lam and Cat Bi airbases had the task of strafing and bombing our army.

General Navarre asserted that with such powerful forces and so strong a defence system, Dien Bien Phu was "an impregnable fortress…" The American general O Daniel, who paid a visit to the base, shared this opinion. From this subjective point of view the enemy came to the conclusion that our troops had little chance of success in an attack on Dien Bien Phu. They even considered that such an attack would be a good opportunity for them to inflict a severe defeat on us.

On our side, after the liberation of Lai Chau, an attack upon Dien Bien Phu was on the agenda. We considered that the base, well entrenched as it was, had vulnerable points. In attacking it, we would face enormous difficulties in strategy, tactics and supply, but these difficulties could be overcome. After having analysed the situation and weighed the pros and cons, we decided to attack Dien Bien Phu according to the watchword: relentless attack, steady advance. Our tactics would be to attack the enemy defence centres, the various parts of the entrenched camp one by one, thus creating conditions for the launching of a general offensive to annihilate the whole camp.

Three months had passed from the occupation of Dien Bien Phu by enemy paratroops to the launching of our campaign. During that time, the enemy did their utmost to consolidate their defence system, bring in reinforcements, dig new trenches, and strengthen their entrenchments. On our side, the army and people actively prepared the offensive. Carrying out the orders of the Party’s central committee and the government, they mustered all their strength to guarantee the success of the winter-spring campaign, of which Dien Bien Phu was the keystone. Our troops succeeded in liberating the surrounding regions, isolating Dien Bien Phu, forcing the enemy to scatter forces and thus reduce their possibilities of sending reinforcements to the battlefield. We made motor roads, cleared tracks to haul up artillery pieces, built casemates for the artillery, prepared the ground for the offensive and encirclement; in short, we transformed the battlefield terrain with a view to solving our tactical problems. Very great difficulties were overcome. We called upon our local compatriots to supply food to set up supply lines hundreds of kilometres long from Thanh Hoa or Phu Tho to the north-west, through rugged terrain paths and very high passes. We used every means to carry food and ammunition to the front. Our troops and voluntary workers ceaselessly went to the front and actively participated in the preparations under the attacks of enemy aircraft.

In the first week of March, the preparations were completed; the artillery had solid casemates, the operational bases were established, food and ammunition were available in sufficient quantity. After having studied the aim and significance of the campaign, all officers and soldiers were filled with a very high determination to annihilate the enemy, as they were persuaded that only the destruction of the Dien Bien Phu entrenched camp would bring the "Navarre plan" to complete failure.

On Mach 13, 1954, our troops received the order to launch an offensive against Dien Bien Phu.

The campaign proceeded in three phases: in the first phase we destroyed the northern sub-sector; in the second, the longest and bitterest one, we took the heights in the east of the central sub-sector and tightened our encirclement; in the third, we launched the general offensive and annihilated the enemy.

This phase began on March 13 and ended on March 17. On the night of March 13th, we annihilated the very strong defence centre of Him Lam, which overlooked the road from Tuan Giao to Dien Bien Phu. The battle was very fierce; the enemy artillery concentrated its fire, and poured scores of thousands of shells on our assaulting waves. Our troops carried the position in the night. This first victory had very deep repercussions on the development of the whole campaign.

On the night of the 14th, we concentrated our forces to attack the defence centre of Doc Lap, the second strong point of the northern sub-sector, which overlooked the road from Lai Chau to Dien Bien Phu. The battle went on till dawn. The enemy used every means to repel our forces, fired scores of thousands of shells and sent their mobile forces protected by tanks from Muong Thanh to support their position. Our troops fought heroically, took the strong point and repelled the enemy reinforcement.

The third and last defence centre of the northern sub- sector the Ban Keo post, became isolated and was threatened by us. This was a less strong position, manned by a garrison chiefly made up of puppet soldiers. On March 17, the whole garrison left its position and surrendered. After the loss of the northern sub-sector, the central sub-sector, now exposed on its eastern and northern flanks, was threatened.

