People's Democracy

AFTER Surjeet introduced the Draft Political Organisational (Polorg) Report in the morning session on March 22, the evening session on March 22 and the morning session on March 23 were fully devoted to an indepth discussion of the report. As many as 42 delegates from various states took part in the discussion.

Replying to the discussion on the Polorg report, general secretary Surjeet commended the delegates for the high level of discussion and their mature political consciousness that the discussion reflected. An important feature of the healthy discussion was that no delegate voiced any fundamental disagreement with the general tenor of the Polorg report; whatever amendments and suggestions the delegates put forward were in fact for strengthening the report. Surjeet said though the amendments received from the congress delegates could not be circulated, they would be taken into account.

Replying to certain points about the Perspective Tactical Line of 1951, Surjeet again narrated in brief the circumstance in which the document was adopted. He said the basic formulations of the Policy Statement, like the one about the anti-imperialist stage of revolution, came into conflict with the existing reality very soon after it was adopted. The Central Committee of the party did discuss the Tactical Line in 1976, during Emergency, when half of the party leadership was underground. This meeting of the Central Committee did sort out some of the problems, but certain other problems did remain even after that. When the 14th congress of the party resolved to update the party programme, the idea of updating the Policy Statement also came up. However, it was realised that this would not be a fruitful exercise. The CPI(M) general secretary said the question of tactics relates to the day to day activities of the party, and we have to adopt flexible tactics to meet the requirements of the changing situation. In such a situation there is no immediate need to decide the issue. The first thing is to try to become a force to be reckoned with; only then would we discuss what tactical line we need to have in order to effect a revolution. In the end, Surjeet urged the delegates to close the chapter for the time being, and the congress did accede to his request.

There was a query about the Polorg report’s contention that "Some states should be identified as priority states and the party should concentrate its efforts on these states. In the states, priority districts/areas should be selected to concentrate work." One of the delegates wanted to know in what way was this contention different from the concept of "contiguous areas" that was found in the party’s 1967 document titled Tasks on the Kisan Front and was given up in 1979. In reply Surjeet clarified that the Polorg report’s contention could not be equated with the contiguous areas approach that was connected with the Perspective Tactical Line. In fact, identifying priority states/districts/areas does not mean that we cannot develop the organisation simultaneously in other states/districts/areas.

The question of forming united fronts or entering alliances with bourgeois-landlord parties was one of the most keenly debated topics at the 17th party congress. Regarding the united front tactic, Surjeet said there was no question of giving up the tactic itself. There is nothing wrong with the basic idea behind the united front tactic which is meant to meet the immediate situation as well as to gain access to the masses following the other bourgeois-landlord parties and to bring them into action. But the way we have been implementing this tactic has not enabled us to make any gains out of it. In Assam, for example, we did not join the AGP government, yet we were equated with the government and blamed for all its wrong-doings. We lost our independent position and our demarcation, and our mass base suffered erosion. Moreover, because of our weak position in the state, Mohanta felt no problem in cheating us and going over to the BJP. Similar things happened in Bihar, Tamilnadu, Andhra Pradesh and some other states. Surjeet said the Polorg report has pinpointed the drawbacks in the way we have implemented this tactic in the last two-odd decades. This must be thoroughly studied in order to properly and correctly implement the united front tactic and gain from it.

Replying to the points raised about why the party has failed to substantially grow in states other than the three strong states, Surjeet clarified that there were also certain objective factors behind it. One of the most important factors was the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the consequent change of the bipolar world into a unipolar one. The fact is that the USSR was a mighty source of inspiration for a large number of people, and its disintegration was bound to have adverse effects on all of us. As we know, many communist parties lost their moorings after the USSR’s disintegration, even gave up Marxism-Leninism and collapsed. It is not that we escaped totally unaffected. But, still, we did withstand the tragedy and the subsequent bourgeois-imperialist propaganda offensive, and that is no small achievement.

There are also other causes for the party’s stagnation. The continuing hold of the feudal and semi-feudal ideologies on the people’s minds, more so in the vast Hindi belt, is one of the important reasons. But the experiences of Andhra Pradesh and Tamilnadu show that if we take up the social issues and launch social reform campaigns in a vigorous way, it will certainly help us break the present stagnation. The Hindi belt has also witnessed the growth of casteism and communalism, apart from criminalisation of politics, in the last one and a half decades. The situation is fundamentally different in comparison to the 1950s, for instance, when we had comparatively strong bases in Bihar and, to an extent, UP. We then used to have 6 or 7 MPs from Bihar and 3 or 4 from UP. But today we cannot win a Lok Sabha seat here on our own. Yet Surjeet was confident, and he particularly stressed this point, that all these problems may be overcome by launching land struggles in this vast area, conducting vigorous reform campaigns, and running ideological campaigns not only to educate our own cadres and sympathisers but also to counter the influence of the alien ideologies.

In fact, Surjeet said, conducting ideological struggles is absolutely important for us because there can be no advance whatsoever unless our cadres and the masses at large are equipped with a conviction about the efficacy of our ideology for their liberation. There is also the need to raise the political consciousness of the party cadres so that they are able to face any twists and turns in the situation.

Another important point the CPI(M) general secretary noted was the need of launching mass actions on whatever issues our comrades come across. Releasing local level initiative is a vital necessity today. Our comrades must take up the burning issues facing the people, rouse them, and draw them into the orbit of struggle. But they must also strive to register some achievement, which has a great educative value and leaves an impression even on the people who are at present not involved in our agitations.

Thus, Surjeet concluded, an ongoing rectification campaign to purge the party of the vices that have crept into our ranks, constant ideological education of our cadres and ideological struggle against the class enemies’ ideologies, and constant, incessant mass actions on the people’s issues --- these are the most vital necessities of today.

The CPI(M) general secretary winded up his reply by categorically rejecting the need of another plenum on organisation. (This was one of the suggestions made by a few delegates.) Surjeet said all the weak areas of the party’s functioning have already been identified. The most important thing is to make an honest self-criticism about where and why we have failed to implement the guidelines given by the Salkia plenum and the subsequent party congresses. The Polit Bureau and Central Committee have to take a major share of responsibility in this regard. The whole party will have to rise to the occasion, Surjeet summed up.

Following the reply to the discussion by the party general secretary, the Political-Organisational Report was adopted by the party congress with one vote in opposition and one abstention.