People's Democracy(Weekly Organ of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) |
Vol.
XXVII
No. 47 November 23, 2003 |
ECONOMIC NOTES
C P Chandrasekhar
FINANCE
minister Jaswant Singh sounds up beat. He predicts a glorious period of growth
for the Indian economy in the days ahead. To boot, he attributes this
self-predicted outcome to the NDA government, which is taking credit for
spurring an economic boom by managing everything from the monsoon to the
speculative appetite of foreign institutional investors. To support the
government’s case, the finance ministry has released a Mid-Year Economic
Review, which paints a hyped-up picture of an economy ostensibly on the roll,
and promises more if reforms are kept on track.
To
seasoned observers, the timing of the document’s release, besides its content,
establishes the real motives of its authors and their masters. The fiscal
responsibility and budget management act (FRBMA) enacted earlier this year
requires the government to place before parliament a quarterly report on
receipts and expenditures, as a means to monitor the government’s effort at
realising the inexplicable fiscal targets it has set for itself. The first of
these (relating to April-June) was placed before parliament on August 7.
So
it is indeed time for the second. But neither is the quarterly report meant to
be a major event in the government’s reporting calendar, nor is it expected to
be released to the public if the parliament is not in session, as is the case at
the moment. This lends credence to the view that it is not the FRBMA but the
impending elections in a number of states that have encouraged the government to
stick to the reporting calendar. Using the FRBMA’s mandate and the badly
formulated excuse that “a pathological report” cannot wait, the finance
ministry has chosen to contribute to the ruling coalition’s election effort by
rushing to the press with this document.
OPTIMISTIC
PROJECTIONS
There
is much the finance ministry has dredged up to crow about. GDP it claims will
grow by 7 per cent this financial year (2003-04) as compared with 4.4 per cent
in the previous year. Inflation which was a threat at the beginning of the
fiscal, having risen to 6.6 per cent in April, has since shown signs of decline
and is predicted to rule at just 4 per cent over the financial year. Mid-year
results reported by a number of leading corporates point to a year of higher
profits. Above all, India’s foreign exchange reserves have risen to by 17.2
billion dollar during April-October to a record 92.6 billion dollar, despite
outflows of 5.18 billion dollar on account of redemption of the Resurgent India
Bonds.
While
some of these figures may be more in the nature of optimistic projections, they
are more or less in line with what other agencies like the Reserve Bank of India
have put out in recent times. The hype lies in the interpretation that has been
put on them. They are being touted as evidence of a reform-led “take-off” of
the Indian economy.
However,
explanations for the current moderate upturn in the graph of economic
performance are not difficult to find. The year ending October 2003 is best
characterised as one of a transition from a drought-induced slump in the
principal commodity producing sectors of the economy to a situation of modest,
across-the-board revival. Agricultural marketing year 2002-03 saw a sharp
fall in kharif output from a 112 to 91 million tonnes and in rabi production
from 101 to 92 million tonnes. A poor monsoon during June-September 2002, when
rainfall was 19 per cent below normal, was obviously the principal explanatory
factor.
One
remarkable feature of this period, however, was that unlike in the past a
monsoon as poor as this, with its attendant effects on output, did not impact
too adversely on prices. The most immediate explanation for this was of course
the large grain stocks with the government that helped ensure that supply was
well in keeping with demand. These stocks, however, have been attributed by many
economists to an inadequacy of purchasing power resulting from an overall
deflationary environment during the latter half of the 1990s, when hopes of a
“new growth trajectory” promised by the reformers were belied It is in this
background that signs of a recovery in growth over the last year have been
received with some relief. But the recovery has been hesitant and far too slow
to realise the 8-9 per cent growth targeted by the planners. Though rainfall
figures point to a gradual end to the drought starting October 2002 and the fact
that the monsoon during June-September was extremely good, with excess rainfall
in more than 90 per cent of the subdivisions, the rise in agricultural
production has been restricted.
The revival in kharif production in 2003-04 by 20 per cent to a projected 108.5 million tonnes still keeps it below the level attained in the 2001-02 kharif season. Based on optimistic estimates of what the rabi crop would be, the Review expects foodgrains production in 2003-04 to surpass its previous high of 212 million tonnes achieved in 2001-02. But even that would not imply that the trend rate of growth over time would be significantly raised.
UNIMPRESSIVE
Further,
thus far the good monsoon has not provided much of a stimulus to industrial
growth. The most recent IIP figures suggest that industrial growth during
April-September was only 5.8 per cent and the manufacturing segment has recorded
a marginally higher 6.3 per cent growth. If yet, corporate earnings have been
buoyant, it is primarily because of the “other incomes” of corporates
possibly derived from their treasury operations.
