People's Democracy(Weekly Organ of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) |
Vol. XXXV
No.
19 May 08, 2011 |
Labour Market
Flexibility
Prabhat
Patnaik
ONE of the
most persistent
demands of the advocates of neo-liberalism in
There is, of
course, no
empirical evidence for this claim, a fact that even the more astute
among the neo-liberal
advocates of labour market flexibility will concede. And, in any case,
in an
economy like ours where the unionised work force which alone is capable
of
putting up any resistance to hire-and-fire-at-will is a minuscule
proportion of
the total work-force, there is presumably de
facto labour market flexibility anyway, so that the meagerness of
employment growth cannot possibly be attributed to the absence of
labour market
flexibility. Nonetheless the advocates argue that there are strong theoretical reasons to believe that the
introduction of labour market flexibility will improve employment
growth.
The basic
argument they
advance is quite simple. When an employer takes on a worker, if he or
she is
constrained to keep the worker on the pay-roll even in the event of a
drop in
demand in the future, then the adverse effect of such a drop on profits
will be
even greater than if the worker could be sacked under such
circumstances. This
means that the risk to the employer from taking on a worker, other
things
remaining the same, is higher in a regime of no-freedom-to-fire than in
a
regime of freedom-to-fire. This higher risk acts to the detriment of
employment
growth in several ways.
First, in a
regime of
no-freedom-to-fire, investment itself will be lower, other things
remaining the
same, than in a regime of freedom-to-fire. This is because the returns
net of
risk from any particular project will be lower in the former regime,
owing to
its higher risk, than in the latter; hence more projects will be
unattractive
from the capitalists’ point of view in the former regime compared to
the latter,
resulting in lower investment and, consequently, lower employment.
What is more,
since the
risk to the employers will be particularly greater in the former regime
from
the adoption of more employment-intensive techniques of production, the
bias
against such techniques will be particularly pronounced. Or looking at
the
matter differently, in a regime where employers have the absolute right
to fire
workers at will, not only will investment be higher, for any particular
technique of production, but there will also be a bias towards more
employment-intensive
techniques of production, compared to a regime where they have no such
right.
Both these factors constrain the rate of growth of employment.
LOGICAL
FLAW
Even at this
level of
argumentation, however there are two obvious problems with the above
claim.
First, this whole supposition that there is a multiplicity of
techniques for
producing a “given good” is a bit of a chimera. If a modern steel plant
is to
be built then there is a particular technology for doing so and there
is not
much scope for varying the employment-intensity within that technology;
on the
other hand it is true that backyard steel can be produced with a far
higher
employment-intensity than in a modern steel plant, but then for the
purposes
for which steel is typically required in the economy the outputs of the
two
cannot be deemed to be the “same”. So, this entire assumption of
employment-intensities
being different for the production of the “same good” is a bit of a red
herring. A “good”, strictly defined, has only one particular technique
of
producing it at any particular time. In an economy, given its pattern
of income
distribution, certain types of goods are demanded, and they are
typically
produced with certain fixed techniques (or even when there is a
multiplicity of
techniques for producing a “good”, the
employment-intensities do not vary much among them); labour market
flexibility as such makes little difference to the choice of techniques.
Secondly, the
introduction
of labour market flexibility necessarily entails a weakening of the
bargaining
position of workers; it necessarily entails a death-blow to all forms
of
workers’ organisations like trade unions, since anyone attempting to
organise
the workers will be sacked forthwith. This in turn necessarily entails
a
reduction in the share of wages in the net output of the economy. And
since a
rupee paid out as wages creates more demand than a rupee that accrues
as profit
(of which a larger proportion is saved), such a shift in income
distribution
against workers, quite apart from being regressive in itself, results
in a
constriction of the domestic market, with
an adverse effect upon employment for this reason. Besides, as
suggested
above, since goods demanded by workers typically tend to be produced by
more
employment-intensive methods, the generation of employment is
constricted for
this additional reason too in a regime of labour market flexibility.
