People's Democracy(Weekly Organ of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) |
Vol.
XXVI
No. 39 October 06,2002 |
INDIA’S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
PUZZLE
C P Chandrashekar
INDIA’S
balance of payments position provides the principal source of comfort for
India’s policy makers. Large inflows of invisibles in 2001-02 ensured a small
current account surplus after many years, so that the large inflows of deposits,
debt and investment contributed, in the net, to an accumulation of reserves that
have in recent times touched a record level of $60 billion. While remittance,
debt and investment flows have played an important role here, there is one other
factor that has contributed to create these conditions. This is the fact that
barring the 2 years 1998-99 and 1999-2000, India’s trade deficit has been
close to or well below the levels it reached at the end of the 1980s.
Official
figures indicate that the trade deficit, which was close to $6000 million in
1990-91, came down substantially during the immediate post-reform years till
1993-94, rose subsequently to around $6500 million in 1997-98, shot up to $9170
million and $12,848 million in 1998-99 and 1999-2000, and then fell to the
$6000-6600 range in 2000-01 and 2001-02.
VARIATIONS
IN
DEFICIT
This
experience with the deficit during the 1990s can be broken up into four periods
of varying duration.
First,
during the years 1991-92 to 1995-96, both exports and imports grew at more or
less similar rates, so that the deficit remained low in most years and
fluctuated within the $1 billion to $5 billion range.
Second,
between 1995-96 and 1998-99, while imports continued to grow, exports stagnated,
resulting in a widening of the trade deficit to $9.1 billion by the end of that
period.
Third,
in 1999-00, while exports recovered, imports surged because of a rise in oil
prices, resulting in the widening of the trade deficit to $12.8 billion.
Finally,
in 2000-01 and 2001-02, while exports rose initially and then remained at that
level, imports stagnated and the trade deficit returned to the levels it had
touched in the mid-1990s.
DOWNTURN
IN
EXPORTS
One
feature of this experience is the sharp deceleration in export growth since
1995-96, despite the fact that the advocates of reform had argued that the
new policy regime would infuse dynamism into India’s historical record of
sluggish export growth.
While
over the six-year period 1989-90 to 1995-96 exports rose by 91 per cent, the
increase over the subsequent six years ending in 2001-02 was only 38 per cent.
Further,
besides some expansion in earnings from exports of software and IT-enabled
services, the structure of India’s exports has not changed very much. Clearly,
the dynamism that was expected on the export front in the wake of reform has not
been realised. This implies that whatever "gains" have been registered
on the trade front has been on account of the containment of imports, which is
indeed puzzling given the expected consequences of import liberalisation.
WHY
THIS
BEHAVIOUR?
Resolving
this puzzle requires a closer look at the performance of different categories of
imports. It is known that movements in oil imports, which are influenced by oil
prices, have substantially influenced the size and direction of India’s
overall import bill. From an examination of movements in India’s non-oil trade
balance, the picture that emerges is indeed remarkable:
During
the period 1990-91 to 2000-01, in all years excepting one (1998-99), India’s
non-oil trade has either been in balance or reflected a surplus of exports over
imports. Further, a rise in exports in 2000-01 and a fall in imports had taken
that surplus to $7.8 billion. This is remarkable because, barring a couple of
years, India’s export growth has not been creditable.
On
the other hand, import liberalisation, involving the removal of quantitative
restrictions and reductions in tariffs, was expected to result in a surge in
non-oil imports. It is clearly because such a surge has not occurred that
India’s trade deficit has been contained in most years when oil prices were
not ruling high.
However,
the evidence tracing the category-wise movements in imports, suggests that it
may be premature to arrive at such a judgement. Movements have been quite varied
in the principal categories of imports (oil, non-oil bulk, export-related and
other imports). While oil imports have fluctuated quite significantly, as is to
be expected, and rose to relatively high levels in 1996-97 and 1999-00 to
2000-01, export related imports have shown a low but consistent rate of increase
since 1994-95. Non-oil bulk imports on the other hand have stagnated till the
mid-1990s, risen by a small amount during 1995-97 and stagnated once again
thereafter.
The
really striking feature of the experience is the increase in "other
imports" between 1991-92 and 1998-99, after which they have stagnated. We
must note here that the segment of imports most affected by liberalisation was
the large category of "other imports", which includes most
manufactured imports directed towards production for or direct sale in the
domestic market. The share of that category, which stood at 40 per cent in
1990-91, rose to 47 per cent in 1995-96 and 52 per cent in 1998-99, before
falling to 43 per cent in 2000-01.
The
point to note is that this increase was not of a magnitude adequate to undermine
the gains in terms of import containment registered in other areas. If we look
at the shares of different categories of imports in the total, it is clear that
while the share of oil imports has fluctuated significantly, rising sharply in
periods when the trade deficit has widened, the share of export related imports
has varied within a small range and stagnated over time, and that of non-oil
bulk imports has declined. This has meant that the rise in the share of other
imports did not result in a worsening of the trade deficit to an unsustainable
extent.
ROLE
OF CAPITAL
GOODS
IMPORTS
One
reason why the other imports category did not rise even further as a result of
the liberalisation was the fact that capital goods imports which rose from $4.2
billion in 1991-92 to $10.3 billion in 1995-96, stagnated thereafter,
fluctuating between $9 and $10 billion till 1998-99. This was the period when
after a short-term boom between 1993-94 and 1995-96, Indian industry registered
a deceleration in its rate of expansion. That this deceleration would have
affected capital goods imports through its impact on investment is partly
corroborated by the fact that after 1998-99, when industry began its slide into
near-recessionary conditions, capital goods imports fell below $9 million in
1999-00 touching $8.8 billion in 2000-01. Since capital goods constitute an
important component of other imports, though its share fell from 60.4 per cent
in 1995-96 to 40.4 per cent in 2000-01, this trend would have substantially
influenced movements in the ‘other imports’ category.