Overall,
however, there is some evidence corroborating the assessment of a revival of
growth in recent months. The quarterly estimate of GDP (at factor cost) relating
to the first quarter of financial year 2003-04 released by the CSO suggests that
the quarterly growth which stood at 2.3 and 4.9 per cent respectively during
October-December 2002 and January to March 2003 rose to 10.5 per cent during
April-June 2003. While these figures are provisional, they do suggest that
monsoon-induced agricultural recovery, the modest industrial revival suggested
by the IIP must have combined with some dynamism in services to help GDP along.
The
government has, of course been arguing that there are pieces of indirect
evidence to suggest that industry too is turning buoyant. Growth in the capital
goods sector has picked up sharply. And much is being made of recent signs of
buoyancy in India’s imports. Despite trade liberalisation, India’s import
growth in recent years, especially of its non-oil imports, had been subdued,
largely as a result of the sluggishness of growth in the commodity producing
sectors. However, recently released figures indicate that India’s imports
during the first quarter of fiscal 2003-04 was at 17.3 billion dollar, the
highest in a decade. In fact since the third quarter (October –December) of
fiscal 202-03, imports have been growing at over 20 per cent relative to the
corresponding quarter of the previous years. Since such high and sustained
import growth rates were last seen in the mid-1990s, this revival in import
growth is being attributed to the revival the economy is witnessing.
As
a result of higher imports, the trade deficit has already touched 6 billion
dollar for the first five months of fiscal 2003-04 and the first quarter of that
fiscal year has seen a current account deficit of 1.2 billion dollar against a
4.1 billion dollar surplus for 2002-03. Under other circumstances this would
have been a cause for some worry. But the revival it is seen as signifying has
been received with some celebration as it is associated with three other signs
of ostensible “robustness” of the Indian economy.
QUESTIONABLE
INDICATORS
First,
was a sharp rise in the inflow of foreign institutional investor capital that
touched record levels and established India as a favourite among emerging
markets. Even by September 30 this year FII inflows at 3.09 billion dollar had
exceeded their previous full-year peak of 3.058 billion dollar recorded in 1996.
What is more the evidence suggests that inflows were accelerating with net
inflows in October exceeding 1 billion dollar, which is the highest for any
single month since Indian markets were opened to these investors.
Second,
was an unusual strengthening of the rupee, especially vis-à-vis the dollar,
leading to a situation where exporters and even the government have started
worrying about the adverse impact this would have on the competitiveness of
India’s exports and the size of the balance of trade deficit. Export growth in
dollar terms during April to September has fallen from 18.1 per cent in 2002 to
10 per cent in 2003. The recent surge in foreign capital flows into India, at a
time when India’s need for foreign exchange to finance its current account
deficit was minimal has obviously been responsible for this. In the more
liberalised foreign exchange management system introduced post-liberalisation,
wherein the availability or supply of foreign exchange relative to the demand
for the same has a role in determining the exchange rate, this has lead to an
appreciation of the value of the rupee relative to the currencies of its trading
partners. Between November 8, 2000 and October 10, 2003 the exchange rate of the
rupee rose from Rs 48.34 to 45.38 to the dollar. A sudden appreciation of the
rupee renders exports more expensive and imports cheaper. This could result in
sluggishness in export growth and an increased demand for imports, leading to a
widening of the balance of trade deficit, a process of domestic
deindustrialisation and a subsequent weakening of the currency that may be
difficult to halt because of a panic withdrawal by foreign portfolio investors.
Third,
to prevent such developments, the Reserve Bank of India has been forced to
purchase dollars from the market and adjust the imbalance between the demand and
supply for foreign exchange in order to reduce the
pace of appreciation of the rupee, even if not to reverse the process.
The consequence has been a massive acquisition of foreign currency by the
Reserve Bank of India, which resulted in the accumulation of record foreign
exchange reserves in excess of 90 billion dollar by mid-October 2003.
The
government’s “feel-good” propaganda blitz, reflected in the Mid-Year
Review, is driven more by these factors then the modest revival in the commodity
producing sectors. However, it should be clear that these signs of
“buoyancy” are double-edged in nature. While nationalist sentiment may be
buoyed by a stronger rupee and a large foreign reserve, indications are that
these financial successes have not translated themselves into real growth; that
India is finding it difficult to “absorb” the huge inflow of speculative
portfolio investment into the country; and that there is a danger of the
rupee’s appreciation having adverse balance of trade and growth effects.
All of these could result in international financial investors’ view of India
changing rapidly from being today’s favourite to tomorrow’s feared
destination. But such caution is hardly material to support a document seeking
to paint a pretty picture of the economy just prior to a series of elections.