It follows
then that even
if we accept the neo-liberal argument that when the employers lack the
absolute
freedom to fire workers, the level of investment is likely to be lower
for this
reason than it would have been if this freedom was available to them,
we still
have to offset against this the consequences of a regressive income
distribution while evaluating the overall impact of such employers’
freedom on
employment. And when we do so it is more than likely that the adverse
effect
upon employment of a regressive income distribution will outweigh the
claimed
positive effect: indeed we can see in front of our eyes how
distributional
shifts against the working population, which have accompanied India’s
high GDP
growth, have led to a change in the pattern of demand, and hence in the
structure of output, that has been inimical to the growth of employment.
But let us
take the logic
of the neo-liberal argument itself, deliberately abstracting from these
other
powerful factors that offset in practice whatever validity it might
have. There is a basic logical flaw in the
neo-liberal argument itself. When it talks about risk-reduction for
employers in a regime of free hire-and-fire, it makes the
implicit assumption that the workers work with the same skill,
dedication and intensity no matter what regime they are in. And
this is
patently untrue.
Indeed,
ironically, it was
common not very long ago to find explanations for Japan’s economic
success-story, advanced by such reputed economists as Michio Morishima
and
accepted quite widely, which emphasised its practice of
“lifetime-employment”
and treatment of workers as if they belonged to a family represented by
the
corporation. Whether or not this explanation was a valid one for the
so-called
Japanese “miracle”, it recognised at least the importance of the issue
of
workers’ motivation in the process of capitalist production. The labour market flexibility argument does
not recognize the issue of workers’ motivation at all.
TREATING
WORKERS
AS
OBJECTS
If it did,
then it should
be talking not just of the one kind of risk it actually talks about,
namely the
risk to employers’ profit in the event of a drop in demand; it should
also be
talking of another kind of risk, namely the risk to profits from
workers’ alienation
and disgruntlement, from destructive wild-cat strikes, from anarchic
angry acts
of dismissed workers who are thrown to penury and distress. It should
then be
looking at the desirability of labour market flexibility by comparing
at least the
relative weights of the two kinds of risks.
But it does
not do so. It
does not in other words reckon with the issue of workers’ motivation at
all. And
the reason that the labour market flexibility argument does not reckon
with the
issue of workers’ motivation is
because it believes that fear alone will be enough to make them work;
their motivations are irrelevant. The threat
of the “sack” and the perennial existence of an army of the unemployed
into
whose ranks the “sack” confines you, is enough to make you work to your
full
capacity. The question of eliciting work from you through providing
appropriate
motivations does not arise. With this fear-instilling mechanism in
place, it sees
workers as potentially reducible to
inhuman objects appended to machines and no different from machines.
This
reduction of the
worker to the level of an object, as Marx had famously argued, is both
the
premise and the objective of capitalism. The beating down of the
subjectivity
of the workers, the process of reducing them to the status of
proletarians
where they are forced to abandon whatever freedom they had in their
earlier
occupations for a “mess of pottage”, the conversion of the human being
into an
appendage of the machine: this is what capitalism is all about.
Neo-liberalism,
with its insistence upon labour market flexibility, is nothing else but
a
reassertion of this elemental drive of capitalism.
The fact that
neo-liberalism, which is the latest stage of capitalism, insists upon
it, shows
the vacuity of all talk of a “humane capitalism”, of “capitalism with a
human
face”, or of a capitalism that can at the same time provide scope for
“freedom”
and “creativity” to the workers. It reveals the fundamental spontaneity
of the
system that invariably seeks to set aside all interference with its
elemental
tendencies.
At the same
time however
it also shows the necessarily transient character of the system. The
premise of
capitalism that workers can be reduced to the status of objects no
different
from the means of production, has been as unrealisable throughout the
history
of the system as it has been persistently adhered to. Against the
persistent
attempt of capitalism to reduce workers to the status of objects,
workers have
as persistently asserted their subjectivity by forming “combinations”,
keeping
“combinations” alive through their sacrifices, and moving on to the
terrain of
political struggles.
The
introduction of labour
market flexibility, premised upon the presumption that workers are no
different
from objects, is an attempt at the same time to realise this
presumption. This
presumption however is fundamentally unrealisable, which indeed is why
capitalism is necessarily transient: it is premised upon and seeks to
realise
in practice something that is essentially unrealisable. The struggle
against
labour market flexibility must be total and uncompromising, for if it
is not,
then the struggle will be there anyway but it is likely to take chaotic
and painful
forms.