In the phase of the fighting, the correctness of our tactical decisions, the good organisation of our anti-aircraft defence reduced the effectiveness of the enemy artillery and air force. Besides our artillery fire, which was very accurate, inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. The main airfield was threatened. Our anti-aircraft batteries, which were going, went into action for the first time, brought down many enemy planes. But above all, it was by their heroic spirit, their high spirit of sacrifice and their determination to win that our troops distinguished themselves during those battles.

The great and resounding victory, which ended the first phase of operations, stirred our army and people and gave each and every one faith in final victory.

As for the enemy despite their losses, they still had confidence in the power of resistance of the central sub-sector, in the strength of their artillery and air force. They even expected that we would suffer heavy losses and would be obliged to give up the offensive; and especially, that if the campaign was protracted our supply lines would be cut and that the great logistic difficulties thus created would force us to withdraw.

The second phase was the most important of the campaign. We had to deal with the central sub-sector, in the middle of the Moung Thanh plain, and new difficulties arose in the conduct of the operations. Our troops had to work actively to complete the preparations; they had to dig a vast network of trenches, from the neighbouring hills to the plain to encircle the central sub-sector and cut it off from the southern sector. This advance of our lines, which encircled the enemy positions, was made at the cost of fierce fighting. By every means the enemy tried to upset our preparations by the action of their air force and artillery. However, our troops drew ever closer to their positions through uninterrupted fighting.

During the night of March 30th, the second phase began. We launched a large-scale attack to capture the heights in the east and a certain number of strong points in the west in order to tighten our encirclement and to hamper and cut off supplies to the garrison.

On the night of March 30th, we concentrated important forces to attack simultaneously the five fortified heights in the east. On that same night, we succeeded in capturing hills E-1 and C-1, but could not take hill A-1, the most important of all. The defence line constituted by these heights was the key to the defensive system of the central sub-sector: its loss would lead to the fall of Dien Bien Phu. Consequently, the fight here was the fiercest. Particularly on hill A-1, the last height, which protected the command post, the battle lasted until April 4. Every inch of ground was toughly fought. Finally, we occupied half of the position while the enemy, entrenched in casemates and trenches, continued to resist in the other half. While this fighting was going on, the garrison received paratroops reinforcements. On April 9, the enemy launched a counter attack to re-occupy hill C-1. The battle went on for four days and nights and the position was occupied half by the enemy and half by us.

While the situation in the east was static, in the north and in the west our encirclement grew tighter and tighter. The lines of both sides drew nearer and nearer to each other; in some points they were only 10 to 15 metres apart. From our newly occupied positions to our frontlines northward and westward, the fire of our artillery and mortars pounded the enemy without let-up. Day and night the fighting went on. We exhausted the enemy by harassing them, firing constantly at their lines and at the same time tried to take their strong-points one by one, combining nibbling operations and full-scale attack.

In mid-April, after the destruction of several enemy positions in the north and the west, our lines reached the airfield then cut it from west to east. As our encirclement grew still tighter, the fighting became fiercer. The enemy launched several violent counterattacks supported by tanks and aircraft aimed at taking ground from us and forcing us to loosen our encirclement. On April 24, the most violent counterattack was launched with the aim of driving us from the airfield: after inflicting heavy losses on the enemy, we remained the master, and the airfield stayed under our control.

The territory occupied by the enemy shrank in size day by day to become only two kilometres square and was under continuous heavy fire. The enemy’s supply problem became more and more critical. The airfield having been out of action for long time, all supplies were dropped by parachute. But as the enemy zone was too narrow, and their pilots feared our anti-aircraft fire and dared not fly low, only a part of the parachutes carrying food and ammunition fell into the enemy positions, while the bulk of them fell on our ground; thus we poured shells parachuted by he enemy on the entrenched camp.