Has
any fact other than sluggish demand played a role in influencing the demand for
imported capital goods? There is reason to believe that prices have played a
role as well. Over a 13-year period starting from 1980-81, the unit value and
quantum indices of imports of Machinery and Transport Equipment maintained a
consistent rise. However, in 1994-95, the unit value index, representing the
price of capital goods, dropped significantly, only to rise sharply over the
next four years till 1998-99, and fall marginally thereafter.
PRICE
& QUANTITY
CHANGES
These
price movements have been partly neutralised by changes in the quantity of
imports. The quantum index of imports of Machinery and Transport Equipment shot
up in 1994-95 and then fell sharply till 1997-98, before stabilising at that
level over the next three years. The explanation of this could be more complex.
One consequence of liberalisation has been an increase in the production of a
range of "new" import-intensive manufactures based on component
imports by production facilities that carry out assembly or penultimate stage
production activities. A crucial requirement for these units is the adequate
availability of imported intermediates and components to meet demands for the
final product. Thus it is not merely an increase in demand for the final product
that triggers an increase in imports, but expectations of any increase in
demand, since firms should be in a position to ensure delivery in short periods
of time and not be strapped by delays created by import procurement.
This
would imply that in periods of rising demand, firms would accumulate inventories
of imported components and intermediates. Given the fact that components and
spares for capital are included in the "capital goods" category in
import data, periods of such accumulation of inventories would also be periods
in which the imports of "capital goods" would register an increase.
The years 1994-95 to 1996-97 were years when as a result of the release of the
pent-up demand for import-intensive manufactured goods, there was a
"min-boom" in industry, which would have resulted in a sharp increase
in capital goods in the forms of components of various kinds. In fact,
qualitative evidence suggests that there was not just such an increase, but that
the expectations created by the mini-boom resulted in the excess accumulation of
such inventories, which firms were hard put to reduce once the market created by
a pre-existing pent-up demand was exhausted. Thus the quantum indices of capital
goods, which point to a sharp increase in imports in 1994-95, reflect in all
probability this tendency rather than the effects of a decline in prices. It is
also not surprising, therefore, that once inventories were accumulated and
demand for the final good tapered off, such imports fell sharply and stabilised
at a low level. The recession rather than price has finally put restraints on
the run-away increase in imports of ‘capital goods’.
That
this could be a valid explanation is suggested by the experience with Chemicals,
where both unit value indices and prices have risen for most years during the
1990s. While the experience in 1989-90, 1995-96 and 2000-01 suggests that the
import demand for chemicals is indeed price sensitive, price changes are hardly
the explanation for trends in imports, which must come from the demand side.
Import
prices could, however, have had an effect on import trends in other commodities,
which do not share these characteristics of capital goods or chemical imports.
One such group of commodities is Food and Food Articles. The unit value index of
Food and Food Articles rose significantly between 1990-91 and 1994-95, fell
sharply thereafter till 1999-00 and rose in 2000-01. The quantum of imports on
the other hand, fluctuated around a stagnant trend during the first of these
periods, rose sharply between 1995-96 and 1998-99 and has fallen quite
significantly over the next two years. It appears that imports rose only when
prices were low and fell in response to price increases. The reason why the
price factor has been so important here is that "sticky" imports,
which occur irrespective of the price level, are no more a major component of
food imports.
These
"sticky" imports are primarily those made by official agencies to
counter domestic shortages and the inflation they engender. Two factors have
contributed to a decline in the share of such imports.
First,
a combination of consecutive normal or good monsoons and a slow growth in demand
that has substantially eased the availability of many food items, especially
foodgrains, reducing the need for imports to meet shortfalls.
Second,
the fact that import liberalisation has contributed to the dampening of upward
movements in domestic food prices over the long run, reducing the need for
anti-inflationary imports.
To
sum up, despite liberalisation and the stagnation or slow growth of India’s
exports since the mid-1990s, India’s balance of trade deficit has not worsened
because of the sluggishness of aggregate import growth in years when oil prices
have been subdued. Two factors seem to have combined to deliver this result.
First, the price responsiveness of imported food and food articles and the
decline in bulk imports of food articles aimed at controlling domestic price
inflation, both of which keep the import bill on this account under control.
Second, the sluggishness in the economy in general and the industrial sector in
particular after 1995-96, which has resulted in a tapering off and even decline
in the demand for a range of manufactured intermediates. This has meant that the
trade deficit tends to widen significantly only when oil prices rise, since the
demand for oil and oil products is substantially price inelastic.
Thus
there appear to be only two circumstances that can lead to a substantial rise in
the import bill. First, a recovery and sustained growth in industrial
production. And second, a sharp rise in oil prices. If either of these occurs,
the trade deficit is bound to widen, unless India is able to make the
breakthrough in world markets that the liberalisation was expected to deliver
and has not. In the meanwhile, a contained deficit, combined with large inflows
of remittances, deposits, debt and investment have created a situation where
India’s foreign exchange reserves have increased substantially to touch the
record levels at which they stand at present.