"FOOD security is not food in the godowns, but dollars in the pocket." So had pontificated the then agriculture secretary of India’s union government when trade liberalisation policies were introduced in the country in 1991.

The possibility of increasing our agricultural exports was dangled before us as a major lure for accepting the "free trade" disciplines of the WTO. However, ever since Indian agriculture was subjected to liberalisation, the value of our agricultural exports in hard cash has actually declined, instead of increasing as was predicted by the proponents of "free trade."

Taking the concrete figures, the share of agricultural exports in India’s total exports declined from 17.96 per cent in 1996-97 to 15.93 per cent in 1997-98 and further down to 14.57 per cent in 1998-99. Trade liberalisation in this period has thus led to a reduction in this share, rather than to an increase.

In this context, it is worthwhile to examine the experience of wheat exports in these years and see what we have gained on this count.

According to the statistics of foreign trade of India, issued by the ministry of commerce every month, India exported 2.5 lakh tonnes of wheat during 1987-88, followed by an import of 18 lakh tonnes in 1988-89. Then, 6.6 lakh tonnes were exported during 1991-92, followed by 13.6 lakh tonnes in 1992-93, 10 lakh tonnes in 1995-96 and 18 lakh tonnes in 1996-97. Then it had to go in for an import of 15 lakh tonnes of wheat during 1997-98.

One can of course say that there is nothing wrong in exporting the produce when there is surplus production and in going in for import when the production is below normal. But, then, one has also to see what the country had to pay for these exports and imports. According to the government’s own data, exporting wheat in one year and importing it in the following year cost the country Rs 1062 per tonne during 1988-89, Rs 3013 during 1992-93 and Rs 854 per tonne during 1996-97. The difference between export and import prices worked out to be Rs 588 of 1997-98. In percentage terms, the price paid for wheat import following the export in the year 1987-88, 1991-92, 1995-96 and 1996-97 exceeded the international prices by about 80, 138, 15 and 10 per cent respectively.

Another disquieting aspect of India’s wheat export is its impact on the domestic prices. The increase in the wholesale price of wheat over a nine month period, between a farm harvest period and the subsequent pre-harvest period, was 36 per cent in 1990-91 and 1991-92, and was 35 per cent in 1996-97. These results indicate what strong inflationary pressures the wheat exports must have exerted on the domestic prices. At the same time, the peasants did not benefit whatsoever from this increase, as the price of wheat during the harvesting period was kept as low as possible.

The experience of the recent wheat export, in a bid to dispose of the excess stocks with the government, is all the more depressing. As against an economic cost of Rs 8300 per tonne to the Food Corporation of India and an open market price of Rs 7000 per tonne, India was offered a price of Rs 4300 per tonne in international market in May 2001. Not only that, this price is much below the issue price at which the people "above poverty line" (APL) could purchase wheat from the public distribution system. This exposes the government’s desire to subsidise the foreign consumers and not the Indian people.

This experience of wheat export all these years clearly shows where the policy of "gaining dollars in the pocket to import whatever we want" leads us to. It has led to a drain of money from the Indian people to the grain trade multinationals and also to the big wholesale traders in the country.

What this experience actually shows is that the policy has benefited only a handful of multinational companies who control the entire grain trade in the world. Some of these multinationals are the Cargill, Continental, Con. Agra, Louis Dreyfus, Bunge, Carnac, Mitsui, Cook and Archer, Deniels Midland, etc.

In fact, it is these grain trade giants who are the architects as well as the beneficiaries of the globalisation of agriculture. It is they who control agriculture and food production from seed to table. It is because of their control that the international price of wheat or any other agricultural commodity remains no longer based on its supply and demand, but is determined by the interests and profit motives of these multinationals.

This bitter experience is not confined to wheat only but extends to all other agricultural commodities. Interestingly, it was because of this experience that our industries and commerce minister --- the same person who signed an agreement with the United States of America about the removal of all quantitative restrictions --- had to recently describe the rich nations as "Shylocks not sparing even the last pound of flesh" (The Economic Times, New Delhi, June 30).

The lesson is clear --- the experience of grain export and import during the last ten years shows in practice that the government will have to reverse its policy in this regard. Hence the million-dollar question: Is the NDA regime prepared for such a change?