Throughout the second phase, the situation was extremely tense. The American interventionists sent more bombers and transport planes to support the Dien Bien Phu base. The enemy bombers were very active; they ceaselessly bombed our positions, dropped napalm bombs to burn down the vegetation on the heights surrounding Dien Bien Phu, and bombed points that they thought were our artillery bases. Day and night they shelled our supply lines, dropped ‘blockbusters’ on the roads, showered them with delayed-action and "butterfly" anti-personnel bombs, in an endeavour to cut supply lines. These desperate efforts did not achieve the desired results. They could not check the flow of tens of thousands of voluntary carriers, packhorses and trucks bringing food and ammunition to the front. They could not stop us from carrying out our plan of encirclement, which was to hasten their doom.

The French and American generals then realised the danger of the destruction of the Dien Bien Phu entrenched camp. At one moment, the High Command of the French Expeditionary Corps thought of gathering its remaining forces for an attack on our rear and in the direction of Viet Bac, to cut our supply lines and force us to withdraw for lack of food and ammunition. But it could not carry out this plan. Moreover, it feared that a still more severe defeat could be the result of so foolhardy an action. At another time it intended to regroup the Dien Bien Phu garrison in several columns which would try to break through our encirclement and open at all costs a way towards Upper Laos. Finally, it had to give up this plan, too, and continue to defend it positions.

On May 1 began the third phase. From May 1st to May 6th, following several successive attacks we occupied hill C-1, hill A-1 which was the key of the last defensive system of the central sub-sector, and several other strong-points from the foot of the hills in the east to the Nam Rom river, and finally some positions in the west. The enemy were driven into a square kilometre, entirely exposed to our fire. There was no fortified height to protect them. The problem of supply became extremely grave. The situation was critical: the last hour of the entrenched camp had struck.

On the afternoon of May 7th from the east and the west, we launched a massive combined attack upon the headquarters at Moung Thanh. On several posts, the enemy hoisted the white flag and surrendered. At 5.30 p m we seized the headquarters: General de Castries and his staff were captured. Then the remaining forces at Dien Bien Phu surrendered. The prisoners of war were well treated by our troops.

The "Determined to Fight and Win" banner of our army fluttered high in the valley of Dien Bien Phu. That very night, we attacked the southern sub-sector. The whole garrison of more than 2,000 men was captured.

The historic Dien Bien Phu campaign ended in our complete victory. Our troops had fought with unprecedented heroism for 55 days and 55 nights.

During that time, our troops were very active in all theatres of operations in co-ordination with the main front.

In the enemy’s rear in the Red River delta, they destroyed on after another, a large number of positions and seriously threatened Road No 5.

In the Fifth Zone, they attacked Road No. 19 annihilated the mobile regiment No 100, liberated An Khe, penetrated deep into the region of Cheo Reo and threatened Pleiku and Banmethuot.

Our troops were also very active in Binh-Tri-Thien and in Nam Bo.

In Middle Laos, the Vietnamese and Pathet Lao units increased their activities on Road No 9 and advanced southward.

Our troops won victories on all fronts.

That is a broad outline of the military situation in winter 1953 and spring 1954. On all fronts, we put out of action 112,000 enemy troops and brought down or destroyed on the ground 177 planes.

At Dien Bien Phu, we put out of action 16,200 enemy troops, including the whole command of the entrenched camp, one general 16 colonels, 1,749 officers and non commissioned officers, brought down or destroyed on the ground 62 planes of all types, seized all the enemy’s armaments, ammunition and equipment, and more than 30,000 parachutes.

Those great victories of the Vietnam People’s Army and people at Dien Bien Phu and on the other fronts smashed to pieces the "Navarre plan" and foiled the attempts of the Franco-American imperialists to prolong and extend the war. Those great victories liberated the North of Vietnam, contributed to the success of the Geneva conference and the restoration of peace in Indochina on the basis of respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam and of the two friendly countries, Cambodia and Laos.

Those are glorious pages in the history of our People’s Army and our people. They illustrate the striking success of our Party in leading the movement for national liberation against the French imperialists and the American interventionists.