People's Democracy(Weekly Organ of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) |
Vol.
XXVII
No. 31 August 3, 2003 |
THINKING
TOGETHER
Does
communism believe in religion? What is the Marxist understanding of religion?
---
Satish K Bagmar & others, Pune
The
vast majority of Indian people are religious. By opposing religion and
considering it as the "opium," how can the CPI(M) advance in the
country?
---
Mohanlal & others, Delhi
AS
stated earlier in this column, the CPI(M) does not impose any conditions of
being an atheist on anyone wishing to join the party. Religious faith is a
personal matter. It is a relationship of the atma
with a paramatma. But this choice of a paramatma
is purely that of the atma. An
individual may well choose to be an atheist. In this relationship between the atma
and the paramatma, no one can interfere, not even the paramatma. The choice of the individual is, hence, supreme.
This individual choice to choose his/her religious affiliation and faith
is a right enshrined in the Indian constitution and a right that the CPI(M) is
committed to uphold. Any attempt, however, to interfere, obstruct and spread
hatred against peoples belonging to different religious faiths constitutes a
direct infringement of this right. The CPI(M), therefore, respects the
individual's choice of a religious faith or that of being an atheistic or an
agnostic. This right cannot be misused by attacking or preventing the right of
the individual and his choice. In a secular country, the choice of the
individual is supreme and will be protected by the state.
There
is often a popular misconception regarding the Marxist understanding of
religion. The popular perception is the normally out-of-context quotation that
"religion is the opium of the people." In fact, the passage in which
this statement finds place is, deliberately, never quoted in the full. Marx had
stated: "Religious distress is at the same time the expression of real
distress and the protest against real distress. Religion is the sigh of the
oppressed creature, the heart of the heartless world, just as it is the spirit
of the spiritless situation. It is the opium of the people" (Introduction
to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, 1844).
Religion
is the opium in the sense that it is as potent as opium in creating an illusory
world. The intoxication of opium provides an illusory escape and relief for
people running away from daily toil and misery. At the same time, it cripples
the human being rendering him/her incapable of changing that very situation that
is responsible for the misery. As Marx said in a by now famously statement, the
moot point is to change the world. For a human being who is oppressed, religion
provides the escape for relief, it provides
a "heart in a heartless world, a spirit in a spiritless
situation." For this precise reason, it is the opium that lulls people into
inaction instead of changing their miserable conditions of existence that
appears outside of both their comprehension and control.
The
Marxist understanding of religion is essentially integrated with its entire
philosophic foundations. In pursuit of the simple question of what constitutes
the real freedom of a human being and his/her consequent liberation, Marx
proceeded to reject the Hegelian idea of the revolution of the mind as
represented by Feuerbach, during his time, to come to a conclusion of seminal
importance. That was: consciousness of a human being is determined by the social
conditions and not vice versa. "It is not the consciousness of men
that determines their being, but on the contrary their social being that
determines their consciousness" (Introduction to the Critique
of Political Economy, 1859).
It
is on the basis of such a fundamentally important conclusion that Marx says:
"the basis of irreligious criticism is: Man makes religion, religion does
not make man." In other words, like every other manifestation of human
consciousness in terms of thinking and the consequent intellectual practice,
religion also is the product of human social existence and not the reason or the
cause for the same.
Such
an understanding at once places religion not as a thing in itself, not as
something that exists by itself independent of the driving force of society in
history. In fact, precisely for this reason, Marxism does not lay blame for, e g
the persecution of Copernicus or that of Ekalavya, on religion alone. It regards
all these things as the natural manifestation of social forces and movements
expressing themselves in religious terms because religion
has been the dominant form of ideology through all recorded history.
Progressive and reactionary ideas, the vested interests of the ruling class or
the demands of an exploited class equally present themselves in the form of
religion in men's minds so long as religion is a dominant form of ideology.
Hence Marxism is able to take cognisance of the positive and progressive content
of religious reform movements, e g the Sufi and Bhakti movements, but at the
same time point out their limitations that they would not be able to effect the
desired change in society by remaining only within the limits of the religious
fold. Unless they are able to change the social conditions that find expression
for domination in a specific religious form, that particular form and associated
oppression cannot be removed. Thus, while recognising the positive content as
well as the limitations of religious reform movements, Marxism is able to place
the history of religion too within the realm of the evolution of human
civilisation and the corresponding human consciousness.
Hence
Marxism, when it imparts a scientific treatment to history, is able to see the
complex role religion played in great social struggles. The origins of
Christianity can be seen in the role of mass revolts that marked the decay of
the Roman empire. In the rise of Islam, Marx and Engels both drew attention to
the internal struggles between the Bedouins and the townspeople, the awakening
of Arabian national consciousness for the liberation of the Arabian peninsula
from the Abysanians and to recapture the long dormant trade routes. Similarly,
the Protestant reformation was seen as a reflection of the complex class
struggle taking place between the decaying feudal order and that of the rising
bourgeoisie. "The ineradicability of the Protestant heresy corresponds to
the invincibility of the rising bourgeoisie" (Engels,
Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, 1888).
For
Marx and Marxists, therefore, religion is a product of the social conditions in
which man existed and continues to exist. The history of religion, in one sense,
is also a reflection of the history of human evolution. Hence, religion is a
reflection of the real world and the creation of an illusory world. In so far as
human beings are unable to comprehend the forces of nature or of society that
appear to determine their day to day existence and guide their destinies, the
quest for creating an extra-terrestrial supernatural force arises. Religion,
therefore, provides for the human being a sense of comfort, beauty and solace
that he cannot find in the real life. At the same time, religion, also being the
dominant form of ideology, is an expression of ruling class domination at any
point of time.
For
this precise reason, having understood the genesis, origin and the continued
domination of religion on the human mind in a scientific manner, Marx and
Marxism alone stated with authority that the role of religion is contained and
determined by the state of social organisation in any society. And, for that
precise reason, Marxism does not attack religion per
se. Its attack is on the conditions that give rise to religion and the
conditions that perpetuate the hold of religion on the people. Marxism seeks to
radically alter the conditions that provide the basis and perpetuate religion as
an instrument of class oppression.
This, then, is the Marxist materialist understanding and appreciation of religion. Its humanist content and at the same time its utilisation as an instrument of class rule have to be understood in its totality.